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ABSTRACT
ii
Abstract
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems provide the security
analysts with a huge amount of alerts. Managing and analyzing such tremendous
number of alerts is a challenging task for the security administrator. Alert correla-
tion has been designed in order to alleviate this problem. Current alert correlation
techniques provide the security administrator with a better description of the de-
tected attack and a more concise view of the generated alerts. That way, it usually
reduces the volume of alerts in order to support the administrator in tackling the
amount of generated alerts. Unfortunately, none of these techniques consider neither
the knowledge about the attacker’s behavior nor the enforcement functionalities and
the defense perimeter of the protected network (Firewalls, Proxies, Intrusion Detec-
tion Systems, etc). It is still challenging to first improve the knowledge about the
attacker and second to identify the policy enforcement mechanisms that are capable
to process generated alerts.
Several authors have proposed different alert correlation methods and techniques.
Although these approaches support the administrator in processing the huge num-
ber of generated alerts, they remain limited since these solutions do not provide us
with more information about the attackers’ behavior and the defender’s capability
in reacting to detected attacks.
In this dissertation, we propose two novel alert correlation approaches. The first ap-
proach, which we call honeypot-based alert correlation, is based on the use of know-
ledge about attackers collected through honeypots. The second approach, which
we call enforcement-based alert correlation, is based on a policy enforcement and
defender capabilities’ model.
iii
RESUME
iv
Résumé
Les SIEMs (systèmes pour la Sécurité de l’Information et la Gestion des Evénements)
sont les cœurs des centres opérationnels de la sécurité. Ils corrèlent un nombre im-
portant d’événements en provenance de différents capteurs (anti-virus, pare-feux,
systèmes de détection d’intrusion, etc), et offrent des vues synthétiques pour la ges-
tion des menaces ainsi que des rapports de sécurité. La gestion et l’analyse de ce
grand nombre d’alertes est une tâche difficile pour l’administrateur de sécurité. La
corrélation d’alertes a été conçue afin de remédier à ce problème.
Des solutions de corrélation ont été développées pour obtenir une vue plus concise des
alertes générées et une meilleure description de l’attaque détectée. Elles permettent
de réduire considérablement le volume des alertes remontées afin de soutenir l’admi-
nistrateur dans le traitement de ce grand nombre d’alertes. Malheureusement, ces
techniques ne prennent pas en compte les connaissances sur le comportement de
l’attaquant, les fonctionnalités de l’application et le périmètre de défense du réseau
supervisé (pare-feu, serveurs mandataires, Systèmes de détection d’intrusions, etc).
Dans cette thèse, nous proposons deux nouvelles approches de corrélation d’alertes.
La première approche que nous appelons corrélation d’alertes basée sur les pots de
miel utilise des connaissances sur les attaquants recueillies par le biais des pots de
miel. La deuxième approche de corrélation est basée sur une modélisation des points
d’application de politique de sécurité.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Security issues are becoming increasingly severe to organizations. Thus, it isvital to apply appropriate security measures in order to protect both users and
organizations. Security mechanisms are deployed in a network in order to prevent
attacks and to react to them when detected. In the literature, multiple security
mechanisms have been designed to meet the needs of information systems security.
These needs can be summarized by security properties such as availability, authen-
tication, confidentiality, integrity and privacy.
The main impact of cyber attacks is financial. According to a joint study performed
by Microsoft Digital Crimes Unit (DCU) and National University of Singapore [1],
organizations spend around 500 billion US dollars dealing with security issues and
data breaches due to malware. Indeed, this economic aspect represents one of at-
tackers motivations. However, many other motivations exist, in particular accessing
confidential data and stealing bank accounts.
In recent decades, attackers have developed techniques and exploits that are in-
creasingly sophisticated and complex. This makes both of intrusion detection and
reaction difficult. In addition, considering the existing limitations of these systems
(intrusion detection and reaction), the role of the security administrator is becoming
more and more challenging.
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems have been developed
to assist the security administrator in achieving his role. SIEM combines two distinct
aspects: Security Information Management (SIM) and Security Event Management
(SEM) [2]. It focuses on:
• logs collection and normalization;
• events analysis and correlation;
• events aggregation and reporting.
1
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Integrity 
Security 
Figure 1.1 - Core principles of computer security: Conﬁdentiality,
Integrity, Availability (C, I, A).
Tarala [3] shows that SIEM systems are able to provide the data required by
organizations in order to maintain and improve their security policy.
We now review basic deﬁnitions related to computer security (Section 1.1). Then,
in Section 1.2, we give the problem statement, objective and contributions of this
dissertation. Finally, the dissertation road-map is detailed in Section 1.3.
1.1 Basic Deﬁnitions
Research on alert correlation is a domain where many diﬀerent related domains such
as intrusion detection, intrusion response decision, security policy enforcement, are
combined. For a better understanding, a consistent terminology is used along this
dissertation. In this section, the basic deﬁnitions are given, most of them have been
taken from [4]. The rest of the deﬁnitions can be found in the glossary of terms of
this dissertation.
Information security is the protection of information and its critical elements based
on three key factors: Conﬁdentiality, Integrity and Availability (C, I, A) (Figure
1.1), as deﬁned by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) [5] :
• Conﬁdentiality (C): it protects the data against unauthorized disclosure.
Only authorized users are allowed to access the information;
• Integrity (I): it ensures the accuracy and the consistency of the data during
its entire life-cycle. It also prevents from unauthorized modiﬁcations that can
be brought to the information;
• Availability (A): it ensures the authorized access to the data when this latter
is needed.
2
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Figure 1.2 - Security properties as represented by the McCumber’s
cube. Source: [6]. This cube contains three blocks: the first block
corresponds to the critical information characteristics (C, I, A), the
second block corresponds to the information states, and the third
block corresponds to the security measures.
Although this core factor of IT security (C, I, A) is still considered as a sine-qua-
none for computer security, it is closely related to the protection of information.
Due to the rapid growth of IT infrastructures and networks, researchers extended
these principles in order to handle contemporary security requirements.
In [6], the author includes additional properties to the (C, I, A) principles. The
proposed model in [6] is known as the McCumber’s Cube which is shown in Figure
1.2. The McCumber’s cube extends the (C, I, A) properties (block in the cube
shown in Figure 1.2) with two blocks: i) information states (transmission, storage
and processing) and ii) security measures (technology, policy and practices, and
education, training and awareness). The McCumber’s cube is proposed in order to
adapt computer security to the evolution of technology, networks and attacks.
In information security, a threat is a circumstance or event with the potential to
adversely impact organizational operations (e.g., mission, function and reputation),
as well as organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and even the Nation
through unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of information,
and/or denial of service.
A vulnerability is a weakness in one (or more) of the following: information systems,
system security procedures, internal controls and software implementation. It can
be exploited by attackers.
A risk is the level of impact on organizational operations, assets, or individuals
resulting from tampering with the operation of the information system. The notion
of risk covers two aspects: the potential impact of a threat and the likelihood of
such threat occurring.
An attack is the instance or the realization of a potential threat. An attack is defined
as:
3
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• an attempt to gain unauthorized access to system services, resources, informa-
tion, or;
• an attempt to compromise the integrity of a system.
In an organization, identifying threats is usually based on discovering systems’ vul-
nerabilities. Discovered vulnerabilities are generally referred by the MITRE organi-
zation 1. It defines the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) dictionary, 2,
known as CVE-IDs. CVEs are common identifiers for publicly known information-
security vulnerabilities in publicly released software packages. In addition, known
vulnerabilities are also collected in the Open Source Vulnerability Database (OS-
VDB) 3. OSVDB is an independent and open sourced web-based vulnerability which
provides in-depth information about technical security information and vulnerabili-
ties.
In addition to threats associated to system’s vulnerabilities, threats can be associ-
ated with external and physical weaknesses of the information system. For instance,
keeping critical servers in an insecure environment is a potential threat which can
be exploited in order to have direct access to the server.
To mitigate the effects of a given attack, one needs to implement security measures
that are known as Countermeasures. Countermeasures are security actions required
to:
• oppose an attack by eliminating or preventing it [4];
• minimize the harm caused by the attack.
In this dissertation, we assume that the implementation of a countermeasure always
results into an update of the security policy’s implementation. A Security Policy,
as defined in [7], defines and constrains the activities of a data processing facility in
order to maintain the security of systems and data. Security policies are enforced by
Policy Enforcement Points (PEP). A PEP is a logical entity that enforces policies
for admission control and decisions in response to a request from a user seeking to
access a resource or a service on a computer or a network server. For instance, the
"Authentication, Authorization, Accounting" (AAA) protocol, [8], is implemented
by PEPs such as access control systems (radius servers, network firewalls, application
firewalls, etc).
1MITRE, http://www.mitre.org/
2Common Vulnerability Exposure: CVE, http://www.cve.mitre.org/
3Open Source Vulnerability Database: OSVDB, http://www.osvdb.org/
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1.2 Problem Statement, Objectives and Contribu-
tions
This dissertation proposes two different alert correlation approaches allowing a more
precise diagnosis of SIEM alerts.
The first approach, called "honeypot-based alert correlation", is based on
improving the content of these alerts by exploiting the knowledge about the at-
tackers. This knowledge can be gathered using specific attack learning techniques
which are the honeypots. Since honeypots are capable to interact with attackers,
they expose the attacker capabilities and behavior. In addition, honeypots allow
reassessment of vulnerabilities by providing information about attacks’ impact.
The second approach, called "enforcement-based alert correlation", is
based on the knowledge about policy enforcement capabilities deployed in the infor-
mation system. This knowledge includes information about the defender capabilities
which is deployed in the network to be protected from attacks.
In [9], Chapter 3, the author states: "One who knows the enemy and knows him-
self will not be endangered in a hundred engagements. One who does not know the
enemy but knows himself will sometimes be victorious. Sometimes meet with defeat.
One who knows neither the enemy nor himself will invariably be defeated in every
engagement."
Following this citation, the two proposed approaches are complementary, in the
sense that the security administrator is able to improve network security by enhanc-
ing his knowledge about:
• the attackers: information about the attacker includes details about his behav-
ior and the attack vectors and exploits. This information is convenient for the
security administrator to rank the importance of threats exploited by attackers;
• the defender: information about the defender include details about his capa-
bilities in enforcing the security policy of the supervised information system.
This information is convenient in order to identify the capacity of the defender
to mitigate attacks and limit their impacts.
Problem statement :
Current Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems process a
huge amount of security events without having a better knowledge neither about
the attacker nor the defender capabilities.
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Thesis statement:
Attack impact’s evaluation and efficient response decision support could
significantly benefit from a better knowledge about the attacker and the
intrusion response capabilities deployed in the network. Improving our knowl-
edge about the attacker allows a better understanding of alerts and then a
more efficient alert correlation. Identifying the policy enforcement capabilities -
deployed in the network - contributes to apply efficient response decision support.
In order to tackle this problem and validate the thesis statement, the objectives
of this dissertation can be defined as follows:
• Objective 1 : designing and experimenting a novel alert correlation methodol-
ogy which benefits from information collected by honeypots;
• Objective 2 : proposing an Alert Correlation methodology based on the pro-
posed PEP’s Responsibility Domain;
• Objective 3 : applying the proposed enforcement-based alert correlation ap-
proach on a real case study.
Contributions: The proposed alert correlation approaches developed in this dis-
sertation rely on existing data provided by both honeypots and the configurations
of deployed PEPs.
In our "honeypot-based alert correlation" proposed approach, we study the appli-
cation of attackers’ information provided by honeypots in order to correlate alerts.
Moreover, since information about attackers is not generally sufficient to improve
response decision, we propose an "enforcement-based alert correlation" approach
which is based on the policy enforcement capabilities deployed in the network.
The contributions on this dissertation are detailed as follows:
• Identification of appropriate data that can be provided by honeypots and that
can improve our knowledge about generated alerts (Objective 1);
• Design of an alert enrichment process which properly improves the information
raised in generated alerts and enhances alert correlation (Objective 1);
• Identification of honeypot limitations in improving information about alerts
and enhancing alert correlation (Objective 1);
• Design of a PEP model which illustrates the role of a PEP in an intrusion
response decision process. Our model is based on the proposed notion of Re-
sponsibility Domain of a PEP (Objective 2);
• Development of an enforcement-based alert correlation approach based on the
notion of responsibility domain of PEP (Objective 2) and the analysis of its
application on the security patterns commonly used in security architecture
6
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(Objective 3).
1.3 Dissertation road-map
This dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 - Computer Security, Intrusion Detection and Response
Decision: a State Of the Art describes the state of the art in intrusion de-
tection and response as well as alert representation, honeypot techniques and alert
correlation. From the identified limitations of intrusion detection and alert correla-
tion techniques, we propose two alert correlation approaches as introduced above:
honeypot-based alert correlation and enforcement-based alert correlation.
Chapter 3 - Alert Correlation based on honeypots introduces the us-
ability of honeypot datasets in order to improve information about generated alerts.
In this chapter, we detail our honeypot-based alert correlation. We demonstrate
how honeypots can be deployed in order to improve our knowledge about generated
alerts. We then propose an alert enrichment process based on honeypot datasets.
We detail our experimental results and discuss the different limitations related to
the application of honeypots in our proposed alert correlation. Chapter 3 fulfils to
Objective 1.
Chapter 4 - PEP Model formalizes the proposed PEP model. In this chapter,
we show how responsibility domain of a PEP can be approximated. We also propose
five approximation methods that can be applied in alert correlation. We evaluate
these approximations and analyse their impact on alert correlation. Chapter 4 con-
tributes to Objective 2
Chapter 5 - Enforcement-based alert correlation framework defines our
proposed enforcement-based alert correlation approach. We investigate the appli-
cation of the proposed PEP model in correlating alerts. Chapter 5 contributes to
Objective 2
Chapter 6 - Applications and interpretations shows two use cases on single
and multiple PEP environment and demonstrates the applicability of our model in
real scenarios. Chapter 6 fulfils Objective 3
Chapter 7 - Conclusions and Perspectives concludes the dissertation with
a summary of contributions and presents the perspectives for future work.
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2.1 Introduction
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems repre-sent today an essential tool to meet the security requirements of complex
networks. It supports security administrators in identifying, understanding and
reacting to intrusions. Moreover, it contributes to maintaining and enforcing the
security policy of the network. Thus, a SIEM strongly depends on Intrusion De-
tection Systems (IDS), Intrusion Response Systems (IRS) and Policy Enforcement
Points (PEP).
In this chapter, we review the most important areas of security research that are
related to our proposed approaches. In Section 2.2, we first give an overview of
computer security policy and policy enforcement. Then, Section 2.3 and Section 2.4
describe the different intrusion detection techniques: from traditional IDS to recent
honeypot tools. Section 2.5 details the Intrusion Detection and Message Exchange
Format (IDMEF) which allows a standard representation of security events and
alerts generated by IDS and other security probes. In Section 2.6, we review exist-
ing alert correlation approaches. Finally, in Section 2.7, we briefly define Intrusion
Response Systems.
2.2 Computer security policy and policy enforce-
ment
2.2.1 Computer security policy
Implementing a security service and service arrangement can be complex [10]. The
security services defined in Section 1.1 are characterized by their costs and risks.
There must be a trade-off between the security services and the organization’s secu-
rity objective. An organization deploys security services depending on the near-term
costs and the long-term risks related to the system vulnerabilities and their evolu-
tion. The decision maker in this context should study the impact and risk of each
potential threat and decide about the security policy to be deployed.
Therefore, the security administrator, when defining a security policy, should be
aware of several parameters and constraints. One of the most important constraints
are the funding allocated to deploy the security policy, the technical and archi-
tectural obstacles, the organizational and personnel issues, etc. The ISO 27001
standard [7] specifies the requirements for establishing, implementing, maintaining
10
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Figure 2.1 - PDCA: Security policy life-cycle, source [7]. It repre-
sents the four steps (represented by colored circles) of the security
life cycle that are: Plan (orange circle), Do (blue circle), Check (red
circle) and Act (green circle).
and continually improving an information security management system within the
context of the organization. It also includes requirements for the assessment and
treatment of information security risks tailored to the needs of the organization.
Thus, it formally specifies the design of an Information Security Management Sys-
tem (ISMS). It defines the most critical steps of the security policy life-cycle which
are summarized in the so-called PDCA model shown in Figure 2.1. The PDCA
model defines how information security requirements and expectations are processed
in order to carry out managed information security. PDCA stands for:
• Plan (P): In this step, the security objectives are identified in accordance with
the organization overall policies and objectives. The plan step is depicted by
the orange circle in Figure 2.1;
• Do (D): the security policy is implemented in this step following the previously
defined objectives. The do step is depicted by the blue circle in Figure 2.1;
• Check (C): it is important to continuously control the conformity of the imple-
mented security policy with the organization’s security objectives. In this step,
the ISMS is audited and assessed. The check step is depicted by the red circle
in Figure 2.1;
• Act (A): this step includes both of the corrective and the preventive actions
based on the results of the check step. The objective of the act action is to
continuously preserve the security of the organization. The act step is depicted
by the green circle in Figure 2.1.
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In practice, the PDCA life cycle is established through the deployment of different
techniques and mechanisms, known in general as policy enforcement.
2.2.2 Policy enforcement
Policy enforcement is the application of access control mechanisms. It fulfils the
security policy objectives along its life-cycle as detailed in Figure 2.1. In particular,
check and act actions ensure the security policy enforcement through setting up and
updating configurations on Policy Enforcement Points (PEP).
The deployment of modern information systems and networks is strongly associ-
ated with Access Control technologies that are located at critical points of the net-
work. Access control technologies are usually provided by Policy Enforcement Points
(PEP). The term of PEP was introduced in [11] as an entity that performs access
control by making decisions requests and enforcing authorization decisions made
by the Policy Decision Point (PDP). Referring to the latest version of [11], a PEP
comes in many forms. It can be part of a remote-access gateway, part of a web
server or email user-agent, etc.
In [12], the PEP is defined as the most security critical component, which protects
the resources and enforces the PDP’s decision. Generally, the PDP and the PEP
are combined to control access and enforce the security policy. According to [13],
PEPs are defined as modules which reside on the managed devices and are respon-
sible for installing and enforcing the Security Policy. "the Policy Decision Points
(PDPs) process Access Control policies, along with other data such as network state
information, and take policy decisions regarding what policies should be enforced and
how this will happen. These policies are sent as configuration data to the appropri-
ate Policy Enforcement Points (PEPs), which reside on the managed devices and
are responsible for installing and enforcing them". In [14], authors define a PEP as
a network entity which is responsible of controlling the traversal of packets across
network segments.
In [15], authors specifies that the logical level integration allows the enforcement of
policies through a PEP (Policy Enforcement Point). Usually, in applications where
multiple architecture is layered, the PEP is located between the presentation layer
and the logical layer, intercepting the application requests, using the controls, and
in case the application requests is authorized, it can be executed.
As defined in Section 1.1, the PEP can be either a dedicated product (e.g., fire-
walls, intrusion detection systems), or embedded modules (e.g., patch modules, use
of vlans) in larger products or systems.
Since policy enforcement is usually distributed along the different communication
layer of the system, we categorize the PEPs based on the communication layer on
which it is able to enforce decisions:
• Network-level PEP: iptable, checkpoint, fortinet, snort;
• Application-level PEP: ModSecurity, anti viruses;
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Figure 2.2 - Basic intrusion detection system architecture, source
[19]. It represents the main components of an IDS that are: a sensor,
an analyzer, a response module, and a repository
• Information-level PEP: MySQL (security mechanisms of SQL language);
• Identity Access Control PEP: LDAP.
The deployment of these PEPs enforces the security of the supervised system along
its different communication layer. PEPs are deployed in a cooperative way in order
to satisfy the security policy objectives.
2.3 Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
2.3.1 IDS Definition
Authors in [16] and [17] are the first researchers who tackled the problem of intrusion
detection. They defined the foundations of intrusion detection systems. Intrusion
detection has a critical role to preserve and control the safety of the organization.
In the literature, we may find different intrusion detection definition. Definition
given in [18] is the most suitable one where IDS is defined as the process of moni-
toring the events occurring in a computer system or network and analyzing them for
signs of intrusions, defined as attempts to compromise the confidentiality, integrity,
availability, or to bypass the security mechanisms of a computer or network. Figure
2.2 represents a generic architecture of intrusion detection systems. It is composed
of: a sensor, an analyzer, a response module, and a repository [19]. Once the sensor
have collected recorded events from applications, systems and networks being mon-
itored, it sends events to the analyzer and to the repository. The analyzer is then
responsible of qualifying these events (malicious or not malicious). Consequently, it
13
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Figure 2.3 - Intrusion Detection taxonomy, source [24]. The cate-
gorization depends on the detection method, behavior on detection,
detection paradigm, usage frequency.
sends information about detected attacks to the Response Module which is in charge
of reporting this received information mainly alerts to the human operators.
An IDS can be either centralized or distributed. The former supposes that all mon-
itoring, detection and reporting is controlled directly from a central location. The
latter consists in using an agent-based approach for monitoring and detection, so
the response decisions are made at the point of analysis.
Henceforth, the main goals of these systems are to identify, preferably in real time,
unauthorized use, misuse, and abuse of computer systems by both internal and ex-
ternal accesses. These automated systems are used in blending with the traditional
mechanisms of security to yield better security for computer systems. In fact, it can
be placed into the control points of the network, for example close to the router, or
outside and/or inside the firewall.
2.3.2 IDS Taxonomy
Along years, researchers has been continuously developing new detection techniques
and methods. There is a number of existing literature that survey IDS or propose
taxonomies [17,20–32]. In [24], authors reviews the existing IDS techniques. Figure
2.3 shows the proposed IDS taxonomy as it is proposed in [24]. The classification
of intrusion detection system may be conditioned by the mechanisms of detection
used (detection method), the behavior on detection, the nature of the analyzed
information (audit source location), and the different operational modes where it is
ran (usage frequency):
• Behaviour on detection: According to the kind of the intrusion, the IDS per-
forms the appropriate detection methods. For more details about these types,
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the interested reader would refer to [17] and [24]. In [24], authors specifies two
types of IDSs. The first type is the passive IDSs which only generate alerts
when detecting unexpected behavior. These systems do not contribute on at-
tack mitigation since they do not interleave with these activities. The second
type is the active IDSs which make possible countering ongoing attacks. Active
IDSs are capable to act on the detected threat.
• Audit source location: it refers to where an IDS look for intrusive behavior.
Three categories are discerned: host based, network based, and application
based.
• Application-based IDS refers specific applications, using application’s trans-
action logs as main sources of data. It monitors the interaction between
user and application, which is not afforded by the other two categories of
IDS. Moreover, this system allows the targeting of finer grained activities
on the system.
• Host based IDS monitors and process activities related to a software en-
vironment associated with a specific host. It looks also at the communi-
cations traffic in and out of a single computer.
• Network-based IDS monitors the entire network environment. It uses audit
trails of multiple hosts and network traffic as main sources of data to
identify the intrusion signatures. It performs local analysis of the traffic,
via the use of a set of single-purpose sensors placed at various points of
the network, then reports attacks to a central management console.
• Detection method: there are two well known approaches of intrusion detection:
misuse detection and anomaly detection. In [33], Chapter 2, authors review the
existing detection approaches. Hereafter, we detail the most commonly used
detection approaches:
• Misuse detection: is based on signatures of known attacks. It analyzes sys-
tem activity and audit data stream, looking for events or sets of events that
match predefined pattern of events. It relies on a database of attack sig-
nature knowledge. Therefore, IDSs using misuse detection are not capable
to detect zero-day attacks for which the signatures are not yet published.
Moreover, they do not take into account environmental characteristics of
the supervised network.
• Anomaly detection: is based on normal activity profile of a system (e.g.,
CPU usage, job execution time, system calls, etc). Any action that signifi-
cantly deviates from the normal behavior is considered intrusive. Depend-
ing on the type of the analysis approach, various processing techniques are
employed for analyzing data to perform the detection of harmful events as
described in [34]. Several anomaly detection approaches has been proposed
in the literature such as [24, 35–37]. In contrast to the misuse detection
IDS, anomaly detection IDS are capable to detect zero-day attack. But,
they require a definition of the legitimate system behavior. This latter
15
CHAPT 2. COMPUTER SECURITY, IDS AND IRS: A STATE OF THE ART
changes over time and makes the anomaly detection IDS obsolete.
2.3.3 IDS Issues
Although IDS provides us with several advantages to enforce existing security mech-
anisms, researchers in the field on intrusion detection has been continuously working
on alleviating limitations of IDSs [38]. In fact, IDSs presents distinct drawbacks re-
lated to their detection techniques, attack knowledge, alerts reporting format, etc.
One of the most critical IDSs limitations are the alert representation format, false
positive rate, huge number of generated raw alerts, etc. Moreover, IDSs usually
require frequent updates of their attack knowledge and detection techniques aiming
at detecting new attacks and thus decreasing false negative. Thus, the deployment
of an IDS, its configuration and its maintenance represents a costly and time con-
suming task. Hereafter, we detail the aforementioned drawbacks:
Alerts Representation
In [39–42], authors highlight one of the major drawbacks of developed IDSs which
is their reporting format. Both commercial (e.g. Corero 1) and non-commercial
(e.g. Snort 2) IDS solutions use different reporting formats. In general, each IDS
solution use its proper alerting format. Heterogeneity of generated alerts format
makes challenging cooperation between IDSs. Tenable network security 3 reviews
the different alerts and logs representation. It proposes 7 types of logs: Application
Execution logs, Authentication logs, DNS logs and Passive Monitoring, Firewall
logs, Network Intrusion Detection logs, Netflow and Network Monitoring logs and
web server logs.
In order to efficiently analyze attacks, IDSs interoperability becomes a requirement.
To alleviate this issue, alert normalization has been proposed by several researcher
in the context of alert correlation. These works will be detailed in Section 2.6.
The standard Intrusion Detection Message and Excheange Format (IDMEF) has
been proposed by Intrusion Detection Exchange Format Working Group (IDWG) in
IETF. We detail IDMEF in Section 2.5.
False Positives
Every IDS, independent of its detection technique, generates false positive and false
negative alerts. False negative corresponds to non detected attacks and then to
1Corero: First Line of Defense, www.corero.com
2Snort, www.snort.org
3Log Correlation Engine: Best Practices,
http://www.tenable.com/whitepapers/log-correlation-engine-best-practices
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non generated alerts. However, false positive corresponds to non malicious behavior
reported as malicious. Unless false negative is much more critical for a vendor of
IDSs, false positive are more serious from a user’s point of view, [43]. In fact, an
important number of false positive can hide real attacks and then makes the response
decision faulty. For instance, due to false positive, a legitimate user can be blocked
and then the service will no longer be available for him.
In [43–47], authors examine the causes of false positive and how can be reduced.
In [43, 45], authors presents a study on statistical analysis of false positive and
false negative from real traffic with IDSs. They propose techniques to identify false
positive. They demonstrated that around 90% of false positive are using HTTP and
are due to IDS’s policy and not security issue. In [46], the notion of Usual False
Positive was proposed in order to reduce false positive in an IDS. In the literature,
several false positive reduction approaches has been developed such as [47]. The
existing approaches are based on data mining and artificial intelligence techniques,
fuzzy logic, machine learning, etc.
In our work, false positive reduction will not be addressed. As a consequence, our
work will come on the top of these false positive techniques.
Duplicated Alerts
Duplicated alerts are an IDS issue similar to the false positive in the sense that they
overwhelm the security operator when analyzing alerts. Multiplied alerts are due
to the limited visibility of the IDS throughout the environment and its contextual
parameters. For instance, IDSs do not generally aggregate same alerts related to
a same attack. In [48], authors explain the multiplied alerts by the fact that IDS
do not take into account the context of the attack. They point out that an attack
can cause multiplied alerts over a period of time and they propose a method which
is able to eliminate duplicate alerts. In [49], authors proposes an alert aggregation
technique based on a dynamic and probabilistic model of the current attack. A
meta-alert model was proposed. They proved how their developed approach is able
to achieve a reduction rate of up to 99,6%.
Information about Attacks
Another IDS issue which has been pointed in [48] is the semantic of information
provided by IDS in generated alerts. Usually, IDS alerts includes low level of in-
formation. These events often lack precise and concise information [50]. This fact
prevent the security operator from obtaining a consistent view of the ongoing at-
tacks. In order to tackle such issue, alert enrichment techniques has been proposed.
In [51], authors exposes the issues of alert’s data quality in processing generated
alerts. They propose an Intrusion Alert Quality Framework (IAQF) which is re-
sponsible of enriching alerts with quality criteria such as correctness, accuracy, reli-
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ability, etc. Unless this work attempts to enrich alerts, it was not able to complete
knowledge about detected attack. Such knowledge can be gathered from honeypots.
Honeypots techniques are detailed hereafter in section 2.4.
Moreover, in order to tackle this issue in particular and IDS issues in general, Se-
curity Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems has been developed. It
constitutes the central platform of modern security operating centres. They gather
events from various sensors (intrusion detection systems, anti-virus, firewalls, etc.),
correlate these events, and deliver synthetic views for threat handling and security
reporting.
2.4 Honeypot
2.4.1 Honeypot Definition
Discovering and analysing attacker behavior allows better protecting the supervised
network and choosing appropriate response decisions. Therefore, honeypots are
valuable solution that has been designed to gather and analyze information about
attackers.
In [52], the author gives a classical definition of honeypots which affirm that a hon-
eypot is an information system resource whose value lies in unauthorized or illicit
use of that resource. In [53] and [54], a honeypot consists in an environment where
vulnerabilities have been deliberately introduced in order to observe attacks and
intrusions and to facilitate in-depth analysis of attackers strategies. It provides its
operators with intelligence about threats and network exploits. In recent years, hon-
eypots are proved to be a relevant mean for collecting and analyzing information
about attackers behavior. In [55], authors demonstrate how honeypots enable the
security administrator to understand the attackers, their techniques, tactics, inten-
tions, and motivations. Honeypots are non-production systems. In fact, they do not
belong to any user in the network and do not impact publicly available services.
Honeypots sensors interact with attackers in different ways, classified according to
three types of interaction level as listed in [52,56].
2.4.2 Low-interaction Honeypot
It emulates the presence of different network services on a host rather than a com-
plete system. In general, low-interaction honeypots are based on simple system pro-
cesses and services. It allows monitoring attack attempts. Unless low-interaction
honeypot are useful to detect new attack attempts, they are not capable to emulate
more complex environment. HoneyD is an example of low-interaction honeypot [57].
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2.4.3 Medium-interaction Honeypot
It is a more sophisticated honeypot than low-interaction one but it is still not em-
ulating a complete operating system like high-interaction honeypots. It emulated
a collection of services and more complex operations. Thus, the attacker has more
attack entry points. Nepenthens, [58] is an example of medium-interaction honey-
pots that deploys honeypot modules. It offers a large-scale malware collection. A
recent evolution of medium-interaction honeypot research field is proposed in [59]
and integrates different tools such as ScriptGen [60], Argos [61] and Nepenthes [58].
In [59], authors propose a distributed system of honeypots in order to gather more
details about attacker’s activity against several victim machines and networks.
2.4.4 High-interaction Honeypot
Unlike low-interaction honeypot and medium-interaction honeypot, a high-interaction
honeypot emulates a complete real system. It usually runs a full implementation
of an Operating System and installed applications. It is able to ensure a real envi-
ronment with which the attacker will interact. This technique gathers more details
about the modus-operandi of attackers by allowing a high interactivity level with
the attacker. It allows discovering the attacker behavior in order to gain root access
in a machine. Capture C [62] is an example of high-interaction honeypot. Argos [61]
and Minos [63] and are also other examples of high-level interaction honeypots.
2.4.5 Discussion
Honeypots are still being an active research topic because of their deployment dif-
ferences and techniques. In Table 2.1, we summarize the pros and cons of these
honeypot technologies (in the second and the third column on the table) and we
give examples of each category (in the fourth column) and more details about the
information collected by them (in the last column).
A common drawback of honeypots is that their field of view is limited and they only
gather attacker’s activity which interacts with them.
In [64], authors demonstrate how honeypot databases offer significant data to study
malware propagation and to get a deeper understanding of their evolution. In this
dissertation, we explore such information about the attacker behavior collected by
selected honeypots.
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Table 2.1 - Honeypot interaction levels. These levels that are low-
interaction, high-interaction and medium-interaction are represented
in the raw of the table.
Interaction
level Advantages Disadvantages Examples
Collected In-
formation
Low-
interaction
honeypot
- simple
implementa-
tion
- easy to
use and
maintain
- low risk of
penetration
- emulate specific
services
- lower interaction
performance
- no real interaction
- limited scope of at-
tacker’s activity
- detection of known
attacks
- detectable by ad-
vanced attackers
- capture only activ-
ity that directly in-
teract with them
Specter
[65], Hon-
eyD [57]
- limited to the
level of emula-
tion
- time and date
of the attack
- protocol
- source and des-
tination IP ad-
dress
- source and des-
tination ports
High-
interaction
honeypot
- full imple-
mentation of
an Operat-
ing System
- real inter-
action with
attacker
- complex implemen-
tation and maintain-
ing
- time-consuming to
design
- increased risk
- capture only activ-
ity that directly in-
teract with them
Honeynet
[66], Ar-
gos [61],
Minos [63]
- information
about the
attacker’s be-
haviour
- possible infor-
mation about
zero-day attacks
Medium-
interaction
honeypot
- simulated
services are
more com-
plicated
- low risk of
penetration
- better
interaction
performance
- do not emulate a
complete real Oper-
ating System
- capture only activ-
ity that directly in-
teract with them
nepenthes
[58], mw-
collect [67],
honey-
trap [68],
SGNET
[59]
- information
about more
complex attacks
such as bot-
nets, multi-step
attacks, etc.
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2.5 Representation of Alerts: Intrusion Detection
and Message Exchange Format (IDMEF)
Independently from the intrusion detection techniques described above, the afore-
mentioned IDSs generate alerts using different logging format. For instance, for the
same suspicious behavior, two IDSs generate two different alerts with the same mean-
ing. This alert format heterogeneity avoid automatic cooperation between IDSs as
explained above. The proposed Intrusion Detection and Message Exchange Format
(IDMEF) [69] aims at alleviating this problem. Its main purpose is to define date
formats and exchange procedures for sharing information of interest to intrusion
detection and response systems and to the management systems that may need to
interact with them. In [70] authors specifies the requirements for IDMEF and also
for a communication protocol for communicating IDMEF.
IDMEF ensures both of syntactic and semantic interoperability between IDSs. Syn-
tactic interoperability means that a data generated by two different systems is syn-
tactically analysed with the same manner. Semantic interoperability ensures getting
the same meaning of a same data generated by different systems. IDMEF uses DTD
XML format in order to represent alerts and uses an object-oriented representation.
We detail in Figure 2.4 the alert model as defined in IDMEF.
As depicted in Figure 2.4, IDMEF message is the top-level class of the IDMEF data
model. It is composed of two sub-classes: Alert and Heartbeat. Alert class includes
information about the detected event by an analyzer. It is essentially composed of 9
main classes. Hereafter, we detail the most significant classes used within the Alert
class.
Analyzer : This component analyzes the collected data by sensors in order to de-
tect suspicious activity. Usually, the analyzer and the sensor are included in
the same component in existing IDSs. In the alert class, the analyzer field in-
cludes information about this component such as its name, version, Operating
System (OS) type, etc;
DetectTime : The time when the attack is detected;
Source : It contains information about the possible sources generating the alert.
It is represented in Figure 2.4 by black written term. It is composed of four
main sub-classes: Node, User, Process and Services;
Target : It contains information about the possible target that are exploited by
the detected attack. It is represented in Figure 2.4 with the same form as
Source class. Target class is composed of different sub-classes and it reuses
the sub-classes of Source class with additional other sub-classes detailed in [69];
Classification : This class provides the name of the alert which usually depends
on the deployed IDS product. It includes a reference associated to the alert.
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The reference is an information which points to an external documentation
detailing the alert.
Assessment : This class informs the security administrator about the analyzer’s
assessment of the event. For instance, it provides the impact of the detected
attack, its confidence level, actions that should be taken in order to respond
to the attack, etc.
IDMEF-Message 
Heartbeat Alert 
Analyzer 
CreateTime 
Analyzer 
CreateTime 
AdditionalData DetectTime 
AnalyzerTime 
Target 
Source 
Node 
User 
Process 
Service 
Classification 
Assessment 
AdditionalData 
Figure 2.4 - IDMEF Alert model. It is composed of two major
classes that are the alert class and the heartbeat class. The alert
class includes information about the detected attack. The heartbeat
class indicates information about the current analyzer’s status to
managers
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2.6 Alert Correlation
2.6.1 Alert Correlation Definition
In practice, IDSs are deployed in a distributed manner. Each single IDS has a
limited scope in terms of capabilities and coverage. In fact, an intrusion detection
sensor is not able to observe total information about an ongoing attack. This results
in two issues:
• high number of generated alerts because of the multiple deployed IDSs. In
addition, IDSs generate multiple alerts associated to the same root-cause. This
issue prevents the administrator to prioritize the most critical alerts.
• generated alerts include partial information about the ongoing attacks. This
issue makes more challenging the enforcement policy decision in order to fill
security policy objectives.
Alert correlation has been designed in order alleviate these IDSs issues. To satisfy
this aim, it usually verifies the relationships that may exist between alerts following
a correlation criteria. Alert correlation approaches have also been developed to im-
prove the accuracy of alerts and attack understanding [71].
In the literature, we may find different correlation techniques. Hereafter, in para-
graph 2.6.2, we categorize these techniques following our proposed taxonomy.
2.6.2 Alert Correlation Taxonomy
In [72], we review different Alert Correlation approaches. The main categories
of Alert Correlation techniques are similarity-based, knowledge-based which is di-
vided into scenario-based and rule-based approaches, and model-based correlation
approaches.
2.6.2.1 Similarity-based Alert Correlation
This technique aims at clustering alerts which have the closest similarity values
between alert attributes. Most considered attributes are source and destination IP
address and ports as well as timestamp. Distance-based function and probabilistic
function, as proposed in [73], are computed to evaluate similarities between alerts.
The goal of this technique is to group alerts with high similarity in a new meta-
alert. Thus, similarity-based techniques are able to correlated alerts while ignoring
the attack type.
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Discussion
Such correlation approaches cannot entirely satisfy the security administrator’s needs
in responding to detected attacks. While they are useful to cluster similar alerts,
they are not useful to neither evaluate to causality links between alerts nor provide
information about alerts’ root-cause. First, they do not provide additional informa-
tion about the attacker. Second, they do not take into account information about
the supervised network.
2.6.2.2 Knowledge-based Alert Correlation
Knowledge-based alert correlation is based on a priori knowledge on malicious ac-
tivities and attacks scenarios and exploits. It requires not only expertise rules and
heuristics to correlate heterogeneous alerts but also a consistent information related
to alerts. We distinguish between two main sub-categories of knowledge-based tech-
niques:
2.6.2.2.1 Rule-based Alert Correlation Known as prerequisites and conse-
quences, this technique is designed to correlate alerts following their causality rela-
tionships. It is a specific technique that serves for scenario-based alert correlation.
But, it does not require a prior knowledge of attack scenarios. Rule-based alert cor-
relation approaches take advantage of the JIGSAW attack description language [74]
to model the conditions of an attack to occur and its steps.
These latter are constructed once the attack conditions are satisfied. Hence, if some
alerts are missed, the attack steps reconstruction remains incomplete. This limita-
tion was addressed by the MIRADOR correlation method which does not require
full satisfaction of all attack conditions, [75].
Discussion Rule-based alert correlation approaches explore the causality links
between generated alerts. Therefore, the security administrator can adjust the re-
sponse decision based on detected causality links. He also has the possibility to
process rule-based correlated alerts more efficiently. In fact, it is possible to react to
these correlated alerts based on the discovered intrusion objective. However, such
correlation approaches do not refer to extra knowledge about defense capabilities
deployed in the supervised system.
2.6.2.2.2 Scenario-based Alert Correlation A single alert reflects often to
an elementary step of an attack scenario. Consequently, various attack scenario tem-
plates are required to correlate those alerts. Modelling language such as LAMBDA
(Language to Model a Database for Detection of Attacks), [76] and AdeLe (Attack
Description Language) have been used for attack scenarios specification. In [76],
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authors define a formal attack description language called LAMBDA. Respecting
LAMBDA language, an attack is characterized by its pre-conditions (pre) and post-
conditions (post). Pre-conditions are the conditions satisfied by the computer sys-
tem and which make the attack feasible. Post-conditions are the consequences of
the successful execution of the attack. Using LAMBDA formalism, it is possible
to discover ongoing attack scenarios. In fact, an attack scenario is a succession of
elementary attacks which aim to achieve an intrusion objective. Two elementary at-
tacks att1 and att2 belong to the same scenario if post(att1) = pre(att2). post(att1)
and pre(att2) are respectively the post-conditions and pre-conditions of att1 and
att2. Similar to [76], in [77], authors propose to correlate alerts based on deduction
rules.
Furthermore, attack scenarios recognition techniques were developed like statistical
Granger Causality Test, chronicles formalism and other machine learning techniques
to enlarge the set of scenarios.
Discussion Within scenario-based alert correlation, alerts are correlated based on
predefined scenarios. Thus, such correlation approaches are based on a priori knowl-
edge about the attacker’s behavior. Using techniques such as honeypots is a key fact
in order to enhance these correlation techniques. In fact, as we explained in Section
2.4, attacker’s behavior can be gathered through honeypots. Moreover, scenarios
are predefined independent from the supervised system. Thus, such approach may
not support the administrator in defining adequate intrusion response decision.
These aforementioned alert correlation techniques are essentially based on the in-
formation contained in the alert itself and on static databases including informa-
tion about vulnerabilities such as the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure CVE
database, National Vulnerability Database, Open Source Vulnerability Database,
etc.
2.6.2.3 Model-based Alert Correlation
This approach aims at supporting alert correlation at analysing security alerts with
a view on the relevant context. M2D2, [78], was the first attempt to offer a formal
representation of sensor capabilities in order to decide whether an alert was false
positive or not. This was enhanced by the proposed data model M4D4 [79,80], which
covers contextual and topology information. This model is a shared model that is
developed in order to process in a cooperative way while correlating alerts. It repre-
sents the different relationships among system entities and components to facilitate
the correlation process by a cooperative analysis of heterogeneous information.
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Discussion Model-based alert correlation are the first correlation techniques that
explore additional information about the supervised network. Otherwise, neither
information about the attacker’s behavior nor the defenser’s capability are taken
into account when correlation alerts.
2.6.3 Discussion
In Table 2.2, we summarize the advantages and drawbacks of each alert correlation
method. Alert correlation methods are listed in the raws of Table 2.2. Advantages
and drawbacks are respectively listed in the second and third columns. We remind
some examples of correlation technique developed in the literature in the last column
of the table. In [81], authors show that the combination of different alert correlation
methods is beneficial for effective alert correlation. For instance, similarity-based
correlation method could be improved by the knowledge-based correlation method,
since this latter are able to correlate alerts based on their causality link.
Table 2.2 - Advantages and drawbacks of alert correlation methods
represented in the table’s lines.
Alert correla-
tion method Pros Cons Examples
Similarity-based
alert correlation
- easy to implement
- no need for exter-
nal knowledge
- unable to discover
causality link between
alerts
Probabilistic
Alert Correla-
tion [73]
Rule-based alert
correlation
- alerts are corre-
lated based on their
pre-defined causality
link
- dynamic attack
scenario construc-
tion
- complex implemen-
tation and maintain-
ing of inference rule
- time-consuming to
design inference rules
- need for expert
knowledge
Managing
alerts in a
multi-intrusion
detection envi-
ronment [75]
Scenario-based
alert correlation
- alerts are corre-
lated based on their
pre-defined causality
link
- complex maintaining
of defined scenarios
- need for a prior
knowledge on attack
description
LAMBDA [76]
Model-based alert
correlation
- consideration of
context information
and external knowl-
edge
- complex to imple-
ment and maintain
M2D2 and
M4D4 [78–80]
In our work, we propose complementary approaches that tackle two main draw-
backs of alert correlation techniques. The first drawback is the lack of information
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about the attacker behavior and the detected attack. The second drawback is the
role of alert correlation in policy enforcement. To the best of our knowledge, no
previous study has proposed solutions to alleviate these issues.
2.7 Intrusion Response Systems (IRS)
Intrusion response system represents the decision tool of an IDS, that takes actions
to mitigate attacks and ensures safety in computing systems. It includes a set of
countermeasures that aims to protect computer resources. Generally, when speaking
about intrusion response, intrusion detection is automatically considered as it gives
the main inputs for the response engine (attack type, time, etc.). Intrusion response
decisions are actions, devices, procedures, or techniques that meet or oppose (i.e.,
counters) a threat, a vulnerability, or an attack by eliminating or preventing it,
by minimizing the harm it can cause, or by discovering and reporting it so that
corrective action can be taken [4].
The focus on the literature shows that several IRSs are developed recently. These
systems are found to be lacking in one or more dimensions that make them unsuitable
for protecting dynamic and complex distributed systems. Some of the commonly
observed shortcomings are:
• the system may have a static mapping of symptoms from the detector to the
response;
• it may not take feedback into account for determining future responses;
• it may assume perfect detectors with no missed and no false alarm;
• or it may assume perfect success rate for a deployed response.
As we can point out, intrusion response decision is a challenging step to ensure the
security of the supervised system. It comes on top of intrusion detection and alert
correlation. Therefore, it is important to design appropriate correlation techniques
that can improve the effectiveness of IRS.
2.8 Conclusion
Detection techniques have been extensively studied in the literature. Honeypot tech-
niques are complimentary tool to intrusion detection. They have been developed in
order to learn about the attacker’s behavior. In our research, we assume that in-
trusion detection techniques are mature enough to satisfy the need of the security
administrator in detecting attacks. We also assume that these IDSs generate ID-
MEF alerts. Honeypot techniques are still an active research topic. Meanwhile,
we assume that they are capable to provide us with appropriate knowledge about
attackers’ behavior. In this dissertation, we explore the knowledge gathered by hon-
eypots.
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Furthermore, we present a definition and a classification of alert correlation meth-
ods. We discuss the advantages and drawbacks of correlation techniques. These
techniques should be improved by the consideration of attacker behavior knowledge
and the policy enforcement capabilities of the supervised network.
The next chapter will be focused on the application of honeypot datasets in alert
correlation and how they can enhance the information about generated alerts.
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Honeypot-based Alert
Correlation approach
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3.1 Introduction
Existing correlation techniques such as [50,71,73–75,78–80,82] are basedon local alert datasets which include locally deployed IDS generated alerts.
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The view over the local alert datasets is limited by functional and structural bound-
aries of the monitored system.
In this context, alert correlation does not provide methods to determine if the alerts,
locally detected, are part of more global threat phenomena. Thus, honeypot tech-
nology is a valuable instrumentation technique to automatically collect and learn
information about server-based exploits and global threat phenomena.
In this chapter, we describe a novel honeypot-based correlation approach capable
of analyzing causality relationships between local alerts detected in the monitored
system level and the global threat phenomena observed by honeypot sensor deploy-
ment. This approach is beneficial to reassess the attack severity and to re-evaluate
the attack impact. In fact, analyzing information about the global threat phenom-
ena attributed to the locally detected alerts apprise us of severity of the global threat
phenomena, its propagation strategy, its capabilities, etc. Our approach takes ad-
vantage of the data collected by four honeypot databases to enrich our knowledge
about alerts.
3.2 Framework Description
Recent works [64, 83, 84] have shown the usefulness of gathering experimental data
to model and better understand the threats due to attackers. The deployment of
honeypots in several locations of the IP space has underlined the fact that different
blocks of addresses are attacked differently. Such in-depth information about global
attack phenomena makes possible identification of the causality links with local
detected attacks.
Our honeypot-based alert correlation approach exploits the information provided
by honeypot datasets in order to enhance correlation of local alerts. The most
important step is the enrichment of local alerts by the information in honeypot
datasets.
Framework workflow
In Figure 3.1, we describe the workflow of our honeypot-based alert correlation
approach. The honeypot-based alert correlation process is composed of three main
steps:
• Alert enrichment process: The objective of this step is to enrich the content
of locally generated alerts by information about the attacker. The output of
this step is an enriched alert denoted by Er_alert. This step will be detailed
in Section 3.4;
• Analyze Er_Alert: At this stage, the content of Er_alert is analyzed in order
to reassess attack severity, re-evaluate attack impact and intrusion objective;
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• Correlate Er_Alert: This step aims at correlating enriched alerts using existing
alert correlation techniques. It is also possible to combine diﬀerent correlation
techniques as explained in Section 2.6.3. This step results in correlated alerts.
Begin Honeypot-based 
alert correlation 
Local alert 
datasets 
Honeypot 
datasets 
Alert 
enrichment 
process 
Analyze 
Er_Alert 
Reassess attack 
severity 
Re-evaluate attack 
impact 
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intrusion 
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External information 
(CVE, Attack Type, 
Criticity, etc) 
Correlated Alerts 
Correlate  
Er_Alert 
Enriched alert 
datasets {Er_Alert} 
Correlation 
features 
Figure 3.1 - Honeypot-based alert correlation workﬂow.
3.3 Information Sources
The proposed honeypot-based correlation operates on heterogeneous security-related
information gathered from two diﬀerent views: local view and global view.
Information in the local view comes from analyzers such as Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS), Firewalls, etc. They are deployed to report traces of malicious
activity aﬀecting the local network. For instance, IDSs monitor the activity of the
network for the occurrence of malicious activities and generate alerts triggered by
their signatures. From the alerts, we can retrieve the timestamp of the malicious
activity, the source and target IP address, used port, etc. We call these attributes
selectors.
Information in the global view comes from honeypot data. As we described in
paragraph 2.4.1, the primary goal of a honeypot is the study of the attacker behavior
while interacting with the sensor. The data collected through honeypot sensor
31
CHAPT 3. HONEYPOT-BASED ALERT CORRELATION APPROACH
Local alert 
datasets 
Honeypot 
datasets 
Alert 
enrichment 
process 
Categorization 
Enriched alert 
datasets {Er_Alert} 
Enrichment 
features 
Collected additional 
information 
Categorized 
information 
Filtering 
Figure 3.2 - Alert Enrichment Process.
includes information about malware behavior, propagation vectors used by malware,
the propagation strategy, relationships between exploits, attacker’s location, source
and destination characterization, origin and relevance of zero-day attacks, etc [56,
59].
3.4 Alert Enrichment Process
In the context of honeypot-based alert correlation, we enrich our local knowledge
about alerts with information about the global threat landscape. Hence, it is essen-
tial to deﬁne an alert enrichment strategy that improves the alert-related knowledge,
especially with appropriate external information related to the occurrence of the ex-
ploit. Figure 3.2 describes an overview of the alert enrichment process. As shown
in ﬁgure 3.2, we ﬁrst collect information respecting appropriate enrichment features
that are detailed hereafter. For instance, based on the originating source of the
observed alert, we collect global knowledge about the tracked server and evaluate
its security proﬁle and evolution over time. After the enrichment is performed, we
categorize the collected information following the deﬁned categories presented later
and we propose a ﬁltering process which is composed of three types of ﬁlters: Tem-
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poral, Semantic and configuration filters. Each filter performs on a corresponding
category of information.
The result of the enrichment process is an Er_alert which appends the elementary
alert’s information with additional information about the security state of the source,
detected attack, in-depth information about corresponding exploits. We then ana-
lyze the relationship that may exist between the threat which has been reported on
the specific server and the locally reported alerts.
The Er_alert is then processed to request for more general information based on a
generalization strategy of the enrichment feature. In fact, honeypots have limited
view on the threat landscape. The more honeypots are distributed, the more infor-
mation about threats phenomena is gathered. Therefore, it is possible to request
generalized information in order to gather more knowledge about the attacker’s be-
havior. For instance, to analyze the environment of the originating source of the
local threat, it is possible to request information about its localization; the classes
of its IP address (class A, B or C).
3.4.1 Enrichment selectors
It is essential to analyze local alert selectors that must be considered in the enrich-
ment process since we manipulate information from two different views: the local
view and the global view.
At the local victim-side, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)s monitor the activity of
the network for the occurrence of malicious activities and generate alerts of detected
malicious activity including elementary information about the infection. Following
the Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) [69], the alert is com-
posed of several aggregate classes. The following aggregation classes can act as
selectors for querying honeypot datasets:
Source: class includes the IP address of the originating source of the detected
threat. As mentioned in paragraph 2.4.1, honeypot databases log information
related to the source IP address of malicious activity.
DetectTime: represents the time when the attack was detected by the local an-
alyzer. In honeypot databases, captured activities are usually timestamped
and allow us to analyze the security evolution of the alert’s originating source
within a specific time window.
Classification: represents the alert semantic. For instance, Intrusion Detection
Systems categorize alerts respecting a set of alert classification which inform
us about the alert’s type. This may be linked to the threat type detected by
honeypot sensors.
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Figure 3.3 - Filtering Processes.
3.4.2 Filtering Process
We propose to categorize the collected information aiming at simplifying the filter-
ing processes. We define three major categories:
- Security Information: This category includes security-related information such as
md5, type of the threat, security states of the originating sources, exploited vulner-
abilities by the attacker, etc.
- Temporal Information : when detecting a malicious activity, honeypots’ logged in-
formation is timestamped. Honeypot datasets’ objects include temporal attributes
about the detection and analysis time.
- Contextual Information : this category includes generic type of information: spa-
tial information, whois information, generic information. This set of attributes al-
lows us to build a more general picture about the environment of the object being
analyzed.
The objective of the enrichment process is to increase the accuracy of the knowledge
related to the alert. To fulfill this need, we set up 3 filters (as shown in figure 3.3).
The objective of these filters is to eliminate data which is less likely to link the local
alert to the corresponding global threat phenomena.
Temporal Filtering: Honeypot sensors track the activity of attackers and the evo-
lution of the threat landscape referring to a time settings. Honeypot datasets
include a timeline of events for each tracked source. This timeline is composed
of different time spans defined by the first and last time (resp. tfirst_seen and
tlast_seen) of the observed activity generated from tracked source. tfirst_seen
and tlast_seen are timestamps expressed by seconds.
We denote by T_thIPaddr = [tfirst_seen, tlast_seen] the time span of an observed
threat on a specific source. Within the defined honeypot-based alert corre-
lation approach, it is important to operate on time spans that are close to
the DetectTime of the local alert. Obviously, it is not significant to attribute
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local alerts to a global threat which no longer exists. Therefore, we use sliding
windows to avoid investigating the correlation of local alerts with old reported
global threats. We denote by α = DetectTime −tlast_seen the delay that ex-
ist between the last time of the last activity observed on a source and the
detection time of the local alert. We expect α to be of the order of a day.
Semantic Filtering: As local alerts are usually generated by IDS systems referring
to attacks’ signature, global threat is also assigned to specific types of attack
phenomena. By setting up a semantic filtering, we eliminate non-relevant
global threat relatively to the classification of the local alert. The objective of
semantic filter is to keep only threats that are highly likely causing the local
alert.
The observed global threat is classified respecting a high level description of
the threat defined by a threat_class. This classification is extremely helpful
to characterize threats and the modus operandi of attackers behind them.
Honeypot datasets use their own set of threat classes to characterize detected
global threats. Therefore, the semantic filtering is able to compare the threat
class against the alert type with the condition that the threat classes used by
honeypots are based on the same dictionary of local alerts classification. The
semantic filtering takes into account intermediate cross-references in order to
map these different sets of threat classes and alert types.
Configuration Filtering: Cross-view correlation also takes into account the con-
textual knowledge of the monitored network. This knowledge is composed of
topological and cartographic data. It represents hosts’ characteristics, their
interconnections, software products, their vulnerabilities, etc. As mentioned
in [80], comparing the affected configuration of vulnerability with the actual
set of products of a given host is valuable for alert correlation.
3.5 Experimentations and Evaluations
Alert enrichment is the most important step in our honeypot-based alert correlation.
It is responsible of enriching our knowledge about locally generated alerts with
appropriate information gathered through honeypots. In this section, we detail the
alert enrichment experimentation results. We then discuss these results and their
impact on our honeypot-based alert correlation.
3.5.1 Local Information Source
Our analysis is conducted on real world alerts generated by a snort v2.8 NIDS sen-
sor running on our University Network for 4 months. The University Network is
composed of hundreds of machines. For the experiment, we use the latest version
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of the signature rule-sets available at the time of the experiment procedure which
began on January 2012.
During these 4 months, snort generated 183170 alerts originating by 2499 unique IP
address source. We summarize these alerts in Table 3.1, sorted by their classification
(detailed in the first column of the table). In the second column of the table, we
give the number of generated alerts during these four month for each classification.
In the third column, we identify the number of unique IP source addresses in gen-
erated alerts. The two last columns show the number of filtered alerts and their
corresponding unique IP source addresses. The alert enrichment experimentation is
based on these filtered alerts.
Table 3.1 - Classification of alerts generated by the local deployed
IDS sensor. In this table, we identify the total number of unique IP
sources for both unfiltered alerts and filtered alerts.
Classification Number ofalerts
Total
Num-
ber of
unique IP
sources
Number
of filtered
alerts
Number
of filtered
unique IP
sources
attempted-recon 156338 2198 870 (0,5%) 132 (6%)
attempted-dos 1 1 1 (100%) 1 (100%)
attempted-user 1540 28 1540 (100%) 28 (100%)
misc-activity 839 174 23 (3%) 21 (12%)
trojan-activity 3 3 3 (100%) 3 (100%)
bad-unknown 22573 34 51 (0,2%) 9 (26,5%)
unclassified 1876 61 1876 (100%) 61 (100%)
Global 183170 2499 4364 (2,5%) 255 (10%)
Several alerts have been filtered. In fact, in order to increase the performance of the
enrichment process, we eliminate several alerts since snort IDS is known by its high
rate of false positive as explained in Chapter 2. Hereafter, we consider classifications
for which alerts have been filtered:
• Attempted reconnaissance alerts are usually preliminary intrusion steps
aiming at collecting information about the network. Most of these alerts are,
in general [45], alerts for normal network activity. In fact, such alerts are more
significant if they are part of a global attack sequence. Therefore, we filter
alerts whose IP source address is not present in other alerts having different
signature. More than 99% of attempt-recon alerts have been filtered (ref. Table
3.1).
• Misc-activity and Bad-unknown alerts include large number of ICMP
alerts which can be considered as a Usual False Positive referring to [46]. These
alerts are usually generated due to misconfigured hosts, topology of the network,
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normal activity of network services, etc. As shown in Table 3.1, more than 99%
of misc-activity and bad-unknown alerts have been filtered.
In the last line of the Table 3.1, we compute the number of alerts generated by our
Snort sensor and the number of corresponding unique IP source address. We then
aggregate the total number of filtered alerts, with its average referring to the totality
of alerts. Finally, we give the number of corresponding filtered IP source address
that will be considered during our experiments.
Table 3.2 shows more detailed information about the exploited vulnerabilities, pro-
tocol and ports reported in the generated alerts. In the second column of Table
3.2, the signature used by the IDS while generating alerts. In the third column, we
specify the corresponding vulnerabilities that are identified by their CVE reference
1. The fourth column specifies the protocol and port used by the detected exploits.
In the last column of the table, the number of generated alerts for each signature is
given.
3.5.2 Experimental Honeypot Datasets
The experimentation uses four honeypot databases provided by Symantec in the
context of the Vis-Sense Project. These datasets include information about malware
characterization and security profile of suspicious web-based servers.
3.5.2.1 HARMUR datasets
HARMUR v1, the Historical ARchive of Malicious URLs, [85], is a security dataset
that aims at exploring the dynamics of the security and contextual information
associated to web-related threats. HARMUR extract several security information
tracked web-based servers where hosted suspicious domains. It is possible to retrieve
threats that were reported on the tracked server. Like SGNET, HARMUR’s develop-
ers improve several functionalities of HARMUR and they developed the HARMUR
v2.
3.5.2.2 SGNET datasets
SGNET v1, [59], is a distributed honeypot deployment which benefits from different
tools, namely ScriptGen [60], Argos [61] and Nepenthes [58]. It collects information
about the malware propagation strategies as well as information providing as bet-
ter understanding about global threat landscape. Recently, an enhanced version of
SGNET has been developed and called SGNET v2.
1Common Vulnerability Exposure: CVE, http://www.cve.mitre.org/
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Table 3.2 - Summary of reported signatures, their vulnerabilities,
protocols and ports.
Classification Signature CVE Refer-ence
Protocol and
Port
Nb. of
alerts
attempted-recon SNMP requesttcp
CVE-2002-
0012/0014 TCP:80 3
SNMP Agen-
tX/tcp request
CVE-2002-
0013
TCP:80,
31337 2
SCAN FIN/S-
CAN SYN
FIN
– TCP 860
attempted-dos DoS Teardropattack
CVE-1999-
0015 UDP 1
attempted-user
MS-SQL probe
response over-
flow
CVE-2003-
0903
UDP:55989,
56538, 41376,
36845, 64439,
4974
1335
Web-Client
Windows Media
Player direc-
tory traversal
via Content-
Disposition
CVE-2003-
0228 TCP:80 1
misc-activity
ICMP PING
CyberKit 2.2
Windows
– ICMP 20
BAD-TRAFFIC
tcp port 0 traffic – TCP:0 3
trojan-activity
BACKDOOR
typot trojan
traffic
– TCP:44086 3
bad-unknown ICMP SourceQuench – ICMP 50
DNS SPOOF
query response
with TTL of
1 min, and no
authority
– UDP:53 1
These honeypot databases have been developed initially within the WOMBAT
project. A public API called WAPI (Wombat API) [86], has been developed in
order to query information from advanced honeypot databases. Information col-
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lected in these datasets is object oriented. The specification of the WAPI protocol
relies on four different concepts: objects, attributes, methods and references. Aggre-
gation of these concepts offer information on a security object (e.g. an IP address)
that is generated by a set of different datasets (SGNET honeypots, HARMUR web
servers, ...).
Table 3.3 - Experimental Results using alert’s IP source address.
The results shown in this table are based on IP sources of filtered
alerts detailed in table 3.1.
Classification
Number of
filtered IP
source ad-
dress
SGNET
v1
SGNET
v2
HARMUR
v1
HARMUR
v2
attempted-
recon 132 – –
1 (SNMP
Agen-
tX/TCP)
–
attempted-
dos 1 – – – –
attempted-
user 28 – – – –
misc-activity 21 – – – –
trojan-
activity 3 – – – –
bad-unknown 9 1 (DNSSPOOF) – –
1 (DNS
SPOOF)
unclassified 61 – –
1 (tcp
portscan)
& 1 (tcp
portscan,tcp
portsweep)
1 (tcp
portscan)
3.5.3 Experimental Results
In our experiments, the enrichment process operates alert attributes such as source
address or port. For instance, based on the IP address of the alert’s source, the alert
enrichment process allows us to gather more details about potential root causes.
Additional features would be considered within the enrichment process such as the
hash of potentially detected malwares.
During our experiments, we check if the originating source reported in our set of
alerts has been analyzed by one of the honeypot sensors. We analyze the security
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evolution of alert’s source and evaluate and quantify the threat phenomenon which
infects the originating source of the local detected alert.
Table 3.4 - Analysis of identified IP source address objects from
Table 3.3.
Signature in-
volved
SNMP
Agen-
tX/TCP
DNS SPOOF tcpportscan
tcp
portscan
& tcp
portsweep
tcp
portscan
Number of
alerts 1 1 4 203 & 103 1
Honeypot
Dataset
HARMUR
v1
SGNET
v1
HARMUR
v2
HARMUR
v1
HARMUR
v1
HARMUR
v2
Temporal Infor-
mation:
first_seen,
last_seen at-
tributes
unfilled unfilled unfilled unfilled unfilled unfilled
Security Informa-
tion:
Number of
hosted Do-
mains
41 – 1 1 2 1
Security cur-
rent color of
hosted domains
28 green, 8
grey, 4 or-
ange & 1 red
– 1 grey 1 green 2 orange 1 red
Number of
corresponding
threat objects
25 nothreat – no threat 4 1
Threats rating 14 unknown& 11 red – – –
4 un-
known –
Type of the
threat
Virus,
Browser
Exploit,
Generic
google
safebrowsing
– – – Virus –
Number of sat-
isfied content
reference
missing – missing missing missing missing
number of
filled help
attribute
13 – – – 4 –
information
about affected
systems
Windows:
98, 95, XP,
Me, NT,
2003, 2000
– – –
Windows
XP,
Vista,
NT,
Server
2003,
2000
–
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Table 3.3 summarizes the results obtained during the alert enrichment process. In
this table, we represent the number of alerts’ IP source address having corresponding
server object analyzed by one of the honeypot sensor. The primary step of the
enrichment process is concentrated on the identification of the set of alerts that are
systematically enriched.
Based on the result shown in Table 3.3, we conclude that a high number of alerts’
IP source address have not been analyzed by honeypot sensors. Thus, we conclude
that many alerts will not be automatically enriched. Moreover, the examples in the
experiment honeypot datasets which are linked to the alerts are difficult to explore
in the context of our honeypot-based alert correlation.
In Table 3.4, we detail the information gathered from each IP source address object
found in the honeypot datasets.
Enrichment : As shown in Table 3.3, the enrichment process operates on a small
set of originating sources. 5 IP source addresses out of 255 IP source addresses
have been identified in the experiment honeypot datasets. Due to this reduced
number of identified IP source addresses, the performance of the enrichment
process is highly reduced. Knowledge about the originating source of the local
alerts is not entirely enriched.
Categorization : Experiment honeypot datasets set temporal attributes for each
object that are composed of last_seen, first_seen. Moreover, security infor-
mation includes information about the threat reported in each source, their
types, their rating, a link to a more detailed description about the threat, the
security color of the hosted domains in the source (e.g. red color means that
the domain is infected). In the case of the source identified in SGNET v1, all
the attributes and references are missing.
Filtering : Temporal information is the main input for temporal filtering. Nor-
mally, this information is of the order of seconds, which is a sufficient granular-
ity in the context of our alert enrichment process. Due to such information in
the results, it does not allow the filtering process to be completely performed.
A part from this, threat type values (e.g. Virus, Browser Exploit, Generic
google safebrowsing) listed in Table 3.4 do not offer a standard representa-
tion of the threat type which avoid the semantic filtering to be automatically
executed.
3.5.4 Honeypot Limitations in Alert Correlation
Four major limitations have been identified during the experiments. Two limitations
are related to the characteristics of a honeypot sensor implementation. In addition,
we identify two other limitations which are related to the design of a honeypot
datasets data representation.
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3.5.4.1 Coverage Limitations
When requesting the corresponding object of a specific originating source of a local
alerts, around 95% of locally detected alerts do not have a corresponding originating
source reference in the explored databases (as deduced from Table 3.3). The main
cause of this result is explained by the interaction level of the honeypot sensors.
Even if honeypot sensors are able to interact with attackers and emulate network
protocols, they would be unable to cover a large variety of activities like a real
interaction between the attacker and the system. For instance, Web-Client Windows
Media Player directory traversal via Content-Disposition attacks (cf. CVE from
Table 3.2) require a high-interaction level with the attacker and this is not always
realized.
Discussion The coverage limitation is also one of the IDS issues as discussed in
Section 2.3. Each intrusion detection node has a limited view on the supervised
network as shown in [87]. This prevents alert correlation in general and knowledge-
based alert correlation in particular of efficiently study the causality link between
alerts and then correlate alerts.
3.5.4.2 Unfilled Attributes and references Limitations
An important number of threats have unfilled attributes such as the help attribute
which contain details about the threat type, the vulnerabilities that can be exploited,
etc. We conduct a statistical evaluation on 73699 threat objects from HARMUR
datasets and we observe that over than 85% of these objects are not referenced to a
content object [86]. This latter includes in-depth information related to the threat.
This pitfall prevent us essentially from applying semantic and configuration filters
described in 3.4.2. Moreover, from Table 3.4, due to the absence of temporal at-
tributes; our temporal filtering is not capable to accomplish the filtering process.
During our enrichment process, we identify the problem of unfilled attributes of
datasets’ objects which does not guarantee the automatic reasoning and the conti-
nuity of the collection process.
Discussion Consistency of alerts’ related information has been the subject of nu-
merous researches in IDS and alert correlation. It has been shown that such related
information is necessary for better alert correlation [80]. Several works have pro-
posed data mining to tackle this problem [88]. Unless these techniques have been
proved to be efficient in enhancing alerts’ content, it becomes more complex when
it is jointly applied on both of alerts datasets and honeypots datasets. Moreover, it
requires more processing time and effort. Therefore, it impacts the overall quality
of our honeypot-based alert correlation.
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3.5.4.3 Lack of Standard representation of honeypot data
During our experiments, we observe that information gathered about threats lacks
a proper and standard representation. Unfortunately, this limitation makes difficult
qualitative evaluation of the exploits and semantic filter. Within HARMUR threats
object, each object has a generic threat type as phishing page, virus, browser exploit,
etc. Such threat types do not provide clear understanding and in-depth details
about the exploit and construct an obstacle for semantic filtering. For instance,
even if honyepot datasets report a threat in a specific server, neither the threat type
representation nor the help attribute allow us identifying if a causality relationship
exist between the locally detected alert and this global threat phenomena.
Discussion We have shown in Section 2.3.3 the importance of security event’s
representation. In the literature, security databases such as CVE and OSVDB offer
a standard representation of vulnerabilities. IDMEF is also a standard format for
representing alerts. In our context, the use of standard representation and references
allow the design of inference rules in order to facilitate the causality analysis between
local and global events. In [89], the use of standard representation and references in
security events allow authors developing a cooperative module for alert correlation.
3.5.4.4 Cross-references Limitations
Since honeypot databases lack of cooperation and coordination between them, it was
a tedious task to request in-depth information of malware infection reported in a
specific web-based server from SGNET that includes information about the malware
characterization and behavior. For instance, it would be interesting to gather in-
depth information about a threat reported in HARMUR by requesting SGNET. In
the context of our approach of honeypot-based alert correlation and enrichment, it is
required that we take advantage of a complete global view of the threat phenomena
such as the infected servers, their security evolution over time, characterization and
specificity of exploits.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter introduces an application of honeypot databases to enhance alert cor-
relation techniques. We describe a honeypot-based alert correlation that aims at
considering external security information collected through the deployment of hon-
eypot sensors in order to enrich the local knowledge of detected intrusions with in-
depth details about the security profile of the originating source, exploits to which
our network is exposed to, etc. We then analyze and explain experimental results
and limitations encountered when dealing with the explored honeypot databases to
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ensure the honeypot-based alert correlation. Although honeypot technologies have
proved to be a valuable mean to analyze the threat ecosystem, our experiments
demonstrate several limitations of the deployment of current honeypot databases to
improve alert correlation. For instance, the lack of precise information and standard
representation do not ensure correlation analysis and automatic reasoning. This
pitfall can be alleviated by conceiving a unified and standardized framework for
honeypot data storage and representation. Assigning standard reference such as
CVE to observed exploits and threats could be of a great interest while exploring
honeypot databases. These suggestions would ensure that honeypot-based alert cor-
relation is executed. It would make the navigation and the cross-references between
these different honeypot databases easier.
Honeypot techniques are still evolutionary and can be ameliorated to cover addi-
tional security analysis application. In the context of our honeypot-based alert cor-
relation, it is important to ensure concise and complete information that offer to the
security analyst a good understanding of threat landscape ecosystem to efficiently
identify causality relationships between the local detected alerts and observed threat
phenomena in the global view.
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4.1 Introduction
Existing correlation approaches such as [50, 71, 73–75, 78–80, 82]) operate in-dependently of the security enforcement capabilities of the network. This is
due to the lack of a unified model of policy enforcement mechanisms capabilities.
In fact, modeling and identifying the enforcement coverage of each security policy
enforcement mechanism is necessary to deploy it effectively when processing alerts
and reacting to ongoing attacks.
Policy Enforcement Points (PEP), once deployed and configured, are responsible to
apply rules on specific requests. Intrusion response decisions and countermeasures
are generally modifications that should be performed on PEP’s configuration. Thus,
it is important to easily identify the appropriate PEP to set up these modifications
and produce the desired effect. In our work, we concentrate on this desired effect. If
alerts are correlated based on these capabilities, it would be more efficient to process
them.
We propose to model these policy enforcement capabilities in order to not only have
a good understanding of deployed policy enforcement capabilities but also tackle
several issues in security policy management and intrusion detection. We represent
this model by the PEP Responsibility Domain (RD(PEP )). The main objective of
RD(PEP ) is to build a consistent view of the deployed policy enforcement capabil-
ities that contribute in defining the appropriate response decision.
We first give basic definitions that are mandatory to our PEP model. Then, we pro-
pose a definition of a Policy Enforcement Point Responsibility Domain RD(PEP ).
Second, we expose several approximation approaches of the RD(PEP). Third, we
evaluate the differences between these approximations. Finally, we describe the
application of the proposed PEP model on two use cases.
4.2 Definitions and axioms
An essential step to be performed when modeling a concept is detailing the basic
definitions and axioms. In this section, we enumerate the basic definitions and
axioms that are used in our PEP model.
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4.2.1 Definitions
A PEP is a set of enforcement rules denoted by r1, r2, . . . , rm (m is the total number
of rules applied by the PEP). In Equation 4.1, we give an algebraic representation
characterizing a PEP.
PEP = {rj}j∈[1...m] (4.1)
A PEP is a security entity capable to apply on the received requests, the enforcement
decisions represented by {d1, d2, d3, . . . , dp} (p is the total number of all decisions
that can be applied by the PEP class such as AAA servers that can either authorize
or refuse access for a specific service or entity [90].).
As defined in access control models [12, 15, 91–94], an access control rule rj has
usually the following general form:
rj : {conditions}j −→ {decisions}j ∀j ∈ [1, . . . ,m]
rj : Cj −→ Dj ∀j ∈ [1, . . . ,m]
In general, Cj is a conjunctive set of condition attributes which we call Selectors
and denote by {Si}i∈[1...n]. Hence, a rule rj is represented following Equation 4.2.
rj : ×si
i∈[1...n]
−→ {dk}k∈[1...p] ∀j ∈ [1, . . . ,m] (4.2)
si (i ∈ [1 . . . n]) are instantiation of selectors. In Section 4.3, we define and charac-
terize these selectors.
4.2.2 Axioms
In the rest of this dissertation, the proposed PEP model and enforcement-based
alert correlation approach are developed based on the following axioms:
• Axiom 1 The verification of false positive alerts is out of the scope of our
work. In the literature, false positive reduction has been studied by many
researchers. It is considered as a complex task. Therefore, we assume that
our processed alerts are not false positives, are written following the IDMEF
(Intrusion Detection and Message Exchange Format) standard described in [69]
and are well formed. This axiom implies that all the IDMEF attributes are
instantiated in the processed alerts.
• Axiom 2 All considered PEPs have a finite set of rules. In practice, security
administrators configure on each PEP a finite set of rules which apply the
security policy guidelines.
• Axiom 3 We ignore the default rule of the PEP. Usually, since the default
rule includes the entire selectors’ domains, it does not inform us about the
configuration specification of the PEP. Thus, only configured rules with specific
selectors’ instantiations are taken into account.
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• Axiom 4 We assume that all the selectors have finite domains. As a conse-
quence, it becomes possible to decompose the selecotrs’ domains.
• Axiom 5 We also ignore the decision/action that can be applied by the PEP.
In fact, the PEP’ enforcement decisions do not include information about the
PEP’s responsibility domain. This axiom limits the identification of modi-
fications that should be performed on PEP’s configuration and in particular
decisions applied by the PEP.
• Axiom 6 The definition of the Responsibility Domain should only consider
the intrinsic characterization and deployment of the PEP. This axiom does not
exclude taking into account common domain knowledge that is easily accessible
from standard documents, public dictionnaries, etc.
4.3 Selector Characterizations
In this section, we define a basic notion of our proposed PEP model which is the
selectors.
4.3.1 Selector Definition
The security policy enforcement is usually based on a set of decision/enforcement
criteria known as "Selectors". Referring to axiom 4 listed in Section 4.2, selectors
have finite domains. This latter is denoted by D(S). We denote by | D(S) | the
cardinality of D(S).
Selector Type
Each selector has a defined Selector Type denoted by S  Type which we define in
Equation 4.3.
S  Type = {(Type(S), D(S))} (4.3)
Type(S) represents the type of the Selector S. It can be for example integer, real,
binary, string, timestamp, etc. For instance, the selector IP address (ip_addr) is an
integer in [0, 232−1]. We write its type as follow: ip_addr Type = {integer, [0, 232−
1])}.
Selector Category
Each Selector has its role in a Security Policy and its significance. It can identify
either the Source and the Target of the considered flow or the type of the interaction
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Figure 4.1 - Example of src/dst_ip selector taxonomy.
Figure 4.2 - Example of src/dst_port selector taxonomy.
between them, mainly the Action. We define S Category the Selector Category.
We consider two categories that are:
• identST: This category of selectors enable us to identify the Source and the
Target of an interaction flow. For example, the ip_src and ip_dst are examples
of this category. LDAP selectors such as common name cn are example of
identST selectors.
• identA: This category of selectors identifies the type of interaction (Action)
between the Source and the Target. For instance the port_src, the port_dst
and the protocol are selectors that specify the type of the connection between
the Source and the Target.
4.3.2 Selector Domain Decomposition
As defined in paragraph 4.3.1, D(S) represents the range of all the possible values
which can be affected to Selector S. D(S) can be split into a finite number l of
generalized sub-domains denoted by δ(S) (Eq 4.4). Those sub-domains are totally
disjoint.
D(S) =
⋃
k∈[1...l]
δk(S)
where ∀k, k′ ∈ [1 . . . l], δk(S) ∩ δk′(S) = 
(4.4)
These sub-domains δk(S) identifies specific ranges/elements of selector values. In
our approach, we assume the these sub-domains are defined by the security admin-
istrator.
For example, the domain of selectors src_ip and dst_ip can be composed of different
subset of IP addresses such as the subsets of an IP subnetwork range, as shown in
Figure 4.1.
As another example, the domain of selectors src_port and dst_port can be composed
of port categories such as privileged ports, registered ports and dynamic and/or pri-
vate ports, as shown in Figure 4.2. Following Equation 4.4, the domain of ports
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is written as indicated in Equation 4.5. Such decomposition is defined in the RFC
6335 [95].
D(src/dst_port) =
⋃
k∈[1...3]
δk(src/dst_port)
= [0 . . . 1023] ∪ [1024 . . . 49151]
∪[49152 . . . 65535]
(4.5)
4.3.3 Selectors Combinability
A selector may have a different meaning and may impact the security policy when
used in a combination with other selectors. Therefore, it should not be considered
independently while instantiating the Security Policy Rules. Hereafter, we analyze
and study the specific relations between selectors and their instantiations. In fact,
there exist several functional constraints and ineffective and insignificant combina-
tions. For instance:
i) Selectors with S Category = identA have functional constraints such as mutually
exclusive sets of values. For example, the protocol when it is set to udp, it implies
the use of a valid sub-domain of D(port_src) and D(port_dst).
ii) Selectors with S  Category = identST have several ineffective and insignificant
combinations that may figure between this type of selectors. For example, the use of
wildcard for both source and destination and combination between the same value
for these selectors has no significance.
We define the Selectors Combinability Boolean function which we denote by the
SCombinability defined in Equation 4.6:
SCombinability : D(Sj1)×D(Sj2)× . . .×D(Sjp) −→ {True, False}
< sj1 , sj2 , . . . , sjp >7−→ {True, False}
where j1, j2, . . . , jp ∈ [1 . . . n]
(4.6)
This function verifies the combinability between instantiation of selectors (i.e. sj1 , sj2 ,
. . . , sjp). It verifies the mutually exclusive values of selectors.
In [96], authors represent a complete analysis of configuration rules aiming at en-
suring reliable network security policies. The main objective of the work proposed
in [96] is the discovery and the removal of anomalies of configuration rules. This
work is based on a prior knowledge about the network topology and architecture.
However, in our axiom 6, we do not take into account this external knowledge in our
proposed PEP model. Since we restrict our proposed model to intrinsic characteri-
zation of a PEP, we manually define combinable selector sub-domains. We suppose
that, for each generalized sub-domain δk(Si) (k ∈ [1 . . . l]) of a selector domain
D(Si) (i ∈ [1 . . . n]), we identify combinable sub-domains in D(Si′) (i′ ∈ [1 . . . n]).
We denote a combinable sub-domain ofDS(i′) associated to a generalized sub-domain
δk(Si) (k ∈ [1 . . . l]) by DComb_δk(Si)(Si′). In Equation 4.7, we give a representation
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D(S1) D(S2) ??(S1) ???(S2) 
?????(S2) 
Figure 4.3 - Combinability between two selectorsD(S1) andD(S2).
D(S1) D(S2) ??(S1) ???(S2) 
?????(S2) 
D(S3) 
??????(S3) 
???????(S3) 
Figure 4.4 - Combinability between multiple selectors D(S1),
D(S2) and D(S3).
of DComb_δk(Si)(Si′).
for k ∈ [1 . . . l] and ∀i, i′ ∈ [1, . . . , n]
DComb_δk(Si)(Si′) = {δk′(Si′), k′ ∈ [1 . . . l′]}
such that ∀ si′ ∈ DComb_δk(Si)(Si′) and si ∈ δk(Si),
SCombinability(si, si′) = True.
(4.7)
In Figure 4.3, we give a representation of DComb_δk(S1)(S2) where we show how the
combinability between two selectors S1 and S2 is deﬁned. In this case, the sub-
domain δk(S1) of D(S1) is combinable with δk′(S2) and δk′′(S2) of D(S2). Then we
have DComb_δk(S1)(S2) = {δk′(S2), δk′′(S2)}.
In Figure 4.4, we show how the SCombinability is evaluated for three selectors S1,
S2 and S3.
For an instance of selectors< s1, s2, s3 >, we evaluate the intersectionDComb_δk(S1)(S2)
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∩DComb_δk′ (S2)(S3). In the example shown in Figure 4.4, we have DComb_δk(S1)(S3)∩DComb_δk′ (S2)(S3) = {δk′′′(S3)}.
For multiple selectors S1, S2, . . . and Sn, in order to have combinable selectors,
we should have DComb_δk(Sk1 )(Sk3) ∩DComb_δk′ (Sk2 )(Sk3) 6= {∅} for all k1, k2, k3∈ [1 . . . n].
4.4 Running Example
In order to illustrate our proposed PEP model, we first detail the running example
shown in Figure 4.5. It represents a network with two zones (D1 and D2) connected
to the Internet and protected by a Firewall.
Figure 4.5 - Running Example: a network with two zones.
The configuration of this firewall is detailed in Table 4.1. All the HTTP flow is
allowed to server 161.120.33.40 in the zone D2 except the traffic originated from the
zone D1 (line 1 and 2 in Table 4.1). HTTP and FTP flows are respectively denied
from servers 140.192.37.20 and 140.192.37.30 to access zone D2 and the Internet
(line 3 and 5). FTP and HTTP flow is allowed from zone D1 to access zone D2 and
the Internet (line 4 and 6). DNS flow destined to zone D2 is allowed (line 9). All
the udp flow from zone D1 to zone D2 is allowed (line 10). Line 8 and line 11 in
Table 4.1 represent the default rule of the firewall which are responsible of blocking
all the tcp and udp traffic.
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Table 4.1 - Configuration of Firewall in Figure 4.5.
Source Destination Action
Protocol Address Port Address Port Action
1:tcp 140.192.37.* * 161.120.33.40 80 deny
2:tcp *.*.*.* * 161.120.33.40 80 accept
3:tcp 140.192.37.20 * *.*.*.* 80 deny
4:tcp 140.192.37.* * *.*.*.* 80 accept
5:tcp 140.192.37.30 * *.*.*.* 21 deny
6:tcp 140.192.37.* * *.*.*.* 21 accept
7:tcp 140.192.37.* * 161.120.33.40 21 accept
8:tcp *.*.*.* * *.*.*.* * deny
9:udp *.*.*.* * 161.120.33.40 53 accept
10:udp 140.192.37.* * 161.120.33.* * accept
11:udp *.*.*.* * *.*.*.* * deny
This example of a PEP can be represented as follow:
Firewall = {rj}j∈[1...11]
The configured rules shown in Table 4.1 are represented as follow:
rj : ×si
i∈[1...5]
−→ {dk}k∈[1...2] ∀j ∈ [1, . . . , 11]
where:
S1 = ip_src, S2 = port_src, S3 = ip_dst, S4 = port_dst, S5 = p
d1 = accept, d2 = deny
We remind that selector’s domain decomposition is defined by the security adminis-
trator as mentioned in section 4.3.2. Therefore, for the running example, the domain
of ip source and destination selectors is extracted from the network topology and
detailed as follow :
D(src/dst_ip) =
⋃
k∈[1...3]
δk(src/dst_ip)
δ1(src_ip) ∪ δ2(src_ip) ∪ δ3(src_ip)
= [161.120.33.0/24] ∪ [140.192.37.0/24]
∪[232 − 1] \ δ1(src_ip) ∪ δ2(src_ip)
The domain of port source and destination selectors is extracted from common
domain knowledge which is the RFC 6335 [95] and detailed as follow:
D(src/dst_port) =
⋃
k∈[1...3]
δk(src/dst_port)
= [0 . . . 1023] ∪ [1024 . . . 49151]
∪[49152 . . . 65535]
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The domain of protocol selector is extracted from common domain knowledge which
is the RFC 6335 [97] and detailed as follow:
D(p) =
⋃
k∈[1...2]
δk(p)
= {tcp} ∪ {udp}
In such example, the SCombinability function allows us evaluate the effectiveness
of the configured firewall policy. For instance, a request (in this example, it is a
network packet) could not contain the same ip source and destination. Hence, we
have DComb_δ1(src_ip)(dst_ip) = D(dst_ip) \ δ1(dst_ip). We also have all values
of src_ip selector combinable with all dst_port selector’s values. Then, we write
DComb_δk(src_ip)(dst_port) = D(dst_port) for all k ∈ [1, 2, 3].
SCombinability could inform us about rules that include same ip source and desti-
nation. These rules are not totally effectively and then are over estimated.
4.5 PEP class
We differentiate between PEPs based on the communication layer: Network-level
PEP (iptables, juniper, checkpoint, snort . . . ), Application-level PEP (ModSecurity,
Anti viruses, . . . ), Information-level PEP (MySQL, . . . ), Identity-Access Control
PEP (LDAP, . . . ). Hereafter, we introduce the notion of a PEP class.
Definition 1 PEP class: It is a family of PEPs which share common functional
characteristics and enforce the policy based on a common (sub)set of selectors.
Usually, attacks perform actions on a specific communication layer. A PEP class
enables the security administrator to identify the capability of a PEP to respond to
these attacks.
PEP class properties
Following the Definition 1, each class of PEP is characterized by an identical core set
of Selectors denoted by {S1, S2, S3, . . . , Sn} where n is the total number of selectors
characterizing the PEP class. n represents the Dimension of the PEP class defined
in Equation 4.8. as shown in Equation 4.8.
Dim(PEP ) =| ({Sj}j∈[1...n]) |= n
where | | is the cardinality of the set. (4.8)
In some cases, as shown in figure 4.6, we may have some optional selectors that are
not mandatory to characterize the PEP Class. Optional selectors are not necessary
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Figure 4.6 - Characterization of a PEP Class.
Table 4.2 - Network-level Firewall common Selectors Domains.
Selector S Meaning S  Type Characterization
src_ip /
dst_ip
source/destination
IP address
{integer,⊂
[0, 232 − 1]}
Core
src_port /
dst_port
source/destination
Port
{integer,⊂
[0, 216 − 1]}
Core
p protocol {string,∈
{tcp, udp, icmp}}
Core
tcp_flag TCP Flag {string,∈
{syn, rst, ack, rst
, psh, urg, ecn, fin}}
Optional
to apply the security policy but allow the definition of finer grained enforcement
rules.
Example: The Network-level firewall class, denoted by netFW, commonly has
a set of five selectors which are { IP source address, source port, IP destination
address, destination port, protocol }. The types and domains of these selectors are
shown in Table 4.2. The TCP flag selector is one of the optional selectors for a
netFW class. The Decision set of the netFW class is reduced to either Accept (a),
i.e. authorize the data flow or Deny (d), i.e. reject it. The dimension of the netFW
class is defined as follow:
Dim(netFW ) =| {src_ip, src_port, dst_ip, dst_port, protocol} |
= 5
(4.9)
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4.6 Responsibility Domain (RD) of a PEP’s rule
RD(r)
4.6.1 Definition of RD(r)
As defined in Section 4.2.1, a configured rule has usually the following form:
rj : Cj −→ Dj ∀j ∈ [1, . . . ,m]
where:
Ci = {ri(Sj) = sij,∀i ∈ [1 . . . n]}
Dj ∈ {d1, d2, d3, . . . , dp}
For each request vector, the access control rule ri, ∀ i ∈ [1 . . .m] applies the de-
cision Di when conditions on selectors Ci are satisfied. A rule can apply several
decisions such as denying and logging. Every rule ri defined in the configured PEP
is responsible of enforcing the decision on the corresponding set of flows.
Definition 2 Responsibility Domain of a rule : It represents the Applicability
Domain of the rule. It is the count of all the instantiated selectors combinations. It
is based on the set of Ci configured for each Selector of the PEP. It includes all the
requests on which the rule’s decision(s) may be applied and enforced. We denote it
by RD(ri).
We write the Responsibility Domain of a rule RD(ri) as follow:
RD(ri) = < Ci >,∀i ∈ [1 . . .m]
= < sij >j∈[1...n],∀i ∈ [1 . . .m] (4.10)
Since sij ⊆ D(Sj), one rule may include multiple selectors combination. We define
hereafter the RD(ri) coverage.
Consequence 1 RD(rj) Coverage: RD(ri) Coverage is the number of all the
selectors combination defined in the rule r. It is expressed in Equation 4.11.
| RD(ri) | =
∏
j∈[1...n]
| sij | (4.11)
Example Consider the following rule of a Network-level Firewall:
r : src_ip = 140.192.37. ∗ ∧src_port = ∗∧
dst_ip = 161.120.33.40 ∧ dst_ip = 80 ∧ protocol = tcp
→ deny
(4.12)
Its corresponding Responsibility Domain is:
RD(r) =< 140.192.37.∗, ∗, 161.120.33.40, 80, tcp > (4.13)
and the coverage of RD(r) is:
| RD(r) | =| 140.192.37.∗ |, | ∗ |, | 161.120.33.40 |, | 80 |, | tcp |>
= (28 − 1)× (216 − 1)× 1× 1× 1 (4.14)
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4.6.2 Characterization of relations between Responsibility Do-
main of rules
In [98], authors define five relations that may exist between rules. They demon-
strate that these relations are unique and that can be applied to define the different
conflicts and anomalies that may figure between rules.
We adopt these relationships and define them between Responsibility Domain of
rules. Overlaps between rules result in overlaps between their Responsibility Do-
mains. Hereafter, we detail the relationships that may exist between the Responsi-
bility Domains of rules.
• RD(r1) and RD(r2) are Completely Disjoint (CD)
and we write CD(RD(r1), RD(r2)), iff
∀j ∈ [1 . . . n], r1(Sj) 4 r2(Sj)
where D ∈ {⊂,⊃,=} (4.15)
• RD(r1) and RD(r2) are Exactly Matched (EM)
and we write EM(RD(r1), RD(r2)), iff
∀j ∈ [1 . . . n], r1(Sj) = r2(Sj) (4.16)
• RD(r1) and RD(r2) are Inclusively Matched (IM)
and we write IM(RD(r1), RD(r2)), iff
∀j ∈ [1 . . . n], r1(Sj) ⊆ r2(Sj)
and ∃j′ such that r1(Sj′) 6= r2(Sj′) (4.17)
• RD(r1) and RD(r2) are Partially Matched (PM)
and we write PM(RD(r1), RD(r2)),iff
∃j′, j′′ ∈ [1 . . . n], r1(Sj′) D r2(Sj′)
r1(Sj′′) 4 r2(Sj′′)
where D ∈ {⊂,⊃,=}
(4.18)
• RD(r1) and RD(r2) are Correlated (C)
and we write C(RD(r1), RD(r2)),iff
∀j ∈ [1 . . . n], r1(Sj) D r2(Sj)
and ∃ j′, j′′ ∈ [1 . . . n] such that r1(Sj′) ⊂ r2(Sj′)
and r1(Sj′′) ⊃ r2(Sj′′)
where D ∈ {⊂,⊃,=}
(4.19)
In [98], these relationships are used in order to detect conflicts which are a topic out
of the scope of our work. Different from [98], these relationships are used in order
to define approximation inferences that will be detailed in Section 4.7.
57
CHAPT 4. POLICY ENFORCEMENT POINT MODEL
Figure 4.7 - Relations between Responsibility Domains of two
rules.
4.7 Responsibility Domain of PEP (RD(PEP ))
Definition 3 Responsibility Domain of PEP: Each PEP, once deployed in the
network, has a finite range of applicability which we call "Responsibility Domain".
We denote it by RD(PEP ). This domain is an abstraction over the PEP imple-
mentation and configuration and its intrinsic enforcement capabilities.
The Responsibility Domain of the PEP informs us about the enforcement coverage
of the PEP across the network.
Definition 4 The Responsibility Domain is multi dimensional domain and its di-
mension is Dim(PEP ).
Following Definition 4, RD(PEP ) is a bounded multi-dimensional domain and we
identify two types of RD(PEP ) bounds:
• The first type of bounds considers specifically the S Types and it is an intrinsic
characteristic of the PEP class. We respectively denote the minimum bound
and the maximum bound of this first type by RDMin(PEP ) and RDMax(PEP ).
RDMin(PEP ) is the lower bound of the first type. It represents the min-
imum number of selectors to be used in order to implement effective rules.
RDMax(PEP ) is the upper bound of the first type. It includes the entire set
of selectors characterizing the PEP class.
• The second type of bounds is related to the instantiation of the PEP class. We
respectively denote by RDinf (PEP ) and RDsup(PEP ), the inferior bound and
the superior bound of the RD(PEP ) once the PEP is deployed.
Definition 5 RDinf (PEP ) is the union of the entire set of Responsibility Do-
mains of configured rules in the PEP’s instantiation.
RDsup(PEP ) considers environmental constraints on the deployed PEP. The
identification of this bound requires external knowledge related to the topological
visibility of the deployed PEP.
Since we assume in axiom 4 the non availability of such knowledge, RDsup(PEP )
will not be identified in this work.
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As policy enforcement is, in most cases, distributed along the different PEPs, it is
important to model their enforcement coverage, RD(PEP ), in order to support the
administrator in selecting the most appropriate ones. An appropriate PEP is a PEP
which is able to process a considerable number of alerts while ensuring a low reaction
cost. Thus, the definition and identification of an appropriate approximation of the
RD(PEP ) must be well defined.
Hereafter, we first give an identification of RDinf (PEP ) and then detail several
approximations of the RD(PEP ).
4.7.1 Definition of RDinf(PEP )
The configuration matrix Confselectors(PEP ) defined in equation 4.20 represents
not only the configuration of the PEP but also the identification the RDinf (PEP ).
RDinf (PEP ) is the union of the entire set of Responsibility Domains of configured
rules in the PEP’s instantiation.
Confselectors(PEP ) =
S1 S2 ... Sn
r1 s11 s12 . . . s1n
r2 s21 s22 . . . s2n
...
...
... . . .
...
rm sm1 sm2 . . . smn

(4.20)
RDinf (PEP ) is the union of Confselectors(PEP ) rows. The definition ofRDinf (PEP )
takes into account the entire set of the different combinations between selectors de-
fined in configured rules.
RDinf (PEP ) =
⋃
i∈[1...m]
RD(ri)
=
⋃
i∈[1...m]
< sij >j∈[1...n]
(4.21)
Running example : Based on the configuration table of the firewall, the
RDinf (Firewall) will be written as follow:
RDinf (Firewall) =
{< 140.192.37.∗, ∗, 161.120.33.40, 80, tcp >,
< ∗. ∗ . ∗ .∗, ∗, 161.120.33.40, 80, tcp >,
< 140.192.37.20, ∗, ∗. ∗ . ∗ .∗, 80, tcp >,
< 140.192.37.∗, ∗, ∗. ∗ . ∗ .∗, 80, tcp >,
< 140.192.37.30, ∗, ∗. ∗ . ∗ .∗, 21, tcp >,
< 140.192.37.∗, ∗, ∗. ∗ . ∗ .∗, 21, tcp >,
< 140.192.37.∗, ∗, 161.120.33.40, 21, tcp >,
< ∗. ∗ . ∗ .∗, ∗, 161.120.33.40, 53, udp >,
< 140.192.37.∗, ∗, 161.120.33.∗, ∗, udp >}
(4.22)
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We remind that we ignore the default rule while identifying the RDinf (PEP ).
4.7.2 Objective of RD(PEP ) approximations and methodol-
ogy
Our objective at this stage is to analyze diﬀerent possibilities of a comprehensive
and appropriate approximation of RD(PEP ) without loosing the speciﬁcities of
the deployed PEP. The RDinf (PEP ) is considered as the unique starting point
for all the approximations. Based on RDinf (PEP ), we deﬁne inferences opera-
tions to build diﬀerent versions of approximated Responsibility Domain denoted as
RDapprx(PEP ). These operations consider the relations between rules and charac-
terizations of selectors, their combination properties. We detail them in the two
next paragraphs.
The diﬀerent approximations that we propose can be split in two major categories:
• Rule-based (rb) approximations: It is based on rules which are represented by
the rows of the Confselectors(PEP ) matrix.
• Selector-based (sb) approximations: It is based on values aﬀected to selectors
across columns of the Confselectors(PEP ) matrix.
RDinf 
RDrb_apprx1 RDrb_apprx2 
RDsb_apprx1 
RDsb_apprx2 
rb() 
gen() 
sb() 
Figure 4.8 - Overview of Responsibility Domain Approximations.
Figure 4.8 represents an overview of the diﬀerent steps and approximation functions.
rb() : U −→ U
RDinf (PEP ) −→ RDrb_apprx1(PEP ) (4.23)
The ﬁrst rule-based approximation RDrb_apprx1(PEP ) is the result of the application
of the function rb(RDinf ) to all vectors of RDinf (PEP ).
sb() : U −→ U
RDinf (PEP ) −→ RDsb_apprx1(PEP ) (4.24)
The ﬁrst selector-based approximation RDsb_apprx1(PEP ) is the result of the appli-
cation of the function sb(RDinf ) to all vectors of RDinf (PEP ).
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We respectively detail these functions: rb() and sb() in Sections 4.7.3.1 and 4.7.4.1.
gen() : U −→ U
< sj, j ∈ [1 . . . n] >7−→< δkj , j ∈ [1 . . . n] > (4.25)
This function, gen(), refers to a generalization process which considers the Selector
Domain Partition defined in paragraph 4.3. For each selector instantiation, sj, gen()
identifies the corresponding partition of sj. The resulting vector will be a tuple of
these generalized partitions.
4.7.3 Rule-based approximations of RD(PEP )
4.7.3.1 First rb_approximation of RD(PEP )
RDrb_apprx1(PEP ) is the result of rb(RDinf (PEP )) which performs several inference
operations as explained before.
Inference operations performed by rb()
• If RD(r1) and RD(r2) are Completely Disjoint , we include both of these
rules. In the approximation algorithm described below, this operation is repre-
sented by ←.
• If RD(r1) and RD(r2) are Exactly Matched , we keep only one rule since they
represent the same Responsibility Domain.
• If RD(r1) and RD(r2) are Inclusively Matched , then:
∃ j′ ∈ [1 . . . n] such that r1(Sj′) ⊂ r2(Sj′) (4.26)
As shown in figure 4.7, in this relation, there is a rule with a larger Responsi-
bility Domain. In our approximation, we only retain this rule. In the approxi-
mation algorithm described below, this operation is represented by ←.
• If RD(r1) and RD(r2) are Partially Matched , then:
∃ i′ ∈ [1 . . . n] such that r1(Si′) 4 r2(Si′) (4.27)
As shown in figure 4.7, in this relation, the two rules have a common area. We
merge these two Responsibility Domains while verifying the SCombinability
function. In the approximation algorithm described below, this operation is
represented by +. If the SCombinability function is not verified, we keep both
Responsibility Domains.
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• Case of Correlated Responsibility Domains:
If RD(r1) and RD(r2) are Correlated , then:
∃ j′, j′′ ∈ [1 . . . n] such that r1(Sj′) ⊂ r2(Sj′)
r1(Sj′′) ⊃ r2(Sj′′) (4.28)
We merge these two Responsibility Domains while verifying the SCombin-
ability function
Algorithm 1 RDrb_apprx1(PEP )← Approximation_RD(PEP)_1(RDinf (PEP ))
1: Input: RDinf (PEP )
2: Output: RDrb_apprx1(PEP ) /* first rb_approximation result of the RD(PEP )
*/
3: k = 1
4: RD(r′1) = RD(r1)
5: RDrb_apprx1(PEP ) = {RD(r′1)}
6: for all i ∈ [2 . . .m] do
7: for all k ∈ [1 . . . lentgh(RDrb_apprx1(PEP ))] do
8: R← verifyR(RD(ri), RD(r′k))
9: if R = IM(RD(r′k), RD(ri)) & SCombinability(sj, j ∈ [1 . . . n]) = true
then
10: RD(r′k)← RD(ri)
11: else if R = PM(RD(r′k), RD(ri)) & SCombinability(sj, j ∈ [1 . . . n]) =
true then
12: RD(r′k)← RD(r′k) + RD(ri)
13: else if R = CD(RD(r′k), RD(ri)) & SCombinability(sj, j ∈ [1 . . . n]) =
true then
14: RD(r′k)← RD(r′k) + RD(ri)
15: else if R = C(RD(r′k), RD(ri)) & SCombinability(sj, j ∈ [1 . . . n]) = true
then
16: RD(r′k)← RD(r′k) + RD(ri)
17: else if R = EM(RD(r′k), RD(ri)) & SCombinability(sj, j ∈ [1 . . . n]) =
true then
18: RD(r′k)← RD(ri)
19: else
20: RDrb_apprx1(PEP )← RDrb_apprx1(PEP ) + RD(ri))
21: k ← k + 1
22: end if
23: end for
24: end for
25: return RDrb_apprx1(PEP )
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RDrb_apprx1(PEP ) Algorithm: RDrb_apprx1(PEP ) is a set of vectors RD(r′k) de-
rived from RDinf (PEP ).
Our approximation algorithm takes into account the relationships between rules and
the constraints of combinability on selectors defined above. Algorithm 1 shows the
different steps of the approximation algorithm. The RDrb_apprx1(PEP ) is first ini-
tialized by RD(r1). Then, we iterate the RDinf (PEP ) to check the existence of the
defined relationships between RD(ri) and RD(r′k). For each discovered relationship,
we append the RDrb_apprx1(PEP ) with the corresponding elementary RD. We de-
note R the discovered relationships between RD(ri) and RD(r′k).
VerifyR is a function which identifies the relationship that exists between two dif-
ferent Responsibility Domains. length(RD(PEP )) is the number of vectors in the
responsibility domain.
Running example In this paragraph, we detail the application of the first rb-
approximation of RD(PEP ) on our running example. m = 9 represents the number
of configured rules while ignoring the default rules. In Algorithm 2, we detail the
application of Algorithm 1 and we indicate for each action the corresponding line
number in algorithm 1.
The result of RDrb_apprx1(Firewall) is represented in Equation 4.29:
RDrb_apprx1(Firewall) =
{< ∗. ∗ . ∗ .∗, ∗, 161.120.33.40, {80, 21, 53}, {tcp, udp} >,
< 140.192.37.∗, ∗, ∗. ∗ . ∗ .∗, {80, 21}, tcp >,
< 140.192.37.∗, ∗, 161.120.33.∗, ∗, udp >}
(4.29)
RDrb_apprx1(Firewall) is a concise representation of RDinf (Firewall).
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Algorithm 2 RDrb_apprx1(Firewall)←
Approximation_RD(Firewall)_1(RDinf (Firewall))
Input: RDinf (Firewall)
Output: RDrb_apprx1(Firewall)
k = 1 and i = 1
4: RD(r′1) = RD(r1) =< 140.192.37.∗, ∗, 161.120.33.40, 80, tcp >
RDrb_apprx1(Firewall) = {RD(r′1)}
9: for i = 2 R = IM(RD(r2), RD(r′1)) &
SCombinability(sj, j ∈ [1 . . . n]) = true
RD(r′1)← RD(r2)
19-21: for i = 3 R = C(RD(r3), RD(r′1)) &
SCombinability(sj, j ∈ [1 . . . n]) = false
RDrb_apprx1(Firewall)← RDrb_apprx1(Firewall) + RD(r3))
RD(r′2) = RD(r3) RDrb_apprx1(PEP ) = {RD(r′1), RD(r′2)}
k ← k + 1
for i = 4 and for k = 1, R = C(RD(r4), RD(r′1)) &
SCombinability(sj, j ∈ [1 . . . n]) = false
9: for k = 2, R = IM(RD(r′2), RD(r4)) &
SCombinability(sj, j ∈ [1 . . . n]) = true
10: RD(r′2)← RD(r4)
for i = 5 and for k = 1, R = PM(RD(r5), RD(r′1)) &
SCombinability(sj, j ∈ [1 . . . n]) = false
11: for k = 2, R = PM(RD(r5), RD(r′2)) &
SCombinability(sj, j ∈ [1 . . . n]) = true
12: RD(r′2)← RD(r′2) +RD(r5)
RD(r′2) =< 140.192.37.∗, ∗, 161.120.33.40, {80, 21}, tcp >
for i = 6 and for k = 1, R = C(RD(r6), RD(r′1)) &
SCombinability(sj, j ∈ [1 . . . n]) = false
9: for k = 2, R = IM(RD(r6), RD(r′2))
10: RD(r′2)
11: for i = 7 and for k = 1, R = PM(RD(r7), RD(r′1)) &
SCombinability(sj, j ∈ [1 . . . n]) = true
12: RD(r′1)← RD(r′1) +RD(r7)
RD(r′1) =< ∗. ∗ . ∗ .∗, ∗, 161.120.33.40, {80, 21}, tcp >
11: for i = 8 and for k = 1, R = PM(RD(r8), RD(r′1)) &
SCombinability(sj, j ∈ [1 . . . n]) = true
RD(r′1)← RD(r′1) +RD(r8)
12: RD(r′1) =< ∗. ∗ . ∗ .∗, ∗, 161.120.33.40, {80, 21, 53}, {tcp, udp} >
19-21: for i = 9 and for k = 1, R = C(RD(r9), RD(r′1)) &
SCombinability(sj, j ∈ [1 . . . n]) = false
19-21: for k = 2, R = C(RD(r9), RD(r′2)) &
SCombinability(sj, j ∈ [1 . . . n]) = false
20: RDrb_apprx1(Firewall)← RDrb_apprx1(Firewall) + RD(r9))
RD(r′3) = RD(r9) RDrb_apprx1(PEP ) = {RD(r′1), RD(r′2), RD(r′3)}
21: k ← k + 1
return 25: RDrb_apprx1(Firewall)
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4.7.3.2 Second rb_approximation of RD(PEP )
A drawback of the first approximation is that it closely depends, by construction,
on the configuration of the PEP. This causes a limited view of the real enforcement
coverage of the PEP, since we only consider the configured values of selectors in
rules and their combinations. But, the enforcement coverage of the PEP may be
larger than inspecting only specific values and it may be capable to control a larger
range of values.
Our second approximation of RD(PEP ) relies on selector taxonomy defined in
paragraph 4.3.1. The objective at this stage, is the relaxation of the estimated
RDrb_apprx1(PEP ) in order to get more realistic view of the PEP’s enforcement
coverage.
We perform gen() function on the set of vectors of RDrb_apprx1(PEP ). For example,
if the selector has a specific host IP address, then, we replace it with its corresponding
sub-network. This operation is performed by the line 8 of the algorithm 3 where
we identify the corresponding generalized domain δk(Sj) such that ri(Sj) ⊂ δk(Sj).
Hereafter, we detail the second approximation algorithm 3.
We denote by mrb_apprx1 the number of rules in RDrb_apprx1(PEP ).
Algorithm 3RDrb_apprx2(PEP )← Approximation_RD(PEP)_2(RDrb_apprx1(PEP ))
1: Input: RDrb_apprx1(PEP )
2: Output: RDrb_apprx2(PEP ) /* second rb_approximation result of the
RD(PEP ) */
3: for all i ∈ [1 . . .mrb_apprx1 ] do
4: for all j ∈ [1 . . . n] do
5: while ri(Sj) 6= D(Sj) and ri(Sj) 6= δk(Sj) do
6: identify δk(Sj) such that ri(Sj) ⊂ δk(Sj)
7: ri(Sj)← δk(Sj)
8: end while
9: end for
10: end for
11: RDrb_apprx2(PEP )←
⋃
i∈[1...mrb_apprx1 ]
ri(Sj), j ∈ [1 . . . n]
12: return RDrb_apprx2(PEP )
Example We consider the example listed above: RDrb_apprx1(Firewall) and we
perform the second approximation algorithm as detailed in Algorithm 4.
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Algorithm 4 RDrb_apprx2(Firewall)← Approximation_RD(Firewall)_2
(RDrb_apprx1(Firewall))
Input: RDrb_apprx1(Firewall)
Output: RDrb_apprx2(Firewall)
for i = 1
for j = 1
5: r1(S1) = D(S1)
for j = 2
5: r1(S2) = D(S(2))
for j = 3
6: r1(S3) ⊂ δ1(S3) = [161.120.33.0/24]
7: r1(S3)← δ1(S3)
for j = 4
6: r1(S4) ⊂ δ1(S4) = [0 . . . 1023]
7: r1(S4)← δ1(S4)
for j = 5
5: r1(S5) = D(S5)
for i = 2
for j = 1
5: r1(S1) = δ2(S1)
for j = 2
5: r1(S2) = D(S(2))
for j = 3
5: r1(S3) = D(S(3))
for j = 4
6: r1(S4) ⊂ δ1(S4) = [0 . . . 1023]
7: r1(S4)← δ1(S4)
for j = 5
5: r1(S5) = δ1(S5)
for i = 3
for j = 1
5: r1(S1) = δ2(S1)
for j = 2
5: r1(S2) = D(S(2))
for j = 3
5: r1(S3) = δ1(S3)
for j = 4
5: r1(S4) = D(S(4))
for j = 5
5: r1(S5) = δ2(S5)
11: RDrb_apprx2(Firewall)←
⋃
i∈[1...mrb_apprx1 ]
ri(Sj), j ∈ [1 . . . n]
return RDrb_apprx2(Firewall)
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The result of RDrb_apprx2(Firewall) is represented in Equation 4.30:
RDrb_apprx2(Firewall) =
{< ∗. ∗ . ∗ .∗, ∗, 161.120.33.∗, [0 . . . 1023], {tcp, udp} >,
< 140.192.37.∗, ∗, ∗. ∗ . ∗ .∗, [0 . . . 1023], tcp >,
< 140.192.37.∗, ∗, 161.120.33.∗, ∗, udp >}
(4.30)
RDrb_apprx2(Firewall) has a dimension which represents most of the real enforce-
ment coverage of the Firewall. The advantage of this second approximation is that
it enables us to estimate the flow that may pass through the Firewall in a blind
manner.
4.7.4 Selector-based approximations of RD(PEP )
4.7.4.1 First sb_approximation of RD(PEP )
This approximation is based on the instantiated values for each selector along
RDinf (PEP ) denoted as Dsb_apprx1(Si). We consider the set of all the valid se-
lectors combinations where SCombinability(sj, j ∈ [1 . . . n]) = True. Algorithm 5
displays the different operations to build the first sb_approximation of RD(PEP ).
Within this approach, the wildcard is taken into account but is processed differently
following the verification of SCombinability function. In fact, if the administrator
does not set a specific value for a selector S along the configuration of the PEP,
we ignore this selector. In this case, the wildcard is used for all the vectors in
RDinf (PEP ). Therefore, the dimension of the PEP will be decreased by one as
described in Equation 4.31:
if ∃i′ such that Si′ = ∗ ∀ j ∈ [1 . . .m]
then Dim(PEP )← n− 1
n← n− 1
(4.31)
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Algorithm 5 RDsb_apprx1(PEP )← Approximation_RD(PEP)_3(RDinf (PEP ))
1: Input: RDinf (PEP )
2: Output: RDsb_apprx1(PEP ) /* first sb_approximation result of the RD(PEP )
*/
3: if ∃i′such that Si′ = ∗ ∀ j ∈ [1 . . .m] then
4: then n← n− 1
5: end if
6: for all i ∈ [1 . . . n] do
7: Dsb_apprx1(Si) = r1(Si)
8: end for
9: for all i ∈ [1 . . . n] do
10: for all j ∈ [2 . . .m] do
11: if rj(Si) 6= Dsb_apprx1(Si) or (Dsb_apprx1(Si) ⊂ rj(Si) and rj(Si) 6= ∗) then
12: Dsb_apprx1(Si)← Dsb_apprx1(Si) + rj(Si)
13: else if rj(Si) = ∗ then
14: Dsb_apprx1(Si)← Dsb_apprx1(Si) + rj(Si)
15: end if
16: end for
17: end for
18: RDsb_apprx1(PEP ) ← { ×
i=1...n
Dsb_apprx1(Si), such that SCombinability(si, i ∈
[1 . . . n]) = true}
19: return RDsb_apprx1(PEP )
Example We consider the example listed above: RDinf (Firewall) and we per-
form the third approximation algorithm. We notice that along all the rows of
RDinf (Firewall), the wildcard is assigned to selector src_port. Therefore, the
dimension of the Firewall is decreased by one.
In Algorithm 6, we detail the application of Algorithm 5 for the first selector which
is src_ip.
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Algorithm 6 RDsb_apprx1(Firewall)←
Approximation_RD(Firewall)_3(RDinf (Firewall))
Input: RDinf (Firewall)
Output: RDsb_apprx1(Firewall)
3: S3 = src_port = ∗ ∀ j ∈ [1 . . . 9]
4: then 5← 4
for all 6: i ∈ [1 . . . 4] do
7: Dsb_apprx1(Si) = r1(Si)
end for
for i = 1
for j = 2
13: r2(S1) = ∗
14: Dsb_apprx1(S1)← Dsb_apprx1(S1) + ∗
for j = 3
r3(S1) ⊂ Dsb_apprx1(S1)(1)
for j = 4
r4(S1) = Dsb_apprx1(S1)(1)
for j = 5
r5(S1) ⊂ Dsb_apprx1(S1)(1)
for j = 6
r6(S1) = Dsb_apprx1(S1)(1)
for j = 7
r7(S1) = Dsb_apprx1(S1)(1)
for j = 8
r2(S1) = ∗
for j = 9
r9(S1) = Dsb_apprx1(S1)(1)
18: RDsb_apprx1(Firewall)← { ×
i=1...4
Dsb_apprx1(Si), such that SCombinability(si, i ∈
[1 . . . 4]) = true}
return 19: RDsb_apprx1(Firewall)
Hereafter in Equation 4.32, we detail the result of the differentDsb_apprx1 domains
of the Firewall selectors.
Dsb_apprx1(src_ip) = {140.192.37.∗, ∗. ∗ . ∗ .∗}
Dsb_apprx1(dst_ip) = {161.120.33.∗, ∗. ∗ . ∗ .∗}
Dsb_apprx1(dst_port) = {21, 53, 80, ∗}
Dsb_apprx1(p) = {tcp, udp}
(4.32)
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The result of RDsb_apprx1(Firewall) is represented in Equation 4.33:
RDsb_apprx1(Firewall) = {Dsb_apprx1(src_ip)×Dsb_apprx1(dst_ip)
×Dsb_apprx1(dst_port)×Dsb_apprx1(p),
such that :
SCombinability (sj, j ∈ [1 . . . 5]) = True}
(4.33)
4.7.4.2 Second sb_approximation of RD(PEP )
At this stage of approximations, we apply the generalization function, gen(), on
Dsb_apprx1(Sj) domains. As a consequence, we consider larger range of values for
selectors referring to its domain decomposition.
RDsb_apprx2(PEP )← { ×
j=1...n
gen(Dsb_apprx1(Sj)), such that
SCombinability(sj, j ∈ [1 . . . n]) = True}
(4.34)
Algorithm 7RDsb_apprx2(PEP )← Approximation_RD(PEP)_2(RDsb_apprx1(PEP ))
1: Input: RDsb_apprx1(PEP )
2: Output: RDsb_apprx2(PEP ) /* second sb_approximation result of the
RD(PEP ) */
3: for all j ∈ [1 . . . n] do
4: identify δk(Sj) such that Dsb_apprx1(Sj) ⊂ δk(Sj)
5: Dsb_apprx2(Sj)← δk(Sj)
6: end for
7: RDsb_apprx2(PEP ) ← { ×
j=1...n
Dsb_apprx2(Sj), such that SCombinability(sj, j ∈
[1 . . . n]) = true}
8: return RDsb_apprx2(PEP )
4.8 Analysis of RD(PEP ) Approximations and In-
terpretations
4.8.1 RD(PEP ) Approximations Properties
As explained above, all the approximations closely depends on the configuration of
the deployed PEP . Therefore, as depicted in figure 4.9, several relations would exist
between these approximations:
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• Totally Inclusive Approximations: The application of gen() function re-
sults in a generalization of the selectors values.
RDrb_apprx1(PEP ) ⊆ RDrb_apprx2(PEP )
⇒ | RDrb_apprx1(PEP ) |6| RDrb_apprx2(PEP ) | (4.35)
RDrb_apprx2(PEP ) includes additional combination with values of a common
generalized sub-domains δk(S) for one selector. Thus, as shown in Equation
4.35, the number of vectors, i.e. the cardinality of RDrb_apprx1(PEP ), is lower
than the cardinality of RDrb_apprx2(PEP ).
Proof:
| RDrb_apprx1(PEP ) | =
∑
k∈[1...mrb_apprx1]
| RD(r′k) |
=
∑
k∈[1...mrb_apprx1]
∏
j∈[1...n]
| s′kj |
≤ ∑
k∈[1...mrb_apprx1]
∏
j∈[1...n]
| gen(s′kj) |
≤ | RDrb_apprx2(PEP ) |
RDrb_apprx1(PEP ) and RDsb_apprx1(PEP ) are also Inclusive domains because
of the generation of additional selector values combinations when building
RDsb_apprx1(PEP ). Thus, as shown in Equation 4.36, the cardinality of
RDrb_apprx1(PEP ) is lower than the cardinality of RDsb_apprx1(PEP ).
RDrb_apprx1(PEP ) ⊂ RDsb_apprx1(PEP )
⇒ | RDrb_apprx1(PEP ) |6| RDsb_apprx1(PEP ) | (4.36)
Moreover, since the approximation RDsb_apprx2(PEP ) includes all the possible
combinations between values of selectors generalized sub-domains, it will in-
clude RDrb_apprx1(PEP ),
RDrb_apprx2(PEP ) and RDsb_apprx1(PEP ).
Depending on the configured values sij in Confselectors(PEP ), it is possible
that RDsb_apprx1(PEP ) is included in RDrb_apprx2(PEP ), Figure 4.9 (b) or
RDrb_apprx2(PEP ) is included in
RDsb_apprx1(PEP ), Figure 4.9 (c).
Proof:
if ∀j ∈ [1 . . . n], ∃kj ∈ [1 . . . lj] such that
Dsb_apprx1(Sj) ⊆ δkj
then ×
j=1...n
Dsb_apprx1(Sj) ⊆ ×
j=1...n
δkj
thenRDsb_apprx1(PEP ) ⊆ RDrb_apprx2(PEP )
• Partially Joint Approximations:
Both of RDrb_apprx2(PEP ) and RDsb_apprx1 may have a common set of vectors
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which is at least the RDrb_apprx1 as shown in Figure 4.9 (a).
Proof:
if for j, j′ ∈ [1 . . . n] with j 	= j′, ∃kj, kj′ ∈ [1 . . . lj]
such that δkj 	= δkj′
then ×
j=1...n
Dsb_apprx1(Sj) 	= ×
j=1...n
δkj
thenRDsb_apprx1(PEP ) ⊆ RDrb_apprx2(PEP )
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Figure 4.9 - Relationships between the proposed approximations.
4.8.2 Qualitative Analysis: Approximation Accuracy metric
Use case
In this Section, we consider the Running Example deﬁned in Section 4.4.
Identiﬁcation of RDsup(Firewall): As mentioned in the Deﬁnition 5, the RDsup
of a deployed PEP includes the set of all possible vectors characterizing the ﬂow that
may pass through the PEP. We denote by Dsup(S) the real domain of a Selector S.
It is identiﬁed by considering the topological information about the network.
Dsup(src_ip) = {140.192.37.∗, 161.120.33.∗, ∗. ∗ . ∗ .∗}
Dsup(dst_ip) = {140.192.37.∗, 161.120.33.∗, ∗. ∗ . ∗ .∗}
Dsup(p) = {tcp, udp, icmp}
(4.37)
RDsup(Firewall) = {Dsup(src_ip)
×Dsup(dst_ip)×Dsup(p),
such that :
SCombinability (sj, j ∈ [1 . . . n]) = True}
(4.38)
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Table 4.3 - Evaluation of Approximation Accuracy Metric of the
running example
RDinf RDrb_apprx1 RDrb_apprx2 RDsb_apprx1 RDsb_apprx2
Λ(RDapprx(PEP )) 4 ∗ 10−11 2, 5 ∗ 10−8 1, 3 ∗ 10−3 3, 9 ∗ 10−3 3, 9 ∗ 10−3
In Section 4.7, we identified the approximations of RD(Firewall) based on
RDinf (Firewall). These approximations correspond to the case of Figure 4.9 (c).
Approximation Accuracy has been introduced in several mathematical theories
such as approximation theory, rough set, fuzzy set, etc. In our approach, we pro-
pose to apply this metric in order to evaluate how accurate the approximations are
regarding the real Responsibility Domain of the PEP. We adapt the Approximation
Accuracy expression defined in Rough Set Theory [99]. In [99], the author define the
Accuracy Approximation as a measure to express the quality of the approximation.
In Equation 4.39, we define the Approximation Accuracy of RDapprx(PEP ) which
we denote as Λ(RDapprx(PEP )) as:
Λ(RDapprx(PEP )) =
|RDapprx(PEP )|
|RDsup(PEP )| (4.39)
Obviously, 0 < Λ(RDinf (PEP )) ≤ Λ(RDapprx(PEP )) ≤ 1 for any RDapprx(PEP ).
Following the definition of the approximation of the Responsibility Domain, it is
more accurate when Λ(RDapprx(PEP )) is closer to 1.
In Table 4.3, we evaluate this metric for the different approximations of the run-
ning example. Based on results shown in Table 4.3, the Approximation Accu-
racy of approximations RDsb_apprx1 and RDsb_apprx2 is 108 times bigger than the
Λ(RDinf (PEP )). In this case, selector-based approximations are more appropriate
than rule-based approximations.
4.9 Applications
The proposed PEP model can be used in several security applications. Hereafter,
we detail some of these applications.
4.9.1 Policy anomalies detection
Security Policy anomalies are one of the most critical security issue in a network.
Rule misconfiguration induce security policy conflicts either within a single pol-
icy (intra-policy conflicts) or between policies in different devices (inter-policy con-
flicts), [14]. In [14], authors present a taxonomy of security policy conflicts. The
most common policy conflict occurs when different access control decisions are ap-
plied on the same flow.
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Conflict detection can be considered as an easy task to cope with in an environment
with a single PEP. However, it becomes a challenging task and error-prone in an
environment with distributed PEP. Referring to our model, conflict detection can
be defined as overlapping domains between different RDinf (PEP ) on which differ-
ent decisions (dk1 and dk2 ∈ {dk}k∈[1...p]) are applied. Our proposed PEP model is
abstract enough to allow us to identify these overlapping domains between several
PEPs. In Equation 4.40, we express the inter-PEP conflict detection process using
our PEP model.
if RDinf (PEP1) ∩RDinf (PEP2) 6= 
⇒ if ∃ dk1 , dk2 ∈ [d1 . . . dp], such that dk1 6= dk2
and corresponds to common rules RDinf (PEP1) ∩RDinf (PEP2)
⇒ Conflict(PEP1, PEP2) = True
(4.40)
Conflict(PEP1, PEP2) is a Boolean function which returns True if there is an inter-
conflict between PEP1 and PEP2. Otherwise, it returns False.
4.9.2 Intrusion Detection Assessment
Scenario-based IDS usually rely on attack signatures when generating alerts. Attack
signatures allow IDSs examining the events monitored in the supervised network by
providing attack description specification. Cuppens et Al. [76] define LAMBDA,
an attack description language. In LAMBDA, an attack is a combination of ac-
tions with additional statements related to the supervised network. LAMBDA lan-
guage specifies the pre-conditions that should be satisfied by the supervised net-
work for an attack to be feasible [76]. It also specifies the post-conditions of an
attack. Post-conditions are the effects of a successful execution of an attack. In
Figure 4.10, we show an example of a LAMBDA attack description. Pre-conditions
and post-conditions are a set of logical conditions respectively denoted by Cpre and
Cpost. From Figure 4.10, remote_access(A,H) is an example of a condition Cpre.
knows(A, use_serviceH, portmapper)) is an example of Cpost. In practice, pre and
post conditions are elements that can be identified based on the attack signature
and more specifically based on the exploited vulnerability 1. IDS relies on these sig-
natures in order to detect attacks and generate alerts. Alerts are messages including
information about the potential attack instantiation. Following the PEP function
given in Equation 4.2 and the LAMBDA description language, we model network
1Open Source Vulnerability Database: OSVDB, http://www.osvdb.org/
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Figure 4.10 - LAMBDA attack description: an example [76].
IDS systems (denoted by netIDS) in Equation 4.41:
netIDS : < D(Aatt)×D(pre) >−→ {dk,k∈[1...pids]), D(post)}
where: D(Aatt) =< D(src_ip)×D(src_port)×D(dst_ip)
×D(dst_port)×D(p) >
D(pre) = {Cpre,ipre , ipre ∈ [1 . . . ppre]}
D(post) = {Cpost,ipost , ipost ∈ [1 . . . ppost]}
(4.41)
D(Aatt) represents selectors domain identifying the attack characteristics. It in-
cludes a common set of selectors as defined in the example of netFW . D(pre) is
the domain of the pre-conditions that are defined based on the signature database
of netIDS. D(post) is the domain of the post-conditions of the successful detected
attacks. dk, k ∈ [1 . . . pIDS], is the intrusion detection decision (generate alert or not)
that is applied by the netIDS. Note that post-conditions are considered to be one of
the decisions taken by the netIDS. In fact, once an attack is detected, the netIDS
identifies the real consequences of this attack by considering the attack signature
allowing the detection of the attack and the properties of the supervised network.
Using the model expressed in Equation 4.41, it becomes straightforward to evalu-
ate the capability of the netIDS in detecting different attack scenarios. In fact, if
∃ Cpost ∈ D(post) such that Cpost ∈⊂ D(pre), then, it is possible to detect elemen-
tary attacks that potentially belong to a same attack scenario.
Our model allows the security administrator to identify IDSs that are capable to col-
laborate in detecting attack scenarios. We note netIDS1 and netIDS2 two different
IDSs and (D1(pre), D1(post)) and (D2(pre), D2(post)) their corresponding domains
of pre-conditions and post-conditions. netIDS1 and netIDS2 are capable to collab-
orate in detecting attack scenarios if ∃ Cpost ∈ D2(post) such that Cpost ∈⊂ D1(pre).
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4.10 Conclusion
We introduce a novel concept to model Policy Enforcement Point by their Respon-
sibility Domain, RD(PEP ). We first characterize the PEP by the set of selectors.
Then, we define the Responsibility Domain of a configured rule RD(r). We analyze
the relationships that may exist between these domains and define a set of approxi-
mation inferences. Based on the different properties that exist between RD(r) and
the characterization of selectors, we give different approximations of the RD(PEP ).
We have shown that these approximations have different properties and multiple use
cases. The advantage of our methodology to approximate RD(PEP ) is the perfor-
mance in a ’blind manner’. Also, the consideration of the PEP configuration makes
the approximations more useful for response decision.
76
Chapter 5
Enforcement-based Alert
Correlation Framework
Contents
5.1 Definition and Framework Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.1.1 Definition and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.1.2 Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.2 Alignment Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.2.1 1st option: From IDMEF to PEP class . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.2.2 2nd option: from PEP class to IDMEF . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.2.3 Comparison between alignment options . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.3 Membership function: Alert ∈ RD(PEP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.4 Enforcement-based alert correlation workflow . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.1 Definition and Framework Description
5.1.1 Definition and Objectives
Alerts are correlated if they share a common (set of) PEP(s) capable of applying a
countermeasure on the flow corresponding to the alert.
Definition 6 Enforcement-based Alert Correlation : Given a set of alerts and
a set of deployed PEP, the Enforcement-based Alert Correlation groups alerts that
can be processed by a common PEPs.
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In Equation 5.1, we write the basic correlation inference used in our Enforcement-
based Alert Correlation approach.
A1 ∈ RD(PEP1) ∧ A2 ∈ RD(PEP1) ∧ . . .
=⇒ Aec = 〈(A1, A2, . . .), PEP1〉 (5.1)
A1 and A2 are two different alerts. RD(PEP1) is the Responsibility Domain of the
PEP1.
Aec represents the Enforcement-based Correlated Alert. It is composed of two com-
ponents. The first component includes the set of correlated alerts. The second com-
ponent includes the PEP(s) that is (are) capable to process the correlated alerts.
Aec is intended to group one or more generated alerts together, to say "these alerts
can be processed by the same PEP(s)".
5.1.2 Framework
The Policy Enforcement-based Alert Correlation Engine (PEACE) represented in
Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 is the core of our framework. It is responsible of checking
which alerts can be processed by a same set of PEP(s).
The configurations of deployed PEPs are retrieved and sent to the RD-Approximator.
This latter performs the proposed approximations on collected configurations. Ap-
proximations are stored in a centralized database which is RD_DB. PEACE is
then able to process the received alerts {A1, A2, . . . , Ant}. nt is the number of alerts
generated during a period of time t.
The PEACE framework provides the security administrator with a set of correlated
alerts {Aec1 , Aec2 , . . . , Aecna′}, where na′ ≤ na.
5.2 Alignment Functions
The membership verification, A ∈ RD(PEP ), mentioned in Equation 5.1, requires
that both A and RD(PEP ) are represented following the same multidimensional
domain. However, on one hand, alerts are expressed in IDMEF. On the other hand,
deployed PEPs are represented according to their PEP class domain as defined in
Definition 1. These discrepancies between the IDMEF standard and PEP class
expressions leads to semantic and syntactic differences which prevent us from easily
computing the membership function defined in 5.3. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 and 5.3 allows
to align the IDMEF attributes and PEP selectors. In IDMEF standard, Source and
Target classes contain respectively information about the possible source(s) and
target(s) of the event(s) that generated an alert. Since Source and Target have
almost the same aggregation classes and attributes, we restrict our comparison in
Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 on the Source class.
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Figure 5.1 - PEACE Framework with alignment function option
1.
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Thus, PEACE requires to align alert domains with the PEPs’ Responsibility
Domains. To meet this requirement, we propose some Alignment Functions. Two
Table 5.2 - Analogy between IDMEF attributes and selectors of
three PEPs (Iptable, ModSecurity, LDAP)
hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhIDMEF (Source class)
PEP
iptable ModSecurity LDAP
Attribute Type Selector Type Selector Type Selector Type
User
Category enum - -
(Request-
Body) string - -
U
se
rI
d
type enum - - - - - -
name string –uid-owner string
Remote-
User string
username,
cn, user,
givenName
string
number integer - - - - - -
Table 5.3 - Analogy between IDMEF attributes and selectors of
three PEPs (Iptable, ModSecurity, LDAP)
hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhIDMEF (Source class)
PEP
iptable ModSecurity LDAP
Attribute Type Selector Type Selector Type Selector Type
Service
ip_version integer - - - - - -
iana_protocol_number integer - - - - - -
iana_protocol_name string - - - - - -
port integer -sport integer Remote-Port integer
peername.ip
= ipv4
[%net-
mask] [
port]
integer
portlist string - - - - - -
protocol string -p string - - - -
options are possible for Alignment Functions.
5.2.1 1st option: From IDMEF to PEP class
This option consists of aligning the received IDMEF alert with the PEP class. In
this case, Alignment has to be performed on each received alert. In Equation 5.2,
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we give the generic expression of Alignment Functions of the 1st option. We denote
it by alignPEP .
alignPEP : Dom(IDMEF ) −→ Dom(PEP )
A −→ A′ = alignPEP (A)
where A =< a1, a2, . . . , anidmef >
and A′ =< a′1, a
′
2, . . . , a
′
npep >
(5.2)
Dom(IDMEF ) is a multidimensional domain including the diﬀerent attributes de-
ﬁned in the IDMEF standard. nidmef is the number of IDMEF attributes present in
an alert A.
Each attribute a′i, i ∈ [1 . . . npep], follows the semantics of selector Si of the corre-
sponding class of PEP. If the alignment function does not ﬁnd in the IDMEF Alert
A the necessary information to ﬁll attributes a′, they will be set as empty.
Alignment Function is the composition of diﬀerent elementary operations as shown
in Figure 5.3. Hereafter, we deﬁne the three alignment operations used within the
Projection 
endo-Deduction 
Exo-Deduction 
alignPEP 
A = < a1, a2, …, anidmef  > A’ = < a’1, a’2, …, a’npep  > 
Ext 
Dom(PEP) 
Figure 5.3 - Alignment Function: 1st option.
Alignment Function:
• Projection: this operation extracts the selector Si directly from the IDMEF
alert. For instance, based on Tables 5.1 and 5.2 and 5.3, projection function
are performed on elements that are not written in bold or underlined. No
additional operations are performed on the corresponding attribute. In this
case, the attribute aj, j ∈ [1 . . . nidmef ] has the semantics of selector Si.
• endo-Deduction: this function performs a ﬁrst order inference in order to
instantiate the appropriate attribute a′j in the alert A′ as described in Equation
5.3. a′j is of the same semantic of Selector Sj, j ∈ [1 . . . npep].
if (ai = val1 ∧ ai′ = val2 ∧ . . .)
=⇒ a′j = val3 (5.3)
val1 and val2 are respectively the information ﬁlled in attributes ai and ai′ .
val3 is the result of the inference which is the information of attribute a′j.
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From Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, elements that are in bold are to be used in endo-
Deduction alignment function.
• exo-Deduction: using the information of the alert and referring to an external
knowledge (represented by the "Ext" component in Figure 5.3 such as the
Geographical Location database, exo-Deduction operation infer the value of a
corresponding attribute a′j in the alert A′. Like endo-Deduction, exo-Deduction
is a set of ﬁrst order inferences. This alignment function considers underlined
elements in Table 5.1 such the GeoIP database.
5.2.2 2nd option: from PEP class to IDMEF
Contrary to the 1st option, Alignment Functions, in the 2nd option, performs align-
ment operations in order to align the Responsibility Domains of PEPs with the
IDMEF format as shown in Figure 5.4. In Equation 5.4, we give the expression of
alignment function of the 2nd option. We denote it by alignIDMEF .
Projection 
endo-Deduction 
Exo-Deduction 
alignIDMEF 
r = < s11, s12, …, s1npep  > r’ = < s’11, s’12, …, s’1nidmef   > 
Ext 
RD(PEP) nPEP RD(PEP) nidmef 
Figure 5.4 - Alignment Function: 2nd option.
alignIDMEF : Dom(PEP ) −→ Dom(IDMEF )
RD(PEP ) −→ RDidmef (PEP )
where Dim(RDidmef (PEP )) = nidmef
(5.4)
As discussed in Section 2.5, IDMEF has been conceived in order to ensure both
of syntactic and semantic interoperability. Therefore, the application of previously
described alignment operations becomes straightforward in the second option of
alignment function.
* ncpep is the number of deployed class of PEPs.
5.2.3 Comparison between alignment options
Alignment is performed during the pre-correlation phase. In Table 5.4, we compare
the two options while considering three important criteria: the execution of the
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Table 5.4 - Comparison between alignment options.
Criteria Option 1 Option 2
Process Online Oﬄine
Complexity ncpep × na ncpep
Time consuming Yes No
alignment process, time consumption and complexity.
The second option aligns Responsibility Domains of deployed classes of PEP. It is
performed in an oﬄine mode relative to the correlation process. The first option
aligns each alert once received with each deployed class of PEP. Such online perfor-
mance increases the delay of correlation execution. Based on this comparative table,
we can easily figure out that the second alignment option presents more interesting
advantages for correlation process. In fact, it presents the advantage of being less
time consuming because it has less complexity and can even be performed oﬄine
and not during correlation.
In the rest of this work, we assume that both alerts and Responsibility Domains
of deployed PEPs are presented in the same multi-dimensional domain. We will use
the notation defined in Equation 5.5 to represent both alert and PEP responsibility
domains.
A =< a1, a2, . . . , an >
RD(PEP ) =
⋃
j∈[1...nr]
< sj1, sj2, . . . , sjn >
=
⋃
j∈[1...nr]
vj
where nr is the number of RD(PEP) rule vectors vj.
(5.5)
5.3 Membership function: Alert ∈ RD(PEP)
The membership function in Equation 5.1 is a fundamental step for our Enforcement-
based Alert Correlation approach. Usually, a vector e =< e1, e2, . . . , en > is included
in an n-dimensional domain D if ∃ d ∈ D such that ∀i ∈ [1 . . . n], ei = di. We call
this property the membership of e in D.
In our context, exact membership means that the deployed PEP is able to implement
a countermeasure rule which is capable to process the alert. Therefore, it is necessary
to verify the membership function of the alert A within the RD(PEP ). We denote
it γ(A,RD(PEP )).
Since the RD(PEP ) is a set of nr vector rules, we first define the membership of the
alert within each Responsibility Domain of a rule vector vj (j ∈ [1 . . . nr]) denoted
by γj(A,RD(vj)). In Equation 5.6, we define γj(A,RD(vj)):
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γj(A,RD(vj)) = ×
i∈[1...n]
verif(ai, vji)
where ×is the multiplication operator of real set R.
and verif(ai, vji) =
{
1, if ai ⊆ vji.
0, otherwise.
(5.6)
The membership of the Alert A within the RD(PEP ) means that there exist at
least a rule vector vj whose the RD(vj) covers all the selectors of the Alert. We
define γ(A,RD(PEP )) in Equation 5.7.
γ(A,RD(PEP )) = u
j∈[1...nr]
(γj(A,RD(vj)))
where u is the logical OR operator
(5.7)
Note that:
γ(A,RD(PEP )) ∈ {0, 1} and we have:
ifγ(A,RD(PEP )) = 1,
⇒ membership of the alert A in the RD(PEP ).
ifγj(A,RD(PEP )) = 0,
⇒ non-membership of the alert A in the RD(PEP ).
5.4 Enforcement-based alert correlation workflow
In this section, we detail in Figure 5.5 the enforcement-based alert correlation work-
flow. It exposes the different steps that should be executed in order to decide whether
the PEP is able to process an alert A or not.
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Figure 5.5 - Enforcement-based alert correlation workflow with one
alert A.
The membership verification is the first step in this workflow. If the alert A
does not fall in the responsibility domain of a PEP, then another PEP will be
analyzed. If the alert A falls in the responsibility domain of a PEP, then the process
"identify rules in Conf(PEP )" is executed. The objective of this process is to
identify the potential rules that may be affected to implement the countermeasure.
After identifying the potential configured rules that can process the alert, we analyze
the possibilities of countermeasure implementation. Hereafter, the possibilities are
described:
• Modify existing rule’s decision;
• Modify configured values for specific selectors in configured rules;
• Create new rule in Conf(PEP ).
We may need external information, such as the vulnerability and the criticality of
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the attack, about the generated alerts when analyzing the response decision.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter introduces a novel alert correlation approach which based on the re-
sponsibility domain of a PEP. Since it is performed on mutli-dimensional elements,
we first study the representation requirements of alerts and responsibility domain.
For this aim, we propose alignment functions which allow the representation of alerts
and responsibility domain vectors in the same multi-dimensional space. We then de-
fine a membership function which allows the identification of PEP that can process
generated alert. Finally, the workflow of the proposed alert correlation approach is
detailed.
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6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we focus on studying the application of our enforcement-basedalert correlation. We first apply our approach on a single PEP environment. We
demonstrate how our alert correlation approach allows the identification of poten-
tial rules in order to react to attacks. We then examine the application of our
approach on a multi-PEP environment using a real case scenario. We explain how
our enforcement-based alert correlation is able to support the security administrator
in response decision and countermeasure implementation.
6.2 Application of PEACE on a single PEP use case
In this section, we detail the application of our proposed alert correlation approach
on a single PEP use case. Respecting Equation 5.5, we remind that both alerts
and Responsibility Domains of deployed PEPs are presented in the same multi-
dimensional domain. Hence, the membership function is performed on vectors with
same dimension.
The application on a single PEP use case assists the security administrator in iden-
tifying configured rules which will be modified in order to process correlated alerts.
Hereafter, we study the application of the proposed responsibility domains of a PEP
on our alert correlation.
6.2.1 Alert Correlation based on the RDinf(PEP )
As defined in Section 4.7, RDinf (PEP ) is composed of all the rule vectors configured
in the deployed PEP. Verifying the membership of an alert within RDinf (PEP )
implies the identification (as shown in Equation 6.1) of the appropriate rule vector
in the Confselectors(PEP ), which is capable to implement the reaction decision.
In such case, the reaction decision is generally a modification of the enforcement
decision applied by the rule.
A ∈ RDinf (PEP )⇒ ∃ i ∈ [1 . . . nr] \ ∀j ∈ [1 . . . n], aj ⊆ sij (6.1)
Two alerts, A1 =< a11, a12, . . . , a1n > and A2 =< a21, a22, . . . , a2n >, are correlated
based on RDinf (PEP ) when ∃ j1, j2 ∈ [1 . . . n] \ a1j ⊆ sij1and a2j ⊆ sij2 . There are
two possible cases:
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• Case 1: j1 = j2. Then, both of the alerts are processed by the same rule rj1 .
In this case, we define the Enforcement-based correlated alert as follow:
Aec = 〈(A1, A2), (rj1 , RDinf (PEP ))〉
This correlated alert specifies the rule vector that will processes the correlated
alerts A1 and A2.
• Case 2: j1 6= j2. Then, the two alerts can be processed by the same PEP but
not by the same rule.
Correlating alerts using RDinf (PEP ) provides more than the verification of the ca-
pability of the PEP to process the correlated alerts, it also identifies the capability of
each rule vector of RDinf (PEP ) in implementing a response decision. For instance,
in the case of a firewall, in order to process an alert, it is possible to modify an
accept to deny enforcement decision.
6.2.2 Alert Correlation based on Rule-based first approxima-
tion
As detailed in Chapter 4 , rule vectors of RDrb_apprx1(PEP ) are obtained by apply-
ing rb() inference functions on RDinf (PEP ). For instance, as shown in Equa-
tion 6.2, when two rule vectors RD(r1) and RD(r2) in RDinf (PEP ) are Par-
tially Matched and combinable, we merge them in a single rule RD(r1,2) vector
in RDrb_apprx1(PEP ).
RD(r1) =< 140.192.37.∗, ∗port, ∗ip, 80, tcp >
RD(r2) =< 140.192.37.30, ∗port, ∗ip, 21, tcp >
=⇒
rb()
RD(r1,2) =< 140.192.37.∗, ∗port, ∗ip, {21, 80}, tcp >
(6.2)
This inference instantiates a generalized rule vector RD(r1,2) which includes both
of RD(r1) and RD(r2). RDrb_apprx1(PEP ) correlates alerts that partially share
a common (sub)set of attributes. Thus, applying RDrb_apprx1(PEP ) in our alert
correlation approach allows to correlate alerts which can be processed by modifying
a common set of rules configured in the deployed PEP or defining new rules. For
instance, the following alerts detailed in Equation 6.3 are correlated with RD(r1,2).
Since this latter is the result of merging RD(r1) and RD(r2), we conclude that both
alerts A1 and A2 can be processed by rules r1 and r2.
A1 =< 140.192.37.140, 51000, 10.0.0.3, 80, {tcp} >
A2 =< 140.192.37.140, 4000, 10.0.0.5, 21, {tcp} > (6.3)
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6.2.3 Alert Correlation based on Selector-based first approx-
imation
As detailed in Chapter 4, rule vectors of RDrb_apprx1(PEP ) are obtained by applying
sb() function on RDinf (PEP ). The application of sb() function on RDinf (PEP )
consists on generating all the acceptable combinations between instantiated selector
values. For instance, as shown in Equation 6.4, the application of sb() function on
RDr1 , RDr2 and RDr3 results in RD(r1,2,3) which is built of all the combinations
between selector values defined in RDr1 , RDr2 and RDr3 .
RD(r1) =< 140.192.37.∗, ∗port, ∗ip, 80, tcp >
RD(r2) =< 140.192.37.30, ∗port, ∗ip, 21, tcp >
RD(r3) =< 140.192.37.20, ∗port, ∗ip, 53, udp >
=⇒
sb()
RD(r1,2,3) = {140.192.37. ∗ × ∗port ×∗ip
×{21, 53, 80} × {tcp, udp}}
(6.4)
RD(r1,2,3) includes additional rule vectors which are totally different from the input
rule vectors. Thus, Enforcement-based Alert Correlation based onRDsb_apprx1(PEP )
correlates alerts which will not be necessary processed by a common set of configured
rules.
6.2.4 Alert Correlation based on the generalized approxima-
tions
The gen() function is performed on both of rule-based and selector-based first ap-
proximations respectively denoted by RDrb_apprx1(PEP ) and RDsb_apprx1(PEP ).
gen() consists in expanding the approximated Responsibility Domain of the PEP
in order to have larger coverage of network flow vectors that may pass through the
PEP. This fact leads to a higher number of alerts that fall in the responsibility
domain of the considered PEP. For instance, applying gen() function on RD(r1,2)
listed in example 6.2 results in RDgen(r1,2) defined in Equation 6.5:
RDgen(r1,2) =< 140.192.37.∗, ∗port, ∗ip, [1 . . . 1024], {tcp} > (6.5)
The evaluation of RDgen(r1,2)coverage shows that gen() function increases the cov-
erage of RD(r1,2) by (210− 3) times. On the one hand, this Coverage Increase (CI)
explains how generalized approximations RDrb_apprx2(PEP ) or RDsb_apprx2(PEP )
allow us to correlated more alerts relative to the same PEP. On the other hand,
correlated alerts will be processed by different countermeasure implementations. In
this case, countermeasure implementations should be either modification of config-
ured rule vectors or insertion of a new rule vector in the configuration of the PEP.
Insertion of a new rule vector in a configuration of a PEP require a deep analysis
and study in terms of conflict detection and policy validation.
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Table 6.1 - Application of Responsibility Domain approximations
in PEACE: a comparative table.
Approximated
RD
Approximation
function impact on Alert Correlation
RDinf (PEP ) –
Alerts are correlated using exist-
ing configured rules.
+ Countermeasure implementa-
tion are immediately identified
− Restricted view on the PEP re-
sponsibility domain
− Alerts that can be processed by
injecting new rules are ignored
RDrb_apprx1(PEP ) rb(RDinf (PEP ))
Alerts are correlated by a set of
combinations between configured
rules
+ Countermeasure implementa-
tion implicates at least one con-
figured rule modification
− Alerts that can be processed by
injecting new rules are ignored
RDsb_apprx1(PEP ) sb(RDinf (PEP ))
Alerts are correlated regarding
all possible combination between
configured values of selectors
− Countermeasure implementa-
tion require deep analysis of in-
volved rules in processing corre-
lated alerts
− Alerts that can be processed by
injecting new rules with different
selectors values are ignored
RDrb_apprx2(PEP ) gen(RDrb_apprx1(PEP ))
Alerts are correlated regarding
generalized configured rules
− The amount of correlated alerts
depends on the distribution over
partitions of configured selectors
values
RDsb_apprx2(PEP ) gen(RDsb_apprx1(PEP ))
Alerts are correlated regarding
generalized configured selectors
values
− The amount of correlated alerts
depends on the distribution over
partitions of configured selectors
values
93
CHAPT 6. APPLICATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS
6.2.5 Interpretations and Analysis
We further compare the application of the different Responsibility Domain approxi-
mations on Alert Correlation. Since our proposed PEP responsibility domain model
is build following a bottom-up approach and in blind manner, there must be a trade-
off between correlation and the PEP responsibility domain approximation coverage.
Table 6.1 depicts the advantages and drawbacks of each responsibility domain ap-
proximations in Enforcement-based Alert Correlation.
The ability to correlated alerts increases with the Coverage Increase since the more
RDapprx(PEP ) is wider than RDinf (PEP ), the more we correlate alerts relative to
the PEP.
Definition 7 We define the Coverage Increase (CI) of the RD approximations
(RDapprx(PEP )), denoted by CI(RDapprx), as the additional rule vectors generated
by the approximation.
In Equation 6.6, we detail how CI is evaluated:
CI(RDapprx(PEP )) = |RDapprx(PEP )||RDinf (PEP )| (6.6)
This metric is evaluated for the example described in 4.4. Table 6.2 includes the
evaluations of this metric for the different approximations. In the second row of the
Table 6.2, we give an evaluation of the cardinality of each approximations which is
denoted by | (RDapprx(PEP ) |.
In the context of the running example, RDsb_apprx1 and RDsb_apprx2 have the same
set of vectors. In fact, the configured values for selectors throughout the rules totally
cover different partitions. Thus, in this case, the generalized function does not result
in an additional number of elements as we assert from the second row of Table 6.2.
Based on the evaluation of the coverage increase shown in Table 6.2, the generaliza-
tion function performed on responsibility domain approximations has an important
effect on the coverage increase. In our running example, it multiplies the cover-
age increase by 105 comparing it to the first rule-based approximation. This fact
increases the ability to correlate alerts.
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implementations in a single PEP environment
Table 6.2 - Evaluation of Coverage Increase Metric of the running
example
RDinf RDrb_apprx1 RDrb_apprx2 RDsb_apprx1 RDsb_apprx2
| (RDapprx(PEP ) | v 2, 16 ∗ 1017 13, 5 ∗ 1019 7 ∗ 1024 21 ∗ 1024 21 ∗ 1024
CI(RDapprx(PEP )) 1 6, 25 ∗ 102 3, 25 ∗ 107 9, 75 ∗ 107 9, 75 ∗ 107
6.3 Role of enforcement-based alert correlation in
countermeasure implementations in a single PEP
environment
In this section, we demonstrate how our correlation approach helps the security ad-
ministrator in implementing countermeasures. We explain how our alert correlation
approach enables us identifying PEPs that are capable to process a group of corre-
lated alerts. The question is: "Once the PEP is identified, is it possible to correlate
alerts based on the configured rules in order to optimize the countermeasure imple-
mentations?"
Since the responsibility domains approximations are build following a bottom up
approach as described in Chapter 4, it is possible to identify configured rules that
are to be modified in order to implement countermeasures. In our context, coun-
termeasures are the modifications brought to the existing configuration of the PEP
in order to mitigate detected attacks. These modifications includes for example ex-
panding the value defined in a configured rule for a selector or a subset of selectors,
merging two rules, etc.
Once alerts are correlated by a specific responsibility domain of a PEP, it is essential
to identify subsets of alerts which can be processed by common set of configured
rules. Figure 6.1, shows an example of the application of our enforcement-based
alert correlation in countermeasure implementations.
We deal with a simple case of a PEP with three configured rules denoted by r1,
r2 and r3. These rules are represented by the circles having the orange colour in
Figure 6.1. The responsibility domain approximation results on an RD(PEP) with
two rule vectors: v1 and v2. These rules are represented by the red circles. The set
{A1, A2, A3, A4, A5} represents the correlated alerts. Alerts are represented by green
circles.
We note that alerts A1, A2 and A3 were correlated regarding rule vector v1. Mean-
while, only A1 and A2 can be processed by rule r1. Alert A3 can be processed by
r2.
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RD(PEP) 
A1 
A4 A5 A2 
A3 
v1 
v2 
r2 
r1 
r3 
Figure 6.1 - Enforcement-based alert correlation and countermea-
sure implementation.
This distribution result of correlated alerts regarding conﬁgured rules can be
demonstrated by the coverage metric (CM) for a given alert A and a conﬁgured
rule r. This metric, denoted by CM(A, r), is evaluated using the function δ(A, r)
as deﬁned in Equation 6.7. In the Equation 6.7, Ak is a correlated alert with the
RD(PEP ) and rp is a conﬁgured rule in Conf(PEP ).
δ(Ak, rp) =< verif(ak1, rp1), verif(ak2, rp2), . . . , verif(akn, rpn) >
=< verif(aki, rpi) >i∈[1,...,n]
verif(aki, rpi) is the binary function deﬁned in Equation 5.6
(6.7)
We deﬁne CM(A, r) in Equation 6.8.
CM(Ak, rp) =
∑
i∈[1...n]
δi(Ak,rp)
n
(6.8)
CM(Ak, rp) is a binary variable.
In the rest of this section, we consider the example of two conﬁgured rules r1 and
r2 whose their responsibility domains is deﬁned as follow:
RD(r1) =< 140.192.37.∗, ∗port, ∗ip, 80, tcp >
RD(r2) =< 140.192.37.30, ∗port, ∗ip, 21, tcp >
The corresponding rule vector v1 ∈ RD(PEP ) for these two rules (referring to the
generalization approximation algorithms 2 and 4 described in Sections 4.7.3.2 and
4.7.4.2) is:
v1 = RDgen(r1,2) =< 140.192.37.∗, ∗port, ∗ip, [1 . . . 1024], {tcp} >
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implementations in a single PEP environment
We consider two alerts defined as follow:
A1 =< 140.192.37.140, 51000, 10.0.0.3, 80, {tcp} >
A2 =< 140.192.37.30, 4000, 10.0.0.3, 53, {tcp} >
Both A1 and A2 are in RD(v1).
6.3.1 Discussion for a single alert
When a single alert A falls in a responsibility domain of a PEP, it is important
to identify the appropriate configured rules which will be responsible to process
this alert. The function CM(Ak, rp) defined in Equation 6.8 identifies common
attributes between the alert and the configured rules. But, in order to implement
the countermeasure, it is necessary to evaluate the modifications that should be
made on the rule.
Therefore, we define the modification rate denoted byMrp/Ak in Equation 6.9.
Mrp/Ak = 1− CM(Ak, rp)
= 1 −
∑
i∈[1...n]
δi
n
(6.9)
CM(Ak, rp) ∈ {0, 1} ⇒Mrp/Ak ∈ {0, 1}
For example, we evaluate this metric using alert A2 and rule r1.
Mr1/A2 = 1− CM(A2, r1)
= 1− 4
5
= 1
5
The evaluation ofMr1/A2 shows that a modification of the single attribute (the des-
tination port) in the configured rule r1 allows to handle the alert A2.
In practice, it is important to set a modification rate threshold which we denote by
ThM . ThM is the acceptance criteria of the modification rateMr1/A2 .
IfMr1/A2 < ThM , the identified configured rule could be considered in order to pro-
cess the alert. Otherwise, ifMr1/A2 > ThM , the modification rate is unacceptable.
6.3.2 Discussion for two alerts
One of the advantages of our enforcement-based alert correlation is the possibility
to identify if countermeasure implementations can be aggregated or not. When
dealing with two alerts or more, aggregation of countermeasure implementation is
important.
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Therefore, we analyze the possibility of aggregating countermeasure implementation
by evaluating the differences between the coverage metric for two alerts A1 and
A2 referring to a single implemented rule rp. We propose the aggregation metric
denoted by AM((A1, A2), rp). In Equation 6.10, we define how we can compute this
aggregation metric:
AM((A1, A2), rp) =
∑
i∈[1...n]
δ(a1i,rpi)×δ(a2i,rpi)
n
(6.10)
× in Equation 6.10 is the multiplication operator of the real set R.
Therefore, if alerts can be both entirely processed by the rule rp (which means that
δ(a1i, rpi) = δ(a2i, rpi) = 1,∀i ∈ [1 . . . n] ), both of the alerts can be aggregated by
the rule rp. Otherwise, it is important to set a tolerance threshold which we denote
by ThAM . This threshold point out the tolerance of the security administrator in
modifying configured rules.
If AM((A1, A2), rp) > ThAM , the identified configured rule could be considered in
order to aggregated countermeasure for both og alerts A1 and A2. Otherwise, if
AM((A1, A2), rp) < ThM , the aggregation of countermeasure is not desirable.
Figure 6.2 represents the workflow described above. When evaluating the aggrega-
tion metric of rules with which alerts were correlated, it is possible to have multiple
rules that satisfy the condition of ThAM . In this case, the administrator should
study the optimal response decision that will be implemented. Such This matter is
out of the scope of our work and may require external knowledge.
Interpretation:
Our objective is to assist the security administrator in selecting which rules are
potentially able to process a number of correlated alerts. As a consequence, we
first provide the security administrator with a distribution of generated alerts based
on the configured rules in a PEP. Then, we provide him with an evaluation of the
modification rate (countermeasure implementation).
6.4 Application of PEACE in multi-PEP scenario
In this section, we analyze the application of our alert correlation approach in a
real life use case where multiple PEPs are deployed. We accordingly deal with
the Olympic Games security architecture which is composed of several commonly
deployed security patterns. We first introduce the Olympic Games use case. We
detail its security architecture and the different deployed PEPs and security patterns.
Then, we discuss the application of our alert correlation approach on some of these
patterns.
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Alerts A1, A2 RD(PEP) 
Identify rules ri in 
Conf(PEP) which 
are in RD(vx) 
Identify rule vx in RD(PEP) such that 
A1 ϵ RD(vx) and A2 ϵ RD(vx) 
Modify existing 
rule’s decision 
(Allow, Deny) 
Modify value(s) for 
specific selector in 
an existing rule 
Create new rule 
in Conf(PEP) 
External information 
(CVE, Attack Type, 
Criticity, etc) 
Select ri such that 
AM((A1,A2),rp)< ThAM 
Select optimal 
response decision 
Figure 6.2 - Enforcement-based alert correlation workﬂow with
two alerts
6.4.1 Case Study: Olympic Games
Olympic Games IT System is a complex and massive IT architecture deployed by
large team of people. Its mission is to provide services and real time information
for competitions of around 20 disciplines that span more than 60 competition and
non-competition venues, involving more than 10.000 athletes, 20.000 members of the
media and 70.000 volunteers. In general, the Olympic Games IT system requires
about 10,000 computers, 1,000 servers, 20,000 desktop phones and 2,500 Intranet
terminals.
Olympic Games case study responds to the needs of improving the IT security of
such critical system. This use case discusses the application of PEACE in an envi-
ronment with multiple deployed PEP belonging to diﬀerent classes and analyze all
possible relationships between RD(PEP ) and their impact on the correlation.
In Figure 6.3, we give a simpliﬁed overview of the Olympic Games system architec-
ture. It is mainly composed of 3 core systems which are:
• Core Games System (CGS): a set of applications for assisting in the capture
and management of data about people who will be attending the Games events
and the staﬀ supporting them (such as Volunteers, Electronic Staﬀ Information
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(ESI) system, etc).
• Information Diffusion System (INFO): a set of applications that retrieve
and distribute information related to, and supporting, of the Games. The in-
formation is provided by different sources e.g. Results system, interfaces with
CGS, Weather provider etc. The information is processed and distributed to
internal clients e.g. broadcasters, journalists, etc. It is also sent to external
clients e.g. World News Press Agencies (WNPA), sports federations and gov-
erning bodies, and Internet Service Providers (ISPs).
• Results System (RS): a set of applications for collecting real-time data dur-
ing competitions (Timing & Scoring Systems) and distributing collected infor-
mation to the INFO system (On Venue Results Systems).
Figure 6.3 - Overview of Olympic Games System Architecture.
6.4.2 Analysis of relationships between multiple PEP Re-
sponsibility Domains
An intrusion response decision requires the identification of the PEP(s) that is (are)
responsible of implementing appropriate countermeasures. In a complex environ-
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ment such as the Olympic Games IT system where an important number of PEPs
are deployed, it is challenging to select the proper PEP(s) that is (are) capable to
enforce the intrusion response decision. Moreover, in a defense-in-depth strategy, the
intrusion response decision results in the participation of diﬀerent PEPs. Thus, it is
important to study the relationships that exist between multiple PEP responsibility
domains. Two cases can be distinguished: disjoint domains and joint responsibility
domains. Figure 6.4 depicts these cases. It is important to remind that in our as-
Network Perimeter 
RD(PEP1) 
RD(PEP3) 
RD(PEP2) 
RD(PEP4) 
Figure 6.4 - Possible relationships between PEPs Responsibility
Domains.
sumption, all the responsibility domains are aligned with the IDMEF format and
have n dimensions. These high-dimensional domains are diﬃcult to be geometri-
cally represented. As a consequence, we restrain our representation to generic sets
represented by circles 6.4.
Let’s also remind that responsibility domains of deployed p PEPs are expressed
as follow:
RD(PEPp) =
⋃
j∈[1...npr ]
< dpji >i∈[1...n]. npr is the number of vectors in RD(PEPp).
n is the IDMEF dimension. dpji are the aligned dimension values of PEPp.
• Disjoint responsibility domains : A responsibility domain is disjoint from
another domain if their vectors are totally diﬀerent.
• RD(PEP2) and RD(PEP3) are Disjoint domains
(we denote it RD(PEP2) ∩RD(PEP3) = ∅ ) , iﬀ
∀j′ ∈ [1, . . . , n2r], j′′ ∈ [1, . . . , n3r] and ∀i ∈ [1, . . . , n]
such that < d2j′i > 	= < d3j′′i > (6.11)
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• Joint responsibility domains:A responsibility domain is joint with another
domain when it is partially (e.g. RD(PEP3) and RD(PEP4)) or totally (e.g.
RD(PEP1) and RD(PEP2)) covered by this latter. We denote it RD(PEP3)∩
RD(PEP4) = I3,4.
Let’s min(RD(PEP3), RD(PEP4)) be the responsibility domain whose di-
mension is the minimum one. In our case, min(RD(PEP3), RD(PEP4)) =
RD(PEP4)
• RD(PEP3) and RD(PEP4) are partially joint domains , iff
∃j′ ∈ [1, . . . , n3r] and j′′ ∈ [1, . . . , n4r]
such that < d2j′i > ⊆ < d1j′′i >, ∀i ∈ [1 . . . n] (6.12)
In this case, dim(I3,4) < dim(min(RD(PEP3), RD(PEP4))).
• RD(PEP2) and RD(PEP1) are totally joint domains , iff
∀j′′ ∈ [1, . . . , n2r] and j′′ ∈ [1, . . . , n1r] and n2r < n1r
such that < d2j′′i > ⊆ < d1j′i >, ∀i ∈ [1 . . . n] (6.13)
In this case, dim(I1,2) = dim(min(RD(PEP1), RD(PEP2))).
6.4.3 Common deployed security patterns description from
Olympic Games use case
The Olympic Security Infrastructure is developed by Atos Company. Its main
objective is to protect the IT infrastructure of the Olympic Games systems from
any undesired and/or uncontrolled phenomena which can impact any parts of the
result chain and associated services.
The SIEM infrastructure of Olympic Games IT system deal with a big challenge
which is mainly due to the number of security event types (about 20,000), and
the volume of generated events to be handled (around 11,000,000 alerts per day).
However, the most critical aspect that a SIEM system faces in the Olympic Games
is that those security events must be processed and reacted upon in real-time, [100].
The deployed security infrastructure of the Olympic Games IT system provides the
administrators with defence-in-depth. In order to meet the requirements of such
system, several PEPs are deployed such as firewalls, active directories, intrusion
detection systems, etc.
From Figure 6.3, we highlight several security patterns that are commonly used
in complex security architecture such as the Olympic Games IT system. We only
discuss common patterns based on network firewall technology.
We distinguish three different security patterns that are detailed hereafter.
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Figure 6.5 - First security architecture pattern: Pattern 1
Figure 6.6 - Second security architecture pattern: Pattern 2.
Security Pattern 1
In this security pattern as described in Figure 6.5, the IDS (IDS2) is placed in front
of the first firewall (FW2) which is controlling access to the entire CGS. Usually,
such IDS placement in the architecture allows the security administrator to inspect
all the traffic -unfiltered- passing through the network levels. The internal CGS
network is divided in two sub-networks with different criticality. To meet the security
requirements of CGS_net1 and CGS_net2, two firewalls, respectively FW2 and
FW7 are deployed in serial. Such configuration enforces access control to CGS_net2
which is more critical.
Security Pattern 2
In this security pattern shown in Figure 6.6, the frontal firewall FW2 enforces the
security of two different zones: the DMZ and the internal CGS network. Both
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Figure 6.7 - Third security architecture pattern: Pattern 3.
of firewalls FW7 and FW3 protect these two zones which have different security
requirements. Moreover, FW7 and FW3 basically inspect filtered traffic coming
from FW2. In such security pattern, the firewall FW2 includes rules with larger
responsibility domain than those of FW7 and FW3.
Security Pattern 3
We observe that in the security pattern shown in Figure 6.7, the IDS is placed after
the frontal Firewall FW1. Therefore, the inspected traffic is the traffic which has
been already filtered by firewall FW1. In this case, the generated alerts correspond
to suspicious flow which has been already allowed by the firewall FW1.
6.4.4 Application of Enforcement-based Alert Correlation on
multi-PEPs environment: Discussions and analysis
In the following, we represent the set of generated alerts by A. A1 and A2 represent
respectively the set of generated alerts by IDS1 and IDS2 respectively listed in
pattern 3 and both of patterns 1 and 2.
We discuss in this part the impact of the relationships between the responsibility
domains of multiple PEPs and the IDS placement on our alert correlation approach.
Due to the non-disclosure of PEPs configurations and generated alerts, we maintain
representing the responsibility domains of PEP and the set of generated alerts by
abstract circles. As explained before, these circles are an abstract representation of
multi-dimensional domains.
6.4.4.1 First pattern: discussion and analysis
As we explained before, in the first pattern, the IDS2 is placed before the front-
end firewall FW2. As a consequence, the set of generated alerts A2 corresponds
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Pattern Perimeter 
A2 
RD(FW2) RD(FW7) 
Figure 6.8 - Relationships between RD(PEP) deployed in pattern
1
to suspicious unﬁltered traﬃc. Thus, A2 set includes in our case vectors of both
RD(FW2) and RD(FW7). Since the front-end ﬁrewall FW2 inspects global traﬃc,
it is responsible of applying rules related to wide value range of selectors. This ex-
plains the dimension of RD(FW2) which covers an area almost equal to the network
perimeter. The FW7 inspects traﬃc related to speciﬁc traﬃc destined to a reduced
zone in the supervised network. Thus, the implemented rules in FW7 covers speciﬁc
ranges of values for corresponding selectors. Therefore, the dimension of RD(FW7)
is much less than the network perimeter and RD(FW2).
Enforcement-based Alert Correlation Advantages :
- Since the set of generated alertsA2 are correlated based onRD(FW2) andRD(FW7),
it then becomes straightforward to process these alerts. In fact, we easily identify
the ﬁrewall that will be able to process generated alerts and implement correspond-
ing countermeasures.
- Based on the ﬁrst pattern, our alert correlation approach allows setting a defense-
in-depth strategy. The set I2,7 enable us correlating alerts that can be processed by
both ﬁrewalls RD(FW2) and RD(FW7). In such case, the security administrator
can decide to enforce the intrusion response decision using both of the deployed
ﬁrewalls.
Enforcement-based Alert Correlation Disadvantages :
- Since our alert correlation approach closely depends on the approximation of the
ﬁrewalls and then their conﬁgurations, it is possible that some generated alerts will
not be correlated. This set of alerts requires more investigation. In fact, ignoring
the default rule deployed in the ﬁrewall and the topology knowledge leads to a sub-
estimation of the responsibility domain of the ﬁrewall. As demonstrated in Chapter
4, this sub-estimation depends on the approximation accuracy of the responsibility
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domain.
6.4.4.2 Second pattern: discussion and analysis
Pattern Perimeter 
A2 
RD(FW2) 
RD(FW7) 
RD(FW3) 
Figure 6.9 - Relationships between RD(PEP) deployed in pattern
2
As we explained before, the second pattern diﬀers from the ﬁrst pattern by the
existing of the DMZ zone which is protected by a third ﬁrewall FW3. In general,
DMZ zone is composed of servers running critical publicly accessible services. As a
consequence and in order to enforce the security of these services, the traﬃc destined
to servers in DMZ zone is checked twice. Therefore, the RD(FW3) is totally joint to
the RD(FW2). In such case, attacks against the DMZ zone servers can be mitigated
either by the frontal ﬁrewall FW2, or by the DMZ ﬁrewall FW3, or when necessary
by both of them.
In terms of enforcement-based alert correlation, the totally joint relations between
RD(FW3) and RD(FW2) induces that all the alerts which are correlated based on
RD(FW3) are immediately correlated based on RD(FW2). In fact, in this case, we
have I2,3 = RD(FW3).
Enforcement-based Alert Correlation advantages :
- Despite ignoring the network topology, we demonstrate the utility and applica-
bility of our approach in the third pattern. In such case, our enforcement-based
alert correlation supports the selection of proper PEP that are capable to process
generated alerts.
Enforcement-based Alert Correlation disadvantages :
- Some of the correlated alerts based on the set I2,3 cannot be eﬀectively processed
by the DMZ ﬁrewall FW3. In fact, it is possible that some of these alerts have to
be only processed by the frontal ﬁrewall FW2. An important recommendation in
this case is to ﬁrst mitigate the attacks at the level of the frontal ﬁrewall. Then,
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investigations on countermeasures implementation have to be achieved in order to
decide enforcing the policy at the DMZ ﬁrewall.
6.4.4.3 Third pattern: discussion and analysis
Pattern Perimeter 
A1 
RD(FW1) 
RD(FW6) 
Figure 6.10 - Relationships between RD(PEP) deployed in pattern
3
As described before, in the third pattern, the IDS control ﬁltered traﬃc by the
ﬁrewall FW1. As a consequence, the set of the generated alerts A1 is included in
the responsibility domain of the frontal ﬁrewall FW1. Obviously, all the generated
alerts are correlated based on RD(FW1). Meanwhile, our enforcement-based alert
correlation supports the administrator in identifying alerts that can be processed by
the internal ﬁrewall FW6.
6.4.5 Role of enforcement-based alert correlation in counter-
measure implementations in a multi-PEP environment
Based on the analysis of the diﬀerent pattern listed above, we conclude that the role
of our enforcement-based alert correlation approach in countermeasure implementa-
tions in a multi-PEP environment is a optimisation problem. In fact, in a multi-PEP
environment, alerts should be correlated while optimising the countermeasure im-
plementation. In a real case scenario like the olympic games use case, we deal with
multiple alerts and several deployed PEP that are responsible of enforcing the policy
in order to mitigate detected attacks.
In such context, alert correlation should minimize the cost of implementing response
decision. This cost covers the diﬀerent modiﬁcations that should be brought to the
security policy in order to process with generated alerts. Mainly, this cost represents
the number of conﬁguration modiﬁcations resulting of countermeasure implementa-
tions. For instance, modifying PEP’s conﬁguration is a challenging task for several
107
CHAPT 6. APPLICATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS
reasons: i) it is critical task to cope with because of related aspects such as conflict
ii) it requires an in-depth analysis iii) it can be time consuming, etc. As a conse-
quence, aggregate different countermeasures in order to process a number of alerts
is a prominent solution. Hence, our enforcement-based alert correlation is able to
support the security administrator in aggregating countermeasures in a multi-PEP
environment.
Usually, we have:
A = {A1, A2, . . . , Ana} represents the set of generated alerts
PEP = {PEP1, PEP2, . . . , PEPnpep} represents the set of the deployed PEPs. We
denote by RD((PEP )) the set of responsibility domains of PEPs in PEP .
We note by Corr(A, RD((PEP ))) the correlation function which correlated alerts
in A with responsibility domains in RD((PEP )). This function results in a subsets
of enforcement-based correlated alerts Aec = {Aec1, Aec1, . . . , Aecnaec} as shown in
Equation 6.14.
Corr(A, RD((PEP ))) = {Aec1 , Aec2 , . . . , Aecnaec} = Aec (6.14)
We model our maximisation problem as indicated in Equation 6.15:
argmax(AM(Aec, RDinf (PEP)))) =
{∀ Aecj | ∃ PEPk ∈ PEP : AM(Aecj , PEPk) ≈ ThAM} (6.15)
AM(Aec, RDinf (PEP))) represents the overall aggregation metric of correlated alerts.
It follows the definition of the function expressed in Equation 6.10. RDinf (PEP) is
the set of the configurations of PEPs in PEP .
Our optimisation problem aims at correlating alerts while ensuring an optimal rate
of countermeasure modifications while processing simultaneously a common group
of correlated alerts.
6.5 Discussions and conclusion
This chapter presents the application of the enforcement-based alert correlation in
a single-PEP environment and multi-PEP environment. Our approach is not only
efficient to determine and select the PEP that is capable to process a group of corre-
lated alerts. But also, it allows the identification of the configured rules that should
be modified in order to implement a countermeasure. It allows the aggregation of
response decision implementation. As detailed in Chapter 2, most of the existing
alert correlation techniques are able to support the administrator in response de-
cision by making the number of generated alerts manageable. These approaches
are based on the alert’s content independent from the environment. Model-based
approach developed in [78,80] is the only correlation method dealing with informa-
tion about the supervised information system. However, it does not make easier the
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response decision process. The advantage of our approach, comparing it to existing
approaches, is the identification of PEP capable to process correlated alerts. More-
over, it allows the selection of appropriate configured rules that should be modified
in order to implement countermeasures.
We provided an in-depth analysis of our correlation’s role in response decision imple-
mentation. However, since we do not take into account the access control decision
(axiom 3 in Chapter 4) when building the PEP’s approximations, our approach is
efficient in the sense that it allows the administrator to identify rules to be modified.
In order to decide about the modification of the identified rule’s decision, external
knowledge, such as the attack impact and the vulnerability, is required. In this
dissertation, we suppose that such knowledge is not available. Therefore, we do not
deeply examine the impact of the PEP’s enforced access control decisions on the
role of our enforcement-based alert correlation in response decision.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and
Perspectives
The open mind never acts: when
we have done our utmost to arrive
at a reasonable conclusion, we still
- must close our minds for the
moment with a snap, and act
dogmatically on our conclusions.
George Bernard Shaw - 1856-1950
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IIn conclusion, we summarize how each of the research topics presented in thefirst chapter has been pursued, and the contributions which have resulted. Next,
we reflect on how we can improve our contributions and provide new research direc-
tions.
Throughout this thesis, our main objective was to propose novel alert correlation
techniques to support the security administrator dealing with the tremendous num-
ber of alerts. Two correlation approaches are presented:
111
CHAPT 7. CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
• Honeypot-based alert correlation (Chapter 3): This approach leverages the
honeypot datasets in order to enhance alert correlation with knowledge about
’attackers’;
• Enforcement-based alert correlation (Chapter 5): This approach deploys the
knowledge about policy enforcement capabilities of the supervised network in
order to enhance alert correlation with knowledge about the ’defender’.
7.1 Contributions
7.1.1 Honeypot-based alert correlation
The ﬁrst proposed approach is related to the use of honeypot datasets in alert corre-
lation as shown in Figure 7.1. In response to Objective 1, we have shown the usability
Honeypot-based alert 
correlation 
Honeypot 
datasets 
generated alerts correlated alerts 
Figure 7.1 - Honeypot-based alert correlation.
of information gathered through honeypots in improving alert’s related information.
This information includes more details about the attacker such as his behavior, his
propagation vector, his location, etc. As shown in Figure 7.1, the honeypot-based
alert correlation explores the honeypot datasets in order to correlate the generated
alerts.
We propose an alert enrichment process that allows the collection of appropriate in-
formation related to the locally generated alerts. This enrichment process is mainly
based on enrichment selectors such us the ip source of the alert and its classiﬁca-
tion. We propose three ﬁltering processes in order to increase the accuracy of alert’s
related knowledge. The designed ﬁlters are: temporal, semantic and conﬁguration
ﬁlters.
Our experiments were conducted on four honeypot-datasets. Experimental results
allow us identifying honeypots’ limitations. These limitations avoid improving alert’s
related information and enhancing alert correlation. We identiﬁed four major limi-
tations that are:
• coverage limitation: It prevents alert correlation from eﬃciently study the
causality link between alerts and then correlate alerts;
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• unﬁlled attributes and references limitations: It impacts the overall quality of
our honeypot-based alert correlation by making challenging the collection of
additional information;
• lack of standard representation of data: It avoids the design of inference rules
in order to facilitate the causality analysis between local and global events.;
• cross-references limitation: It avoids cooperation between diﬀerent honeypot
datasets.
These limitations were an impediment for our honeypot-based alert correlaion. It
would be preferable if the honeypot datasets include better quality of data.
However, honeypots are still evolutionary and are being ameliorated to cover addi-
tional security application. But, in the context of our honeypot-based alert correla-
tion, concise and complete information is required in order to enhance our knowledge
about the information related to the alert.
7.1.2 Enforcement-based alert correlation
The second proposed approach is related to the use of policy enforcement capabilities
in alert correlation as shown in Figure 7.2, in response to Objective 2 and Objective
3. As shown in Figure 7.2, this alert correlation approach takes into account the
Enforcement-based 
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Figure 7.2 - Enforcement-based alert correlation.
responsibility domain of deployed PEP in order to correlate generated alerts. In this
context, we ﬁrst propose to model these capabilities referring to a proposed PEP
model detailed in Chapter 4. We design a PEP model which illustrates the PEP’s
responsibility domain. Since the responsibility domain of the PEP is an abstraction
of its capabilities in enforcing the security policy, we propose to approximate it by
setting up to main approximations which are the rule-based approximations and
the selector-based approximation. We study the coverage relationships between the
diﬀerent proposed approximations. The advantage of our methodology to approxi-
mate RD(PEP ) is the performance in a ’blind manner’. Also, the consideration of
the PEP conﬁguration makes the approximations more useful for response decision.
However, it would be possible if we consider the external knowledge in order to build
the approximations following a top down approach.
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We investigate the application of the proposed PEP model in correlating alerts.
Thus, we detail the correlation approach based on this model in Chapter 5. Two
applications has been analyzed: a single-PEP and a multi-PEP environment in
Chapter 6. We propose the role of this approach in response decision support. We
provided an in-depth analysis of our correlation’s role in response decision imple-
mentation. However, since we do not take into account the access control decision
when building the PEP’s approximations, our approach is efficient in the sense that
it allows the administrator to identify rules to be modified.
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7.2 Perspectives
The final section of this dissertation opens new areas of research showing problems
that remain unsolved and which can be addressed in future works:
7.2.1 Application on other PEP classes
Expand the application of the enforcement-based alert correlation to include other
PEP classes: We conducted our analysis based on a single PEP class which is the
network firewalls. Although this class is commonly used in networks, there exists
other PEP that should be analyzed in order to apply our responsibility domain ap-
proximations. The integration of other PEP class allows the application of our alert
correlation on heterogeneous security systems.
In Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, we briefly introduce other PEP classes mainly ModSe-
curity and LDAP. Similar to network firewall such as iptable, ModSecurity PEP
has five principle selectors that are: Remote-Address, Remote-port, Remote-user,
hostname, Request-Body. LDAP’s selectors are in general represented by string vari-
ables such as the common name (cn), the username, etc. In this case, it is possible
to define a domain decomposition based on keywords or a hierarchy of values. For
instance, LDAP attributes can be defined following a tree decomposition as shown
in figure 7.3.
Figure 7.3 - LDAP tree decomposition.
The generalization function defined in this case could be the choice of a higher
level for a specific selector.
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7.2.2 Select appropriate responsibility domain approximation
Define criteria and metrics which allow the identification of the appropriate ap-
proximation function to be applied. The proposed coverage increases metric allows
evaluating the differences between approximations independent of the context. Since
our proposed Responsibility Domain approximations are built following a bottom
up approach, it is possible that the security administrator prefer one approximation
rather than another based on the configuration and its coverage. However, expert
knowledge is required in order to decide about the appropriate approximation. Thus
including external knowledge such as network topology and routing information and
analyze its impact on the proposed enforcement-based alert correlation approach.
Using such external knowledge, the responsibility domain approximations can be
built following a top down approach.
7.2.3 Identification of countermeasure implementations
Develop a methodology which automatically identifies the countermeasure to be
implemented in order to process correlated alerts. We studied the role of the
enforcement-based alert correlation in response decision support. We point out that
it supports the security administrator in identifying configured rules that should
be modified or should be configured. We also demonstrate how our proposed alert
correlation can be considered as an optimization problem as defined in Section 6.4.5:
argmax(AM(Aec, RDinf (PEP)))) =
{∀ Aecj | ∃ PEPk ∈ PEP : AM(Aecj , PEPk) ≈ ThAM}
This optimization system allow us identifying the PEPs with a minimum modifi-
cations that should be brought to the configuration in order to process correlated
alerts. However, since we ignore the access control decision applied by the PEP
when enforcing security policy, our approach does not allow the identification of the
concrete countermeasure implementation.
116
List of Figures
1.1 Core principles of computer security: Confidentiality, Integrity, Avail-
ability (C, I, A). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Security properties as represented by the McCumber’s cube. Source:
[6]. This cube contains three blocks: the first block corresponds to
the critical information characteristics (C, I, A), the second block
corresponds to the information states, and the third block corresponds
to the security measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1 PDCA: Security policy life-cycle, source [7]. It represents the four
steps (represented by colored circles) of the security life cycle that
are: Plan (orange circle), Do (blue circle), Check (red circle) and Act
(green circle). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Basic intrusion detection system architecture, source [19]. It repre-
sents the main components of an IDS that are: a sensor, an analyzer,
a response module, and a repository . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 Intrusion Detection taxonomy, source [24]. The categorization de-
pends on the detection method, behavior on detection, detection
paradigm, usage frequency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4 IDMEF Alert model. It is composed of two major classes that are
the alert class and the heartbeat class. The alert class includes in-
formation about the detected attack. The heartbeat class indicates
information about the current analyzer’s status to managers . . . . . 22
3.1 Honeypot-based alert correlation workflow. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2 Alert Enrichment Process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.3 Filtering Processes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.1 Example of src/dst_ip selector taxonomy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.2 Example of src/dst_port selector taxonomy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.3 Combinability between two selectors D(S1) and D(S2). . . . . . . . . 51
4.4 Combinability between multiple selectors D(S1), D(S2) and D(S3). . 51
4.5 Running Example: a network with two zones. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.6 Characterization of a PEP Class. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.7 Relations between Responsibility Domains of two rules. . . . . . . . . 58
4.8 Overview of Responsibility Domain Approximations. . . . . . . . . . 60
117
LIST OF FIGURES
4.9 Relationships between the proposed approximations. . . . . . . . . . 72
4.10 LAMBDA attack description: an example [76]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.1 PEACE Framework with alignment function option 1. . . . . . . . . . 79
5.2 PEACE Framework with alignment function option 2. . . . . . . . . . 80
5.3 Alignment Function: 1st option. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.4 Alignment Function: 2nd option. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.5 Enforcement-based alert correlation workflow with one alert A. . . . . 87
6.1 Enforcement-based alert correlation and countermeasure implemen-
tation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
6.2 Enforcement-based alert correlation workflow with two alerts . . . . . 99
6.3 Overview of Olympic Games System Architecture. . . . . . . . . . . . 100
6.4 Possible relationships between PEPs Responsibility Domains. . . . . . 101
6.5 First security architecture pattern: Pattern 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
6.6 Second security architecture pattern: Pattern 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
6.7 Third security architecture pattern: Pattern 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
6.8 Relationships between RD(PEP) deployed in pattern 1 . . . . . . . . 105
6.9 Relationships between RD(PEP) deployed in pattern 2 . . . . . . . . 106
6.10 Relationships between RD(PEP) deployed in pattern 3 . . . . . . . . 107
7.1 Honeypot-based alert correlation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
7.2 Enforcement-based alert correlation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
7.3 LDAP tree decomposition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
A.1 Architecture basique d’un système de détection d’intrusions selon [19]. 142
A.2 Processus de corrélation d’alertes basée sur les pots de miel. . . . . . 144
A.3 Processus d’enrichissement d’alertes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
A.4 Vue d’ensemble des approximations du domaine de responsabilité. . . 152
A.5 Structure de PEACE avec fonction d’alignement option 1. . . . . . . 154
A.6 Structure de PEACE avec fonction d’alignement option 2. . . . . . . 154
118
List of Tables
2.1 Honeypot interaction levels. These levels that are low-interaction,
high-interaction and medium-interaction are represented in the raw
of the table. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2 Advantages and drawbacks of alert correlation methods represented
in the table’s lines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.1 Classification of alerts generated by the local deployed IDS sensor. In
this table, we identify the total number of unique IP sources for both
unfiltered alerts and filtered alerts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.2 Summary of reported signatures, their vulnerabilities, protocols and
ports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.3 Experimental Results using alert’s IP source address. The results
shown in this table are based on IP sources of filtered alerts detailed
in table 3.1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.4 Analysis of identified IP source address objects from Table 3.3. . . . . 40
4.1 Configuration of Firewall in Figure 4.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.2 Network-level Firewall common Selectors Domains. . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.3 Evaluation of Approximation Accuracy Metric of the running example 73
5.1 Analogy between IDMEF attributes and selectors of three PEPs (Ipt-
able, ModSecurity, LDAP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.2 Analogy between IDMEF attributes and selectors of three PEPs (Ipt-
able, ModSecurity, LDAP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.3 Analogy between IDMEF attributes and selectors of three PEPs (Ipt-
able, ModSecurity, LDAP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.4 Comparison between alignment options. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6.1 Application of Responsibility Domain approximations in PEACE: a
comparative table. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
6.2 Evaluation of Coverage Increase Metric of the running example . . . . 95
A.1 Classification des alertes générées par la sonde IDS déployée en local.
Dans ce tableau, nous identifions le nombre total des adresses IP
sources uniques pour toutes les alertes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
119
LIST OF TABLES
A.2 Résultats expérimentaux utilisant les adresses IP source des alertes.
Les résultats montrés dans ce tableau sont basés sur les adresses IP
source des alertes filtrées comme détaillé dans le Tableau A.1. . . . . 148
A.3 Application des approximations de domaine de responsabilité dans
PEACE: un tableau comparatif. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
120
Glossary of Acronyms
FW Firewall
IDS Intrusion Detection System
PEP Policy Enforcement Point
RD Responsibility Domain
SIEM Security Information and Event Management
121
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
122
Glossary of Terms
Attack An attempt to gain unauthorized access to system services,
resources, or information, or an attempt to compromise
system integrity.
Botnet A number of Internet computers that, although their own-
ers are most time unaware of it, have been set up to forward
transmissions (including spam or viruses) to other comput-
ers on the Internet.
Countermeasure Actions, devices, procedures, or techniques that meet or
oppose (i.e., counters) a threat, a vulnerability, or an attack
by eliminating or preventing it, by minimizing the harm
it can cause, or by discovering and reporting it so that
corrective action can be taken.
Denial of Service An attempt against the availability of a particular system.
The main objective is to disrupt service and network avail-
ability by attempting to reduce a legitimate user’s band-
width, or preventing access to service or system.
Honey-pot Systems or accounts used to lure the intruder into pursuing
a decoy controlled environment directly of his own volition.
Honey-pots are placed near assets requiring protection, are
made attractive, and are fully instrumented for intrusion
detection and back tracking.
Host-based in-
trusion detection
system (HIDS)
IDSs which operate on information collected from within
an individual computer system. This vantage point allows
host-based IDSs to determine exactly which processes and
user accounts are involved in a particular attack on the
Operating System.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Infectious
threats
It corresponds to viruses, worms, trojan horses and other
similar threats.
Intrusion de-
tection system
(IDS)
Hardware or software product that gathers and analyzes
information from various areas within a computer or a net-
work to identify possible security breaches, which include
both intrusions (attacks from outside the organizations)
and misuse (attacks from within the organizations.)
Intrusion pre-
vention sys-
temv(IPS)
Systems which can detect an intrusive activity and can
also attempt to stop the activity, ideally before it reaches
its targets.
Network-based
intrusion de-
tection systems
(NIDS)
IDSs which detect attacks by capturing and analyzing net-
work packets.
Policy Enforce-
ment Point
Logical entity or place on a server that enforces policies for
admission control and decisions in response to a request
from a user wanting to access a resource on a computer or
network server.
Risk The level of impact on organizational operations (e.g., func-
tions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, or in-
dividuals resulting from the operation of an information
system given the potential impact of a threat and the like-
lihood of such threat occurring.
Security Policy A set of criteria for the provision of security services. It
defines and constrains the activities of a data processing
facility in order to maintain a condition of security for sys-
tems and data.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Security In-
formation and
Event Manage-
ment (SIEM)
Integrated information security oriented platform that of-
fer the following services: Log management (log collec-
tion, storage, organization and retrieval); IT regulatory
compliance (audit, validation or violation identification);
Event correlation (normalization, fusion, verification, anal-
ysis); Active response (decision analysis, counter-measure
response, prioritization); and Endpoint security (monitor-
ing, updating, configuration).
Threat A circumstance or event with the potential to adversely
impact organizational operations (e.g., mission, functions,
reputation), as well as organizational assets, individuals,
other organizations, or even the Nation through unautho-
rized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of infor-
mation, and/or denial of service.
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Corrélation d’alertes:
un outil efficace d’aide à la décision
pour répondre aux intrusions
Les failles de sécurité sont de plus en plus critiques pour les entreprises.Ainsi, les mesures de sécurité les plus appropriées sont indispensables pour
assurer la sécurité des entreprises et de l’utilisateur. Des mécanismes de sécu-
rité sont déployés dans les réseaux afin de prévenir les attaques et réagir contre
elles lorsqu’elles sont détectées. Actuellement, les systèmes pour la Sécurité de
l’Information et la Gestion des Evénements (connus en anglais par SIEM: Security
Information and Event Management) sont au cœur des centres opérationnels de
sécurité. Les SIEMs ont été développés pour assister le responsable de la sécurité
des systèmes d’information (RSSI) dans la réalisation de ses responsabilités. Ils
combinent deux aspects différents: le système de gestion de sécurité des données et
le système de gestion des événements [2]. Les SIEMs se concentrent sur:
• la collection des journaux dévénements et leurs normalisations
• l’analyse et la corrélation des événements en provenance de différents capteurs
(anti-virus, pare-feux, systèmes de détection d’intrusion, etc)
• l’aggrégation des événements et la création de rapports d’activité.
Les travaux de recherches sur les SIEMs se sont toujours concentrés sur la créa-
tion de rapports d’attaques pour les entreprises dans le but de maintenir leur
politique de sécurité à jour. La corrélation d’alertes représente le coeur des SIEMs.
Toutefois, la plupart des travaux traitant ce sujet ne prennent en compte que les
alertes générées par les sondes déployées dans le réseau. Ces techniques de corréla-
tion ne considérent pas d’autres données telles que le comportement de l’attaquant,
la capacité de réponses aux attaques, etc. Cependant, des recherches récentes sur la
corrélation d’alertes (comme l’étude présentée [78, 80]) ont montré l’importance de
ces données.
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Dans cette thèse, nous proposons deux approches différentes de corrélation d’alertes
permettant d’avoir un diagnostic plus précis des alertes générées par les SIEMs.
La première approche est basée sur les pots de miel. Son objectif est d’améliorer le
contenu des alertes en exploitant la connaissance collectée par les pots de miels sur
les attaquants.
La deuxième approche est basée sur l’application de la politique de sécurité. Son
objectif est de prendre en compte les moyens de mise en application de la politique
de sécurité implémentés dans le réseau en corrélant les alertes.
Énoncé de la problématique :
Les systèmes pour la Sécurité de l’Information et la Gestion des Evénements
(SIEM) doivent traiter un nombre très important d’évènements de sécurité sans
avoir la connaissance suffisante sur l’attaquant ni sur les moyens de défense.
Énoncé de la thèse:
L’évaluation de l’impact d’une attaque ainsi que l’aide à la décision prenant
en compte la contremesure exigent une meilleure connaissance de l’attaquant
ainsi que les moyens de défense déployés au sein du réseau. Améliorer notre
connaissance sur l’attaquant nous permet de mieux comprendre les alertes.
Identifier les moyens d’application de la politique de sécurité contribue à une
décision de réponse plus efficace aux attaques.
Les objectifs de cette thèse sont:
• Objectif 1 : la conception et l’expérimentation d’une nouvelle méthodologie de
corrélation d’alertes qui bénéficie d’informations collectées par les pots de miel;
• Objectif 2 : la conception et l’étude d’une méthodologie de corrélation d’alertes
basée sur le modèle de domaine de responsabilité d’un PEP proposé;
• Objectif 3 : l’application des approches de corrélation proposées sur un cas
d’étude de cas pratique.
Contributions: Les approches de corrélation d’alertes développées dans cette
thèse s’appuyent sur les données fournies par les pots de miel et les configurations
des PEPs déployés au sein du réseau.
Dans notre approche "corrélation d’alertes basée sur les pots de miel", nous étu-
dions les informations concernant les attaquants fournies par les pots de miel dans
l’objectif de corréler les alertes.
En plus, puisque les données sur les attaquants ne sont généralement pas suffisantes
pour améliorer la prise de décision pour les intrusions, nous proposons une "ap-
proche de corrélation d’alertes basée sur l’application de la politique de sécurité"
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qui s’appuie sur les PEPs déployés dans le réseau.
Nous détaillons les contributions de cette thèse comme suit:
• Identification des données appropriées fournies par les pots de miel afin d’enrichir
nos connaissances sur les alertes générées (Objectif 1);
• Conception d’un processus d’enrichissement d’alertes qui améliore, de façon
adéquate, l’information relevée dans les alertes générées (Objectif 1);
• Identification des limitations des pots de miel quant à la corrélation d’alertes
(Objectif 1);
• Conception d’un modèle de PEP illustrant le rôle d’un PEP dans un processus
de décision prenant en compte la contremesure. Notre modèle est basé sur la
notion de domaine de responsabilité d’un PEP (Objectif 2);
• Développement d’une approche de corrélation d’alertes basée sur l’application
de la notion de domaine de responsabilité d’un PEP (Objectif 2) et l’analyse
de son application sur les architectures de sécurité couramment déployées dans
un réseau. (Objectif 3).
A.1 État de l’art
Dans cette partie, nous passons en revue les travaux de recherche sur la sécurité des
réseaux qui sont liés à nos approches développées dans cette thèse. Nous introduisons
d’abords la notion de l’application de la politique de sécurité dans la sectionA.1.1.
Puis, nous exposons les différentes techniques de détection d’intrusions dans la sec-
tion A.1.2 et les techniques des pots de miel dans la section A.1.3. Ces techniques de
détection d’intrusions générent de nombreuses alertes difficiles à gérer. C’est pour
cette raison, la notion de corrélation d’alertes a été développée. Dans la section
A.1.3, nous expliquons cette notion qui sera le cœur de cette thèse.
A.1.1 Application de la politique de sécurité
L’application de la politique de sécurité est la mise en place et configuration des
mécanismes de contrôle d’accès à travers la mise en place et la mise à jour des
configurations des PEPs. Ces éléments de sécurité sont généralement déployés à des
endroits critiques du réseau. Le terme PEP a été introduit au départ (cf. XACML
[11]) comme une entité capable d’effectuer un contrôle d’accès en appliquant des
décisions sur les requêtes. En se référant à la dernière version du [11], un PEP est
présenté sous plusieurs formes. Il peut être une passerelle d’accès à distance, un
serveur web ou un agent de boîtes à courrier électronique, etc.
Plusieurs définitions du PEP ont été données [12–15]. Nous pouvons conclure qu’un
PEP peut être présenté sous la forme d’un produit dédié (comme par exemple les
pare feux, les systèmes de détection d’intrusions, etc) ou d’un module intégré (par
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Figure A.1 - Architecture basique d’un système de détection
d’intrusions selon [19].
exemple les modules de mise à jour, etc.).
A.1.2 Les systèmes de détections d’intrusions IDS
La figure A.1 représente l’architecture générique d’un système de détection d’intrusions.
Ce système est composé d’une sonde, d’un analyseur, d’un module de réponse et
d’un répertoire [19]. Généralement, les IDS génèrent des alertes lorsqu’ils détectent
une attaque. Dans la littérature, nous pouvons trouver plusieurs approches de sys-
tèmes de détection d’intrusions. Plusieurs taxonomies ont été proposées [17,20–32].
La classification des IDS est conditionnée par le mécanisme de détection utilisé, le
comportement lors de la détection, la nature de l’information analysée, etc.
Malgré les différents avantages que les IDS ont, ces derniers souffrent de quelques
limitations à savoir le format des alertes générées, le taux de faux positifs, les alertes
dupliquées et l’aspect incomplet des informations contenues dans les alertes. De
nos jours, avec l’expansion des réseaux, une des limitations qui s’avère critique est
l’augmentation du volume d’alertes générées.
A.1.3 Les pots de miel
Un pot de miel est un environnement où des vulnérabilités ont été délibéremment
introduites pour attirer les attaquants et par la suite étudier leurs comportements
[53, 54]. Ces environnements intéragissent avec l’attaquant de différentes manières.
Il existe des pots de miels avec une interaction minimale. Ces pots de miel imitent
un service de base. Il existe aussi des pots de miel avec une interaction moyenne.
Ils sont plus sophistiqués que la première catégorie. Ces pots de miel sont capable
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d’imiter un ensemble de services et d’effectuer des opérations plus complexes. La
dernière catégorie des pots de miel est dite à interaction haute et sont capable
d’imiter un système de communication réel. Cette dernière catégorie est capable
d’intéragir d’une manière plus complète avec l’attaquant.
A.1.4 Corrélation d’alertes
La corrélation d’alertes a été conçue pour pallier les limitations des IDSs. Prin-
cipalement, elle permet de réduire le nombre d’alertes générées par ces derniers.
Dans la littérature, on trouve plusieurs approches de corrélation d’alertes que nous
catégorisons de la manière suivante:
• Corrélation d’alertes basée sur la similarité: cette approche regroupe les alertes
similaires selon un critère de corrélation.
• Corrélation d’alertes basée sur la connaissance: cette approche est basée sur une
connaissance des activités malicieuses et des scénarios d’attaques. Elle requiert
la présence de règles expertes et d’heuristiques pour corréler les alertes. On
distingue deux sous catégories:
• Corrélation d’alertes basée sur les règles: connue sous le nom d’approche
basée sur les causes et conséquences d’une attaque. Ces approches ne
requièrent aucune connaissance sur les scénarios d’attaque.
• Corrélation d’alertes basée sur les scènarios: l’attaquant exécute souvent
plusieurs actions malicieuses pour atteindre son objectif d’intrusion. Ces
actions élémentaires constituent les étapes d’un scénario. La corrélation
d’alertes basée sur les scénarios regroupe les alertes qui correspondent à
un scénario bien défini.
• Corrélation d’alertes basée sur les modèles: Cette approche qui a été présentée
dans le travail de M2D2 [78] et M4D4 [80] vise à considérer le contexte dans
lequel l’alerte a été générée en corrélant les alertes. Elle inclut les informations
contextuelles et topologiques liés à l’alerte.
A.2 Approche de corrélation d’alertes basée sur les
pots de miel
Les techniques de corrélation d’alertes existantes [50,71,73–75,78–80,82] sont basées
sur les bases de données des alertes générées en local par les IDSs. La vue de ces
derniers est limitée par les frontières fonctionnelles (liés à la configuration de l’IDS)
et structurelles (liés à la couverture topologique du réseau) du système surveillé. Les
pots de miel fournissent une information qui enrichit et améliore notre connaissance
sur l’attaquant et par conséquent, l’information présente dans les alertes.
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A.2.1 Déﬁnition de l’approche
La corrélation d’alertes basée sur les pots de miel que nous proposons consiste à
exploiter l’information sur les attaquants collectée par les pots de miel pour améliorer
la corrélation des alertes générées en local (par les IDSs déployés dans le réseau
supervisé).
Cette approche est capable d’analyser le lien de causalité entre les alertes détectées
localement au niveau du système supervisé et les phénomènes d’attaque observés
globalement au niveau des pots de miel. Elle est bénéﬁque pour ré-évaluer la gravité
et l’impact de l’attaque.
La ﬁgure A.2 présente le processus de corrélation d’alertes basée sur les pots de miel.
Ce processus est principalement composé de trois étapes qui sont:
Begin Honeypot-based 
alert correlation 
Local alert 
datasets 
Honeypot 
datasets 
Alert 
enrichment 
process 
Analyze 
Er_Alert 
Reassess attack 
severity 
Re-evaluate attack 
impact 
Re-evaluate 
intrusion 
objective 
External information 
(CVE, Attack Type, 
Criticity, etc) 
Correlated Alerts 
Correlate  
Er_Alert 
Enriched alert 
datasets {Er_Alert} 
Correlation 
features 
Figure A.2 - Processus de corrélation d’alertes basée sur les pots
de miel.
• Processus d’enrichissement d’alerte: L’objectif de cette étape est l’enrichissement
du contenu des alertes générées localement par l’information sur l’attaquant.
Le résultat de cette étape est une alerte enrichie notée Er_alert. Cette étape
sera détaillée dans la section A.2.3;
• Analyse de l’alerte enrichie (Er_Alert): À cette étape, le contenu de l’alerte
enrichie Er_alert est analysé dans le but de ré-évaluer la sévérité de l’attaque,
son impact et l’objectif de l’intrusion.
• Corrélation des alertes enrichies: Cette étape a pour objectif la corrélation des
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alertes enrichies en appliquant des approches de corrélation existantes. Il est
possible de combiner différentes techniques de corrélation d’alertes. Le résultat
de cette étape est l’obtention d’alertes corrélées selon la technique de corrélation
appliquée.
A.2.2 Sources d’information
L’approche de corrélation d’alerte basée sur les pots de miel exploite des informa-
tions hétérogènes collectées par différentes vues: une vue locale et une vue globale.
L’information locale est collectée à travers des sondes comme les systèmes de détéc-
tion d’intrusion, pare feux, etc. Ces sondes sont déployés pour signaler des traces
d’activités malveillantes affectant le réseau local supervisé.
L’information globale est récupérée des bases de données de pots de miel. Comme
décrit dans le paragraphe A.1.3, l’objectif primaire des pots de miel est l’étude du
comportement de l’attaquant. Les données collectées par les pots de miel contien-
nent des informations sur le comportement des logiciels malveillants, leurs vecteurs
de propagation, la stratégie de propagation, les relations entres les exploits, la locali-
sation des attaquants, la caractérisation de leurs sources et destinations, etc [56,59].
A.2.3 Processus d’enrichissment des alertes
Dans le contexte de l’approche de corrélation d’alertes basée sur les pots de miel,
nous enrichissons notre connaissance locale sur les alertes avec l’information globale
sur la menace. Par conséquent, il est essentiel de définir une stratégie d’enrichissement
d’alerte qui améliore les connaissances liées à l’alerte avec des informations externes
appropriées. La figure A.3 décrit une vue d’ensemble du processus d’enrichissement
d’alerte. Comme le montre la figure A.3, nous collectons d’abord des données corre-
spondantes à des critères d’enrichissement. Ces critères se basent principalement sur
les attributs des alertes générées respectant le format IDMEF (Intrusion Detection
Message Exchange Format) [69]. Selon le standard IDMEF, l’alerte est composée de
plusieurs classes agrégées. Les classes suivantes sont considérées comme sélecteurs
pour interroger l’ensemble des données des pots de miel:
Source: cette classe comprend l’adresse IP source de la menace détectée.
DetectTime: représente le moment où l’attaque a été détectée par l’analyseur en
local. Dans les bases de données des pots de miel, les activités capturées sont
généralement horodatées. Ceci nous permet d’analyser l’évolution de l’état de
sécurité de l’alerte pendant une fenêtre de temps spécifique.
Classification: représente la sémantique de l’alerte. Par exemple, les systèmes de
détection d’intrusion classent les alertes selon le type de l’attaque. Ceci est lié
au type de la menace détectée par des pots de miel.
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Figure A.3 - Processus d’enrichissement d’alertes.
Par exemple, selon la source de l’alerte générée, nous recueillons les connaissances
globales sur le serveur analysé par les pots de miel. Ainsi, nous pouvons évaluer
son proﬁl de sécurité et son évolution au ﬁl du temps. Une fois que cette col-
lecte d’information est eﬀectuée, nous catégorisons les données collectées selon une
catégorisation bien déﬁnie dans cette thèse (information temporel, information sé-
mantique, information contextuelle). Nous proposons aussi un processus de ﬁltrage
qui est composé par trois types de ﬁltres: temporel, sémantique et ﬁltre de conﬁgu-
ration. Ces ﬁltres permettent d’éliminer les données qui sont moins susceptibles de
pouvoir lier l’alerte détectée en local avec les phénomènes de menaces globalement
détectées.
A.2.4 Expérimentations et évaluations
Les expériences menées dans cette partie sont basées sur quatre bases de données de
pots de miel qui sont: SGNET v1 [59], SGNET v2, HARMUR v1 [85] et HARMUR
v2. Les alertes en local ont été collectées par une sonde Snort v2.8 qui a été mise
en place dans notre réseau d’université.
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Source d’information locale
Durant quatre mois de déploiement, notre IDS a généré 183170 alertes qui correspon-
dent à 2499 adresses IP sources uniques. Nous résumons ces alertes dans le tableau
A.1, triées par leur classement (détaillé dans la première colonne du tableau). Dans
la deuxième colonne du tableau, nous donnons le nombre d’alertes générées au cours
de ces quatre mois pour chaque classification. Dans la troisième colonne, nous iden-
tifions le nombre d’adresses IP source unique. Les deux dernières colonnes montrent
le nombre d’alertes filtrées et leur adresse IP source unique.
Table A.1 - Classification des alertes générées par la sonde IDS
déployée en local. Dans ce tableau, nous identifions le nombre total
des adresses IP sources uniques pour toutes les alertes.
Classification Nombred’alertes
Nombre
total
d’adresses
IP source
uniques
Nombre
d’alertes
filtrées
Nombre
d’adresses
IP source
uniques
filtrés
attempted-recon 156338 2198 870 (0,5%) 132 (6%)
attempted-dos 1 1 1 (100%) 1 (100%)
attempted-user 1540 28 1540 (100%) 28 (100%)
misc-activity 839 174 23 (3%) 21 (12%)
trojan-activity 3 3 3 (100%) 3 (100%)
bad-unknown 22573 34 51 (0,2%) 9 (26,5%)
unclassified 1876 61 1876 (100%) 61 (100%)
Global 183170 2499 4364 (2,5%) 255 (10%)
Comme le montre le Tableau A.1, différentes alertes ont été filtrées pour améliorer
les performances du processus d’enrichissement. En effet, le système de détections
d’intrusions Snort est connu par son taux élevé de faux positifs.
Source d’information globale
Les bases de données de pots de miel que nous avons utilisées dans nos expériences
ont été fournies par le projet européen Vis-Sense. Elles comprennent des données
caractérisant les menaces et le profil de sécurité des serveurs web suspicieux.
La base de données HARMUR [85] contient des informations portant sur l’évolution
de la sécurité et de l’information contextuelle associés aux menaces des serveurs
web.
La base de données SGNET [59] contient des informations sur les stratégies de
propagation des logiciels malveillants. En effet, SGNET est un déploiement de pots
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de miel distribués implémentant différents outils, à savoir ScriptGen [60], Argos [61]
et Nepenthes [58].
Résultats expérimentaux
Dans nos expériences, nous avons commencé par la première étape importante qui
est le processus d’enrichissement des alertes. Nous avons considéré l’adresse IP
source comme un critère d’enrichissement. Les expériences menées ont montré que
le nombre des alertes qui peuvent être enrichies est très réduit comme le montre le
Tableau A.2. Nous concluons qu’un grand nombre d’adresses IP source associés aux
Table A.2 - Résultats expérimentaux utilisant les adresses IP
source des alertes. Les résultats montrés dans ce tableau sont basés
sur les adresses IP source des alertes filtrées comme détaillé dans le
Tableau A.1.
Classification
Number of
filtered IP
source ad-
dress
SGNET
v1
SGNET
v2
HARMUR
v1
HARMUR
v2
attempted-
recon 132 – –
1 (SNMP
Agen-
tX/TCP)
–
attempted-
dos 1 – – – –
attempted-
user 28 – – – –
misc-activity 21 – – – –
trojan-
activity 3 – – – –
bad-unknown 9 1 (DNSSPOOF) – –
1 (DNS
SPOOF)
unclassified 61 – –
1 (tcp
portscan)
& 1 (tcp
portscan,tcp
portsweep)
1 (tcp
portscan)
alertes n’ont pas été analysées par des pots de miel. Par conséquent, de nombreuses
alertes ne seront pas enrichies systématiquement. En plus, les données obtenues
des bases de données de pots de miel et liées aux alertes filtrées sont difficile à
explorer dans le contexte de notre approche de corrélation. Nous spécifions dans
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le paragraphe suivant les différentes limitations des pots de miels dans le cadre de
notre approche de corrélation.
A.2.5 Limitations des pots de miel dans l’amélioration de la
corrélation d’alertes
Pendant nos expériences, nous avons identifié quatres limitations majeurs de l’utilisation
des pots de miel dans l’amélioration de la corrélation d’alertes.
A.2.5.1 Limitation de couverture
Environ 95 % des alertes n’avaient pas d’objet dans les bases de données de pots
de miel et correspondant à l’adresse IP source des alertes. Ceci est principalement
dû au niveau d’interaction des pots de miel. Même si les pots de miel sont capable
d’intéragir avec les attaquants selon différentes techniques, ils ne sont pas capables
de couvrir une large variétée d’activités comme l’interaction réelle entre l’attaquant
et le système.
A.2.5.2 Limitation des attributs et références manquants
Dans nos expériences, nous avons remarqué un important nombre d’objects dans les
bases de données expérimentales de pots de miel qui ont des attributs non remplis.
Par conséquent, nous avons mené une étude statistique sur ces bases de données sur
un type d’objet qui est l’objet "menace". Nous observons que 85 % des objets étudiés
avaient des références manquantes. Ceci nous empêche essentiellement d’exécuter
les filtres qui ont été définis dans notre approche.
A.2.5.3 Manque d’un standard pour représenter les données de pots de
miel
Dans nos expériences, nous avons observé que plusieurs attributs ne respectaient pas
une nomenclature standard. Généralement, les attributs sont remplis suivant une
nomenclature générique qui n’apporte pas l’information essentielle pour l’évaluation
qualitative des menaces. Ceci nous empêche d’analyser le lien de causalité qui peut
exister entre les événements détectés à l’échelle global et les alertes générées en local.
A.2.5.4 Limitation de croisement de références
Nous avons remarqué une absence de coopération entre les bases de données ex-
périmentales de pots de miel. Il était difficile de retrouver plus d’information par
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rapport à un objet spécifique dans d’autres base de données. Dans le cadre de notre
approche de corrélation et d’enrichissement d’alertes basée sur les pots de miel, il
est nécessaire que nous profitions d’une vue complète et globale des phénomènes
d’attaques telles que les serveurs infectés, l’évolution de leur sécurité au cours du
temps, la caractérisation et la spécificité des exploits.
Ces limitations présentent un blocage pour mieux explorer l’usage des pots de miels
dans la corrélation d’alertes. Ainsi, nous développons dans la suite une nouvelle
approche de corrélation d’alertes qui est basée sur l’application de la politique de
sécurité.
A.3 Modèle de point d’application de politique (PEP)
Les approches de corrélation d’alertes existantes telles que [50, 71, 73–75, 78–80, 82]
fonctionnent indépendamment des capacités d’application de politique de sécurité
déployées dans le réseau. Cela est dû à l’absence d’un modèle unifié de points
d’application de politique (PEP).
Les PEPs, une fois déployés et configurés, sont responsables d’appliquer des règles
sur des flux réseau spécifiques. Comme les décisions de réponses aux intrusions et les
contre-mesures sont généralement des modifications qui doivent être apportées à la
configuration de ces PEPs, il est important d’identifier facilement le PEP approprié.
Si les alertes sont corrélées en se basant sur les capacités du PEP, leur traitement
serait plus efficace. Dans cette section, nous détaillons le modèle du PEP que nous
proposons. Ce modèle nous permet non seulement d’avoir une bonne compréhen-
sion des capacités d’application de politique déployé dans le réseau mais également
d’apporter d’autres solutions aux problèmes de gestion de politique de sécurité et
de détection d’intrusion.
A.3.1 Définitions et axiomes
Le PEP est une entité de sécurité capable d’appliquer sur les requêtes les décisions
d’application de politique représentées par {d1, d2, d3, . . . , dp} (p est le nombre total
de toutes les décisions qui peuvent être appliquées par le PEP). Le PEP est un
ensemble de règles désignées par r1, r2, . . . , rm (m est le nombre total de règles
appliquées par le PEP). Ci-dessous nous donnons une représentation algébrique
caractérisant un PEP:
PEP = {rj}j∈[1...m]
Comme définie dans les modèles de contrôle d’accès [12, 15, 91–94], une règle de
contrôle d’accès rj s’écrit généralement sous la forme suivante:
rj : {conditions}j −→ {decisions}j ∀j ∈ [1, . . . ,m]
rj : Cj −→ Dj ∀j ∈ [1, . . . ,m]
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En général, Cj est un ensemble de conditions définies sur des attributs que nous ap-
pelons Sélecteurs et noté par {Si}i∈[1...n]. Par conséquent, une règle rj est représentée
par:
rj : ×si
i∈[1...n]
−→ {dk}k∈[1...p] ∀j ∈ [1, . . . ,m]
si (i ∈ [1 . . . n]) sont des instantiations de sélecteurs.
Avant de détailler le modèle proposé, il est important de détailler nos hypothèses de
modélisation:
• Axiome 1 La vérification des faux positifs est en dehors du champ de notre
travail. En plus, nous supposons que toutes les alertes sont écrites selon le
standard IDMEF (Intrusion Detection and Message Exchange Format) décrit
dans [69]
• Axiome 2 Tous les PEP ont un ensemble fini de règles;
• Axiome 3 Nous ignorons la règle par défaut appliquée par le PEP;
• Axiome 4 Les domaines de tous les sélecteurs sont finis;
• Axiome 5 Nous ignorons la décision qui peut être appliquée par le PEP;
• Axiome 6 La définition du domaine de responsabilité d’un PEP doit dépendre
seulement des caractéristiques intrinsèques au PEP.
Nous détaillons ci-dessous la définition du domaine de responsabilité d’un PEP:
Définition 1 Domaine de responsabilité d’un PEP: Chaque PEP, une fois
mis en place dans un réseau, a un domaine d’applicabilité unique que nous appelons
"Domaine de responsabilité". Nous le notons RD(PEP ). Ce domaine est une
abstraction de l’implémentation et de la configuration d’un PEP et de ses capacités
intrinsèques d’application de politique.
RD(PEP ) est un domaine multidimensionnel borné. Dans la définition 2, nous
détaillons ces bornes.
Définition 2 RDinf (PEP ) est l’union de tout les domaines de responsabilité de
règles configurées dans un PEP mis en place.
RDsup(PEP ) considère les contraintes environnementales du PEP mis en place.
L’identification de cette borne requiert une connaissance externe de la visiblité
topologique du PEP. Suivant l’axiome 4, cette borne ne sera bas identifiée dans ce
travail.
A.3.2 Domaine de responsabilité d’un PEP
Notre objectif est d’analyser les différentes possibilités d’une approximation appro-
priée d’un RD(PEP ) sans perdre les spécifités du PEP mis en place. Dans notre
approche, nous considérons que la configuration du PEP déployé dans le réseau est
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le seul point de départ pour toutes les approximations. La conﬁguration du PEP
constitue RDinf (PEP ). En partant de RDinf (PEP ), nous déﬁnissons des opéra-
tions aﬁn de construire les diﬀérentes approximations. Ces opérations prennent en
compte les relations qui existent entre les règles, les caractéristiques des sélecteurs
et leurs propriétés de combinaison.
Les diﬀérentes approximations que nous proposons peuvent être divisées en deux
grandes catégories:
• Approximations basées sur les règles (opérateur rb())
• Approximations basées sur les sélecteurs (opérateur sb())
RDinf 
RDrb_apprx1 RDrb_apprx2 
RDsb_apprx1 
RDsb_apprx2 
rb() 
gen() 
sb() 
Figure A.4 - Vue d’ensemble des approximations du domaine de
responsabilité.
La ﬁgure A.4 représente une vue d’ensemble des diﬀérentes étapes et fonctions
d’approximations.
rb() : U −→ U
RDinf (PEP ) −→ RDrb_apprx1(PEP )
La première approximation basée sur les règles RDrb_apprx1(PEP ) est le résul-
tat de l’application de la fonction rb(RDinf ) sur tout les vecteurs du domaine
RDinf (PEP ).
sb() : U −→ U
RDinf (PEP ) −→ RDsb_apprx1(PEP )
La première approximation basée sur les sélecteurs RDsb_apprx1(PEP ) est le ré-
sultat de l’application de la fonction sb(RDinf ) sur tout les vecteurs du domaine
RDinf (PEP ).
gen() : U −→ U
< sj, j ∈ [1 . . . n] > −→< δkj , j ∈ [1 . . . n] >
La fonction gen() fait référence à un processus de généralisation des valeurs de
sélecteurs suivant une décomposition de leurs domaines. Pour chaque valeur d’un
sélecteur sj, gen() identiﬁes une plage plus générique de la valeur sj.
152
Résumé en français
A.4 Approche de corrélation d’alertes basée sur
l’application de politique
A.4.1 Définition et objectif
Ci-dessous, nous donnons la définition de notre approche de corrélation d’alertes
basée sur le renforcement de politique.
Définition 3 Corrélation d’alertes basée sur l’application de politique :
Étant donné un ensemble d’alertes et un ensemble de PEPs déployés, la corrélation
d’alertes basée sur l’application de politique groupe les alertes qui peuvent être traitées
par un ensemble commun de PEPs.
L’inférence basique utilisée dans cette approche est:
A1 ∈ RD(PEP1) ∧ A2 ∈ RD(PEP1) ∧ . . .
=⇒ Aec = 〈(A1, A2, . . .), PEP1〉
Soient deux alertes , A1 et A2. RDPEP1 est le domaine de reponsabilité du PEP1.
Aec représente le résultat de la corrélation. Elle contient deux composantes. La
première composante inclut l’ensemble des alertes qui sont corrélées. La deuxième
composante inclut le/les PEPs qui sont capable de traiter les alertes corrélées.
A.4.2 Processus de l’approche de corrélation d’alertes basée
sur l’application de politique
Le moteur de corrélation d’alertes basée sur l’application de politique (PEACE) est
représenté dans la figure A.5 et figure A.6. Il est responsable de vérifier quelles
alertes pourraient être traitées par un même ensemble de PEPs.
Les configuration des PEPs mis en place sont récupérées et envoyées au RD-Approximator.
Ce dernier calcul les approximations des domaines de responsabilité des PEP. Ainsi,
PEACE est capable de traiter les alertes reçues {A1, A2, . . . , Ant} où nt est le nombre
d’alertes générées pendant une durée de temps t.
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Figure A.5 - Structure de PEACE avec fonction d’alignement op-
tion 1.
PEACE 
Policy Enforcement-based 
Alert Correlation Engine 
RD(PEP1), 
RD(PEP2), …, 
 RD(PEPm) 
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Figure A.6 - Structure de PEACE avec fonction d’alignement op-
tion 2.
Les fonctions d’alignement montrées dans les deux ﬁgures A.5 et A.6 sont re-
sponsable d’alignement de format des alertes avec les domaines de responsabilité
des PEPs. Dans l’option 1, ces fonctions d’alignement procèdent à l’alignement des
alertes (écrites en IDMEF) avec chaque classe de PEP. Dans l’option 1, ces fonctions
d’alignement procèdent à l’alignement de tous les domaines de responsabilité avec
le même format des alertes qui est IDMEF.
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A.4.3 Applications et intérprétations
Nous avons étudié l’application des approximations de domaine de responsabilité
dans la corrélation d’alertes basée sur l’application de politique dans le cas où un
seul PEP est mis en place et dans le cas où plusieurs PEPs sont déployés. Cette
dernière étude a été menée sur des motifs d’architecture de sécurité. En ce qui
concerne l’étude de cas d’un seul PEP, nous avons pu élaborer le tableau comparatif
A.3 entre les différentes approximations et leurs impact sur la corrélation.
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Table A.3 - Application des approximations de domaine de respon-
sabilité dans PEACE: un tableau comparatif.
RD approximé Fonctiond’approximation impact sur la corrélation d’alertes
RDinf (PEP ) –
Les alertes sont corrélées selon les règles
configurées.
+ L’implémentation des contre mesures
est immédiatement identifiée
− Une vue restreinte du domaine de re-
sponsabilité du PEP
− Les alertes qui pourraient être
traitées par l’introduction de nouvelles
règles sont ignorées
RDrb_apprx1(PEP ) rb(RDinf (PEP ))
Les alertes sont corrélées par une com-
binaison de règles configurées
+ L’implémentation des contre mesures
implique au moins une modification
d’une règle configurée
− Les alertes qui pourraient être
traitées par l’introduction de nouvelles
règles sont ignorées
RDsb_apprx1(PEP ) sb(RDinf (PEP ))
Les alertes sont corrélées selon toutes
les combinaisons possible entre les
valeurs de sélecteurs configurées
− L’implémentation des contre mesures
requiert une analyse profonde des règles
impliquées dans la corrélation d’alertes
− Les alertes qui pourraient être
traitées par l’introduction de nouvelles
règles avec des valeurs différentes de
sélecteurs sont ignorées
RDrb_apprx2(PEP ) gen(RDrb_apprx1(PEP ))
Les alertes sont corrélées selon les règles
configurées généralisées
− L’ensemble des alertes corrélées
dépend de la partition des valeurs con-
figurées des sélecteurs
RDsb_apprx2(PEP ) gen(RDsb_apprx1(PEP ))
Les alertes sont corrélées selon les
valeurs des sélecteurs généralisées
− L’ensemble des alertes corrélées
dépend de la partition des valeurs con-
figurées des sélecteurs
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Dans le cas de plusieurs PEPs mis en place, nous avons conclus que dans un
tel environnement, la corrélation est considérée comme un problème d’optimisation.
En effet, les alertes doivent être corrélées tout en optimisant l’implémentation des
contremesures. Dans ce contexte, la corrélation d’alertes doit minimiser le coût
d’implémentation de la décision de réponse aux intrusions. Ce coût couvre les dif-
férentes modifications qui doivent être apportées à la politique de sécurité. Dans
ce contexte, des travaux de sélections de contremesures ont été développés comme
[106,107]
A.5 Conclusions et travaux futurs
L’objectif de cette thèse est de développer de nouvelles techniques de corrélation
d’alertes pour aider le responsable de la sécurité des systèmes d’information (RSSI)
dans le traitement du nombre très important des alertes générées.
Deux approches de corrélation ont été développées:
• Corrélation d’alertes basée sur les pots de miel (Chapitre 3): Cette approche
exploite les bases de données des pots de miel pour améliorer la corrélation
d’alertes par la connaissance sur l’attaquant. Nos expériences ont été réalisées
en se basant sur quatre bases de données de pots de miel. Elles nous ont permis
d’identifier quatre limitations majeures pour améliorer la corrélation d’alertes;
• Corrélation d’alertes basée sur l’application de politique (Chapitre 5): Cette
approche exploite la connaissance sur les capacités de l’application de politique
pour améliorer la corrélation d’alertes avec la connaissance sur la contremesure.
Nous avons étudié l’application de cette approche sur des environnements à un
seul PEP et à plusieurs PEPs. Cette étude a montré que cette approche joue
un rôle dans l’implémentation de contremesures.
La première approche a contribué à l’identification des limites des pots de miel ex-
istants dans l’amélioration de la corrélation d’alertes.
La deuxième approche a contribué à la démonstration de l’applicabilité des capac-
ités de l’application de politique de sécurité mise en place dans le réseau dans la
corrélation des alertes. Nous avons étudié l’application de l’approche sur des motifs
d’architecture de sécurité qui sont communs à tout les réseaux étendus.
Les travaux futurs se concentreront à considérer d’autres types de PEPs, sélec-
tionner l’approximation du domaine de responsabilité le plus approprié et identifier
l’implémentation des contremesures.
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